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ABSTRACT 
A prominent claim within the literature is that ‘green’ firms are fundamentally more 
resilient to financial, environmental and social shocks, relative to firms that take no 
environmental action.  To test this, this study compared the financial performance 
of firms in the UK FTSE4good, and similar firms outside the FTSE4Good through 
selected financial, environmental and social shocks  
Firstly the FTSE4Good indices were compared to the performance of the FTSE All-
Share through several shocks. The results of which indicated through average returns, 
ranking performance and descriptive statistics that the FTSE4good Benchmark did not 
provide resilience in excess of the FTSE All-Share. The lack of significance was 
thought to be the consequence of diversification caused by the heterogeneity of each 
firm’s core business. The FTSE4good UK 50 showed neither and advantage nor 
disadvantage in resilience performance relative to the FTSE All-Share but the higher 
moments in the distribution of the returns (skewness and kurtosis) shows evidence of 
decreased risk in producing extreme negative returns. Furthermore, the discrepancies 
were also thought to be a consequence of the level at which FTSE4good include firms 
in the index series. 
To account for this discrepancy, FTSE4good’s ESG ratings were used to identify the 
best in class firms, eliminating middle ground performance. Only firms classified 
according to social performance showed conclusive evidence of an advantage for 
investors who could reduce their risk profile by selecting only firms with relatively high 
social responsibility ratings.  
The results show that the assumption that green firms are more resilient to shocks is 
too imprecise, at least when analysed in terms of financial performance across the 
period covered by this study. To become a more effective indicator of environmental, 
social and governance performance the FTSE4good must demand higher levels of 
performance from constituent firms and punish any transgressions more severely.   
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1 Introduction 
Environmental and social issues are prominent topics within the global political and 
economic domain. Consequently a number of solutions have emerged under the 
banner of a green economy. The main obstacle however is the perceived need to 
create wealth whilst also managing to protect the environment and increase social 
equality. Therefore, this study aims to “determine whether financial markets and 
constituent firms, based on ESG (Environmental, Social, Corporate Governance) 
performance, are more resilient to associated shock events than their base universe”. 
To achieve this aim a series of questions must be answered. What metrics are 
appropriate for measuring business resilience? What methods are most appropriate for 
testing whether “green” firms are resilient during shock events? Does the market value 
FTSE4good performance across three asset classes during shocks? Does ethical and 
green production pay? 
Initially this research began with the open statement, “the future of the green economy” 
and subsequently a systematic review was conducted into all meanings of the term 
green economy (See Appendix A & B). From this review the issues that the green 
economy aimed to contend with were abundantly clear but the obstacles that prevent 
widespread acknowledgement and adoption where it’s greatest challenge. Emerging 
from this review was the importance of finance in driving the business-as-usual 
economy and it would therefore be the source of any major correction. From a research 
planning perspective, this research followed a deductive approach. However, the 
contemporary nature of this topic meant that research was in some cases abundant, 
such as with event study methodology and in others, research was very thin, such as 
within ethical markets. This reinforced the novelty aspect of the study but meant that 
progress was initially bound by inductive reasoning to formulate the research aim, 
questions and methodology. Even once firm objectives were set, results led to new 
questions on two occasions to confirm the aims of the study. Therefore, overall the 
study achieved a deductive form but only by means of inductive reasoning. The 
structure of the methodology is presented in Chapter 4.2. 
To provide a thematic link to the research aim and subsequent questions, the following 
chapter provides a rationale of why society is interested in a green economy and 
ethical indices, such as FTSE4good, followed by what part financial markets and 
investments play in the proliferation of externalities and subsequent development of 
this new economic approach.  
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1.1 Background to study: The green economy 
Measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the twentieth century witnessed an 
unprecedented increase in living standards within advanced and emerging economies, 
(Mathews, 2011). A major concern relating to economic growth is the environmental 
degradation that has occurred to achieve this. There is a strong correlation between 
economic progress and resource use: where, as population increases and becomes 
wealthier, demand for basic materials, such as oil and water, increases (Pawlak, 2008). 
Consequently, risks are being taken to satisfy global demand at the expense of the 
environment and social welfare (Walsh, 2012). Because of the scale of recent 
consumption, a number of resources are projected to become depleted within an 
economically foreseeable timeframe (UNEP, 2011a). As more accessible deposits 
become depleted attention shifts to less accessible resources with relatively high 
extraction costs (Morley and Eatherley, 2008). This brings new risks; oil extraction now 
takes place in environmentally sensitive areas such as the deep and arctic seas 
(Walsh, 2012); and the extraction of gas through the process of “fracking” has caused 
environmental concern (Economist, 2011; Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014).    
Furthermore, economic growth has caused an increase in externalities, such as air and 
water pollution (Jackson, 2009). Such effects cause significant damage to the natural 
environment. The effects of externalities also impact on social welfare and human 
development, causing long term and widespread social inequality (Stern, 2007). For 
example, in China, as a result of industrialisation, only 1% of residents breathe air that 
is considered safe by European Union (EU) standards (Assadourian, 2008). Therefore, 
many negative impacts on the environment and human welfare are a direct result of 
economic activity, the costs of which are unlikely to be paid at source (Stern, 2007). 
Internalising externalities and bringing resource use within sustainable bounds is an 
increasingly important political goal (OECD, 2011; HM Government, 2011a). A new 
economic paradigm known as “The Green Economy” captures this aspiration. The idea 
of a green economy has gathered momentum since the financial crisis of 2008, which 
provided an opportunity to re-think economic growth and make it more sustainable (Li 
and Jiang, 2012). Economic reform has been further galvanised by high energy and 
resource prices, the extraction of which has caused further externalities. For example, 
the pollution caused by the processing of rare earth minerals to capitalise on 
unprecedented high prices (Kara et al., 2010).  
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The UK government has clearly stated that the green economy is a system that is 
distinct from, rather than a part of, the current economy (HM Government, 2011a). The 
green economy agenda aims to correct many of the market, economic and social 
failures that exist within the UK. Among the most pressing issues are energy 
dependence, inequality between social classes, quality of the natural environment and 
the potential for new markets that might increase economic growth and social inclusion 
(Jackson, 2009; HM Government, 2011a; HM Government, 2011b; HM Government, 
2011c).  
However, there is a lack of theoretical and practical agreement on what constitutes a 
green economy, and as such the transitional requirements are unclear. Without a 
consensus it is difficult to imagine whether a green economy is feasible and whether it 
could provide all the desired benefits. The United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social affairs addressed the issues around defining the green economy in a publication 
that sought to understand all meanings within the literature (UNDESA, 2012). The 
literature implies that the green economy is a progressive system that reconciles the 
protection of the environment and development of society with economic growth 
(Gurtowski, 2011; Porfir'ev, 2012) (See Appendices A & B). The UNDESA (2012) 
publication concluded with the following definition that fits within the context of this 
study; the green economy is “one that results in improved human well-being and social 
equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. It is 
low carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive. In a green economy, growth in 
income and employment should be driven by public and private investments that 
reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and 
prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services” (UNDESA, 2012). 
 
1.1.1 Resilience and the green economy 
Green economy principles and the characteristics outlined within the definition, are 
thought to benefit firms and economies, making them relatively more resilient to 
economic shocks such as the economic crisis of 2007-09 (Jackson, 2009; OECD, 
2011; HM Government, 2011a; European Commission, 2013; The Danish 92 Group 
Forum for Sustainable Development, 2012; Chousa and Castro, 2011; Fiksel, 2006). 
The UK government believes a UK green economy will be relatively more efficient than 
the business-as-usual economy, thus decreasing exposure to costly and riskier inputs 
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(HM Government, 2011a). The green economy is also thought to open opportunities for 
new markets that will raise employment and, therefore, social inclusion (Environmental 
Audit Committee, 2012). The principles associated with a green economy are 
considered complimentary to resilience performance (Chousa and Castro, 2011). 
Resilience is a frequently cited advantage of a green economy. Countries and 
businesses that pursue green growth will develop resilience to shock events, which will 
give them a competitive advantage over countries and firms who do not (HM 
Government, 2011b; Aldersgate Group, 2011; UNEP, 2011b). The importance of 
business resilience has increased, particularly after recent events in the global 
economy that have manifested in recessionary shocks to volatile oil and energy prices; 
the prediction of which is in most cases impossible (Simmie and Martin, 2010; Bowen 
and Fankhauser, 2011; Anand et al., 2013; Ortas et al., 2013). There exists two types 
of shock; most events fall into a category of “common shocks” that are thought of as 
business cycles that occur periodically such as oil price surges and talent shortages 
(Duval and Vogel, 2008). Extraordinary shocks or “black swan” events are those that 
are unfamiliar and largely unforeseen, such as the first oil shock of 1973 that caused a 
structural trend break in the output time series (Fukuda, 2012; Hutchins, 2012). These 
shocks have severely tested the resilience of most businesses, resulting in many 
failures (Avery and Bergsteiner, 2011).  
 
1.2 The role of financial markets 
1.2.1 Finance, the problem and solution 
The allocation of financial capital through markets and investments assumes some 
responsibility as a significant catalyst of social and environmental externalities due to 
the inextricable link between economic growth and externalities (Jackson, 2009; UNEP, 
2011b; Shieh et al., 2014). The business cycle, which contributes to economic growth, 
relies on financial capital from investments and consumer spending (Bezemer, 2014). 
This flow of capital enables firms to invest in their business, a behavioural pattern that 
in many cases generates externalities (Antoci et al., 2014). In rare cases the 
externalities develop into a shock that changes the physical and economic environment 
that firms must continue to operate within (Jackson, 2009; Bezemer, 2014). This 
change is either detrimental or beneficial to the market players depending on the 
characteristics’ of their business and whether or not this reflects what is required to be 
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resilient (Chousa and Castro, 2011). The following illustration (Figure 1.1) is an 
example of this cycle with the inclusion of the intended benefits of the green economy 
and the resilience it allegedly bestows (HM Government, 2011b; Aldersgate Group, 
2011; UNEP, 2011b). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The economic and financial cycle, its negative effects and the corrective 
benefits of green investment (Source: adapted from Jackson (2009) by Author) 
 
The cycle presented in Figure 1.1 begins with the objective to broadly increase 
productivity within the economy. To fuel this demand, products are created to 
encourage the flow of financial capital in the form of credit and investments. This 
capital is broadly focused into industrialised activities that for example cause pollution 
from growing levels of manufacturing; polluting air and water tables due to increased 
demand for energy. Finally, if these demands continue to grow, then credit continues to 
flow into the cycle, feeding the complex system of externalities that also risk system 
failure in the form of shocks. Whilst this model is crude, as it excludes government and 
not-for-profit organisations, its purpose highlights the connection between finance, non-
socially responsible investments and externalities. Therefore, the implications of 
adopting green economy principles are shown on the outer part of Figure 1.1 in green. 
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Firms aim to attract investment by demonstrating reduced occurrence of externalities 
through environmental and social initiatives. These initiatives reduce the likely hood of 
related shocks, or at least the magnitude of effects, therefore providing resilience to the 
adopter and stakeholders such as investors (Chousa and Castro, 2011; Fiksel, 2006). 
Firms are then better placed to attract investment due to the increased demand for 
ESG values. Consequently, if enough firms adopt these principles, a lasting positive 
change should be apparent on the entire physical and economic environment. This 
would then reduce the risk of externalities and shocks such as the financial crisis, 
climate change and supply chain transgressions (Fiksel, 2003; FTSE, 2011). 
Therefore, avoiding and reducing further harms requires an equally substantial amount 
of financial capital (Jackson, 2009). Indications are that the finance required to drive 
the green economy along with the desired benefits will largely come from private sector 
investments (UNEP, 2011b; Jackson, 2011). Consequently, the assets under 
management that incorporate Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) 
into investment decisions have increased globally from $2.6trillion in 2002 to $3.6trillion 
in 2006 and $10.1trillion in 2010 (FTSE, 2011). This highlights the growth in ethical 
investment and its importance in not only protecting the environment and society but as 
a fundamental aspect of the investment and finance domain (Schmidt, 2010). Despite 
this level of growth, Ernst & Young (2010) highlight that the UK needs to reduce a £370 
billion gap in low-carbon investment in energy infrastructure, renewable sources and 
government backed initiatives to increase adoption of new technologies; it is not clear if 
this figure includes R&D.  
These investments are provided in return for income in the form of dividends, which 
means green business must perform well relative to other businesses to attract 
investors (Jackson, 2009). Therefore, highlighting the advantages that green 
investments bring through increased resilience could serve to raise awareness of such 
investments, thus closing the gap in funding and driving the green economy and its 
associated benefits. Green or socially responsible investments (SRI) reflect the 
corporate social performance of a firm that is often broken down into components, 
namely environmental, social, and corporate governance. Therefore, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is a lagging indicator of businesses practices that is promoted or 
imposed by an institution, and ESG or corporate social performance (CSP) is a leading 
indicator that investment decisions are based upon (Lu et al., 2014). Furthermore, CSR 
is considered a multi-dimensional construct that despite its name contends with 
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ecological, social and economic systems (Sheehy, 2014). Despite this interest in 
protection and enhancement, a comparison of socially responsible investment (SRI) 
and non-SRI fund managers beliefs’ and attitudes to SRI points to significant evidence 
that investment decisions are primarily based on financial returns rather than 
environmental and social concerns. Respondents were rated on a seven point scale 
according to their attitudes towards a range of values within the investment domain; for 
example: wealth and success, or environmental protection and social justice (Jansson 
and Biel, 2014). Therefore, an equitable financial return must be realised for SRI/ESG 
based investments to be accepted within the market place. 
To attract funding, markets must be shaped in a way that investors can differentiate 
between green and less green investments. Globally a range of sustainability indices 
have been developed to guide investors to more socially responsible investments 
(World Federation of Exchanges, 2009); and among the most recognised is the 
FTSE4good Indices (FTSE, 2010b), which has been running since 2001. The 
FTSE4good index aligns with the principles of the green economy and the definition 
proposed by UNDESA (2012) (FTSE, 2011). If green investments are more resilient 
then this should be apparent in the financial performance of sustainability indices, 
otherwise referred to as the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
corporate financial performance (CSR-CFP) (Cavaco and Crifo, 2014) 
 
1.2.2 Identified area of research 
There are two major research needs identified by the literature.  Whilst not explicitly 
requested, a lack of evidence infers the need to test whether a green economy will 
increase business resilience at the firm level and for an investor (HM Government, 
2011a; Aldersgate Group, 2011; UNEP, 2011b). Secondly, Ortas et al. (2013) highlight 
the need to test the relative advantages of socially responsible investment (SRI) based 
portfolios during times of crisis. Answers to these questions have the potential to 
highlight the effectiveness of ESG markets and consequently what is needed to make 
them more effective and ultimately attractive for investment. 
Evidence of such benefits would serve to drive the green economy agenda forward and 
close the gap in green funding (Ernst & Young, 2010). Therefore, this study will attempt 
to fill this research gap by determining whether green actions make firms more resilient 
and whether benefits are also transferred to the investor. To focus issues, this study 
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will look at practices within the UK because HM Government (2011b) have expressed a 
specific interest in the green economy and resilience, and despite this need, no 
research linking financial performance with Environmental, Social and Corporate 
Governance (ESG) performance exists in the UK. A positive relationship between ESG 
performance and financial performance (the CSP and CFP link) would potentially 
motivate the reallocation of capital to firms that demonstrate these relatively higher 
green credentials. This in-turn will also motivate firms to achieve higher Environmental, 
Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) standards so that they can attract investment 
and sell products or services more effectively (Jackson, 2009). 
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2 Literature review 
The introduction initially framed the issues that are present within the current business-
as-usual economy, linking the theories and the emerging green paradigm that aims to 
correct these market failures. This chapter therefore examines the literature in search 
of research that supports these ideas of a connection between corporate social 
responsibility and corporate financial performance during a shock event. This 
potentially reinforces the claims of resilience in the model for a green economy. In 
subsequent chapters, the system used to test these assumptions (FTSE4good) and the 
findings are used to scrutinise the ESG/SRI model. 
 
2.1 Resilience and the green economy 
2.1.1 The meaning of resilience 
The concept of resilience has many meanings as it is applied to multiple disciplines and 
risks. From a “management” perspective, Hyslop (2013) uses the term “hardened 
institutions” to refer to business resilience as firms are able to withstand shocks without 
sustaining damage. Duval and Vogel (2008 p.203) add to this by stating that “economic 
resilience may be loosely defined as the ability to maintain output close to potential in 
the aftermath of a shock”. These definitions all point to the organisational resilience 
definition from McDonald (2006 p.157) that highlights the “ability to adapt to 
environmental requirements while managing its variability”.  Therefore, the common 
denominator is that a resilient firm will function effectively and profit in the face of a 
changing operative climate that would otherwise impact on its business had it not 
adopted certain principles and procedures. 
Resilience can be measured by the extent to which a firm can capitalise on 
opportunities, maintaining or even increasing output (Goffin et al., 2013), measured by 
performance metrics that include sales, production levels and profits (Sheffi and Rice, 
2005). 
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Therefore, a resilient firm would organise to: 
 Protect its core business operations and resources required to function;  
 Gain a competitive advantage through pre-emptive strategies; and  
 Protect stakeholder values by overcoming wider risks and vulnerabilities (BRCCI, 
2011).  
Sheffi and Rice (2005) developed a model (Figure 2.1) that shows the stages that face 
a firm during a disruptive event. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The resilience triangle: the eight stages of a disruptive event and its impact 
on firm performance (Source: adapted from Sheffi and Rice (2005) by Author). 
 
Resilience can be inherent within a firm and/or acquired (adaptive). Inherent resilience 
refers to the existing ability to deal with a crisis or shock event through normal 
operative activity. Adaptive resilience refers to a firm’s ability to adapt to its changing 
environment through extra effort and novelty created by pre-emptive strategies 
(Hutchins, 2012; Rose, 2009). Several studies have focused on the characteristics of 
resilient firms and one study by Ortas et al., (2013) who investigate whether the 
Spanish FTSE4good fosters adaptive resilience for investors. Another study by 
Stephenson (2010) found that organisational size and resilience performance are 
positively correlated. The Harvard Business Review (2012)  found that family run firms 
outperform publicly owned firms during times of recession. Family firms focus on 
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resilience more than performance whereas publicly owned or non-family owned firms 
focus on performance and, therefore, perform better during periods of economic 
expansion but poorer during times of economic difficulty, a finding supported by Lampel 
et al. (2014). An example of a non-family run company that adopts so called family run 
principles of resilience security is Nestle who again only perform better than 
competitors during periods of economic downturn (Harvard Business Review, 2012). 
Ortas et al (2013) looked at the resilience of the Spanish FTSE4good index, during the 
economic crisis, using multivariate techniques. They found that the FTSE4good index, 
although limited to one country, showed significant signs of resilience during the 
financial crisis by outperforming its base-universe of firms, the IBEX35. Conversely, an 
event study of German firms showed a negative effect on stock value relating to 
inclusion in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), an index of companies that 
demonstrate class leading ESG performance (Oberndorfer et al., 2013). Therefore, the 
characteristics of a firm can determine resilience performance before any strategy has 
been employed. 
 
2.1.2 Linking resilience with corporate social responsibility 
As noted in Chapter 1.1, UNEP and other organisations claim that the green economy 
will be inherently resilient and able to withstand shocks and even turn them into 
opportunities (HM Government, 2011a; HM Government, 2011b; UNEP, 2011b). Other 
organisations state the importance of building resilience is to protect vital aspects of the 
economy such as food supply through adaptive capacity (OECD, 2011; European 
Commission, 2010). The overall assumption is that if firms and economies become 
progressively sustainable in the face of economic, natural and man-made shocks, then 
productivity will also increase (Chousa and Castro, 2011). In turn resilience is also 
thought to foster competitiveness as collectively these benefits provide a compelling 
business case (Stephenson, 2010).  
All firms and the industry they operate within carry inherent risks. Therefore they 
attempt to avoid exposure to economic and environmental risks by proactively 
enhancing their “business resilience” (Avery and Bergsteiner, 2011). An example of 
inherent resilience from a green economy perspective is that of Kenco (2013), who 
have established significant partnerships with coffee growers under the Rainforest 
Alliance (2013) programme, which promotes sustainable and ethical methods of 
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farming while securing a direct supply of product at the local level. This initiative has 
social, economic and environmental benefits throughout the supply-chain, bringing 
resilience to shocks in the supply of Kenco’s coffee and ultimately revenue (Hutchins, 
2012). An example of adaptive resilience comes from Rio Tinto (2012) who state that 
there are a range of potential incidents that continually threaten their business, and to 
combat this they have adopted an adaptive approach under their Business Resilience 
Recovery Programme (BRRP) that recognises the presence of risk (plan); assess the 
level of risk and implements plans (execute); establish a tangible means to mitigate 
and respond (check); and review the programme for weakness. It is evident that Rio 
Tinto’s (2012) BRRP is geared to the context of their business and any event that may 
impact upon it. These are examples of behavioural changes that green markets aim to 
foster for effective resilience performance through normal inherent activity and pre-
emptive adaptive capacity (UNDESA, 2012). 
Limited research exists linking environmental, social and governance performance with 
resilience performance. Lampel et al. (2014) found a direct relationship between 
governance and business performance; adding that employee involvement (that 
constitutes social performance) is necessary to develop higher levels of organisational 
resilience. Furthermore, Chousa and Castro (2011) identify corporate social 
responsibility and resilience as being complimentary tools that propagate the constant 
process of business model renewal in order that firms remain competitive beyond their 
products and services. Due to these synergies and benefits, CSR is thought to be a 
highly resilient concept in itself (Harwood et al., 2011). Porter and Kramer (2006b) 
highlight that CSR should not be viewed as a costly burden but a source of innovation 
and opportunity that provides a competitive advantage. This implied relationship 
between CSR and CFP is the primary driver behind this thesis. 
The literature clearly intimates that firms and investors have a significant interest in 
swift recovery following a shock event (Anand et al., 2013; Rose, 2004). This is 
achieved in part through the inherent and adaptive resilience concepts (Rose, 2009). 
Both concepts are central to this study with the capacity for ESG based indices, 
portfolios and firms to resist shocks and return to normality as quickly as possible 
through the creation of novelty and learning (Bhamra et al., 2011). Does the market 
place recognise this capacity?  
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2.2 Does ethical and green production pay?: Evidence of resilience from 
ethical investments 
Chapter 1.2 highlights the importance of financial markets, and the flow of invested 
capital in correcting market failures and driving the green economy. To address the 
situation and influence society and businesses, ethical financial markets have been 
developed. These relatively new markets are designed to give investors a choice of 
engaging their financial capital in securities with quantifiable environmental, social, and 
governance performance (Curran and Moran, 2007). Green indices focus on providing 
value for investors but also help promote and drive organisations to perform better 
within ESG based practices (Collison et al., 2008; Perez, 2011). Globally, an extensive 
range of indices have been released to aid in this respect (World Federation of 
Exchanges, 2009) with the most established being the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(McGraw-Hill, 2013) and the FTSE4good index series (FTSE, 2010b). It has been 
suggested that the existence of these new markets influences investors in such a way 
as to indirectly impact on firm capital costs (Perez, 2011). Therefore, exclusion is 
costly, particularly if competitors are included. Inclusion within ESG based indices and 
mutual funds follow a screening process that varies across administrative organisations 
(DJSI, FTSE4good, Domini, MSCI); initially the employment of negative screening 
eliminates firms from, for example, the tobacco and weapons industry. Screens are 
then employed to varying degrees of strictness and frequency in the areas of 
environmental, social or corporate governance performance, and sometimes within all 
areas (Barnett and Salomon, 2006). The literature indicates, however, that making 
economic returns on green investments is a significant challenge due to the perceived 
cost of adhering to environmental and social standards (Chong et al., 2006; Yang and 
Yao, 2012). 
Fowler and Hope (2007) state that the performance of ESG securities is largely a 
consequence of diversification and the impact screening strategies have on 
performance. Barnett and Salomon (2006) support this claim with the conclusion; 
strategies that employ a relatively high number of social screens eliminate relatively 
lower performing securities. This enhances the overall performance of an index or fund.  
Furthermore, they found that strategies that utilised relatively few social screens 
improved financial performance through increased diversification. Therefore, the 
strategies that utilize an approach between the high and low intensity screening 
strategies underperform in comparison. This research was focused on the screening 
practices of DJSI. 
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During normal times of trading and considering all types of ethical securities,  research 
suggests that performance variations compared with conventional assets are 
inconsistent and largely statistically non-significant (Oberndorfer et al., 2013; Collison 
et al., 2008; Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Chong et al., 2006; Nofsinger and Varma, 
2014). Callan and Thomas (2009) found a positive relationship between CSR and 
financial performance but the choice of sampling interval was not disclosed despite 
being critical to statistical power (MacKinlay, 1997). Conversely, Oberndorfer et al. 
(2013) found in an event study of the relationship between inclusion in the DJSI and 
financial performance of German firms that a strong negative relationship exists. 
However, this study uses relatively old data between 1999 and 2002. Therefore, whilst 
there is a plethora of research into the ethical investment domain, inconsistencies are 
thought to be the consequence of research method variations and the strategies used 
to screen firms (Fowler and Hope, 2007). Inconsistencies may also be a consequence 
of the range of products offered by each administrative organisation, such as 
FTSE4good or DJSI.  
For example Ortas et al. (2013) and Belghitar et al. (2014) both use the FTSE4good 
but their methodologies differ and their findings are contradictory. Ortas et al. (2013) 
found that markets viewed the Spanish FTSE4good-Ibex as a less risky option in 
comparison to the Ibex-35 using multivariate techniques; an approach that Belghitar et 
al. (2014) states misses vital moments in the distributions of the assets returns, namely 
skewness and kurtosis, statistics that have been proven to be fundamental to 
investment decisions. Belghitar et al. (2014) found that investment in the FTSE4good 
UK 50 carries a financial penalty. A conclusion that was made using the higher 
moments of index returns distributions, skewness and kurtosis. Furthermore, the 
majority of research is focused on mutual funds (Fowler and Hope, 2007), and the 
strategies used to formulate portfolios differ drastically according to the subjective view 
of the researcher and the available service of the index provider (FTSE4good).  
The UK FTSE4good index series consists of two indices that are constructed on a bi-
annual basis using ratings of every FTSE All-Share firm across the three E, S and G 
pillars. Within each rating category are sub-ratings that provide greater detail on each 
firm’s performance. The performance across the three ESG (and sub categories) pillars 
equates to an absolute score (FTSE, 2013a). The evidence and consequential gap in 
the knowledge implies that using FTSE4good offers an opportunity to test for the 
presence of resilience within the market place between FTSE4good constituents and 
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non-constituents; relative to ESG performance; eliminating the subjectivity of CSR 
performance, using up to date data, and specifying the model accurately by using daily 
asset price data 
 
2.3 FTSE4good index series 
The FTSE4good index series comprise a range of regionally focused indices that cover 
the UK, USA, European and Global markets along with a number of benchmark only 
indices in Australia, Spain and Japan (FTSE, 2013b). These indices are linked to a 
base universe. For example the FTSE All Share Index is the base universe for the 
FTSE4good UK index series. All firms in the base universe, including those already in 
FTSE4good, are assessed by FTSE according to their predefined ESG criteria. 
Depending on the assessment result, firms are included in or excluded from the 
FTSE4good index series until the following assessment. FTSE calculates two types of 
index, a benchmark and tradable index. The FTSE4good Benchmark Index 
(FT4GBUK) is calculated to include all constituents from the base universe that meet 
the ESG inclusion criteria. The tradable FTSE4good UK 50 index (FT4UK50) is a 
published instrument that consists of the best performing firms included in the 
benchmark index but based on the same metrics used to assess performance in their 
base universe, namely market capitalisation and, therefore, may not include the best 
performing ESG firms from the all-inclusive benchmark population (FTSE, 2010b; 
FTSE, 2013a; FTSE, 2013b). FTSE4good publish the bi-annual ratings for all firms 
regardless of inclusion and exclusion. This data-set is central to this study. 
 
2.3.1 FTSE4good history and performance 
The FTSE4good Index Series was introduced in 2001 by FTSE with the aim of 
providing a resource for investors to measure the effectiveness of their investments 
against a recognised ESG benchmark, directing financial resources to firms and 
industry sectors that indicate social, economic and environmental performance and 
finally to motivate business to employ socially and environmentally responsible 
operative systems (FTSE, 2013a). The FTSE4good business model is designed to 
progressively challenge companies to improve their operational practices. Since launch 
the inclusion criteria have been revised several times, causing a number of 
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controversial casualties (FTSE, 2011). For example, Tesco were excluded from the 
index because of poor environmental policy. However, given that their main competitor, 
Sainsbury’s was included, they were determined to work with FTSE to achieve the 
targets required for inclusion. This was granted a year later in 2002. Since its launch, 
the UK index series has deleted 288 firms, added 793, with over 1000 engagements 
regarding the addition of new inclusion and exclusion criteria. Of the firms that have not 
met the inclusion criteria, FTSE has had a 60% success rate for successfully 
supporting companies in meeting their inclusion criteria (FTSE, 2011).  
The vast majority of literature investigating the link between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance (CFP) focuses on portfolios 
constructed on the subjective perception of corporate social performance (CSP), or 
other sustainability indices such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) (Lu et 
al., 2014). Therefore, specific research into the performance of FTSE4good is sparse 
and largely inconsistent, as some find they perform at least as good as conventional 
investments (Ortas et al., 2013; Curran and Moran, 2007; Collison et al., 2008; 
Brzeszczynski and McIntosh, 2013); another study by Nofsinger and Varma (2014) 
found that while not significant, conventional mutual funds outperformed socially 
responsible funds by 0.67-0.95%. However, during crisis periods, socially responsible 
funds outperformed their conventional counterparts by 1.61-1.7%. The inconsistencies 
may reflect the challenges of testing the wide range of products that FTSE4good offer. 
Most evidence seems to indicate that investment in ESG based indices perform as well 
as investment in normal indices, but rarely better (UNEPFI, 2007). Brzeszczynski and 
McIntosh (2013) found that returns from a portfolio composed of “Global-100” 
(Corporate Knights, 2013) stocks exceeded those of the FTSE4good and FTSE100 
indices. Curran and Moran (2007) focused on events that influence firm value and this 
was centred on the impact of positive and negative announcements and public 
endorsement. This again showed no significant relationship between the two variables 
and FTSE4good firm value.  
Most previous studies were conducted pre-FTSE4good and some more recent using 
old FTSE4good data. Furthermore, research in this area and within the UK is thin, 
particularly relating to FTSE4good. This is partly due to the restricted availability of 
FTSE4good’s ratings data and access to financial markets prices because of the high 
subscription cost. However, FTSE4good have made this data available solely for use 
by the author in the current study. The lack of research and the availability of this vast 
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dataset provide a clear opportunity to test the performance of FTSE4good firm ratings 
history against the very shocks it is designed to mitigate. This research will 
consequently use FTSE4good as a proxy to green economic performance and identify 
if the proposed resilient benefits are actually present within constituent firms and 
perceived by the market. 
 
2.3.2 FTSE4good inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Central to the aim of this research is to detect the impact of resilience, as expressed 
through movements in the FTSE4good indices.  All companies that are included in the 
FTSE All-Share Index are subject to evaluation according to the FTSE4good rating 
framework that is based on performance within ESG (Environment, Social and 
Governance) criteria (FTSE & EIRIS, 2011). Inclusion in the index series is determined 
by an independent committee of experts that meet bi-annually to review the results of 
the assessment (FTSE4Good, 2012). Initially negative screening automatically 
excludes those companies whose business interests are primarily focused on 
producing tobacco, connected to the manufacturing of weapon systems, mining of 
uranium, and nuclear power.  
Those firms that remain eligible are voluntarily scrutinised through their annual reports, 
websites, publicly available material and questionnaires. FTSE4good includes firms 
based on their scores during the assessment and only includes those that surpass an 
absolute score threshold (Perez, 2011). The criteria by which firms are assessed have 
evolved over time according to developments within corporate responsibility and policy; 
making inclusion progressively more difficult. This is reflected by the periodic 
strengthening of environmental and human rights criteria as well as the introduction of 
new standards (FTSE, 2010a). Each ESG criteria has two subcategories within which 
firms are assessed and scored (FTSE, 2010a). 
 
19 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
 
Figure 2.2. Schematic of the ESG assessment for each firm within the FTSE All-Share 
 
The assessment aids investors in understanding the performance of firms’ ESG 
practices as firms are rated from 0 to 5 within each area of assessment. 0 denotes no 
record of achievement up to the highest possible score of 5. 
2.3.2.1 Environmental criteria 
The first area assessed is the environment with the sub-categories environmental 
management, and climate change where firms are classified as high, medium or low 
impact according to their environmental footprint. The higher the impact, the more 
rigorous the inclusion criteria are. The classification process has particular nuances in 
that firms, such as those in financial services, might appear to be low impact but 
significant holdings or loan provision within certain sectors will impact on their 
classification. To be included in the FTSE4good all classified firms must meet a 
standard referred to as “good practice”, which is represented by a score of 3. To score 
higher than 3, firms must meet additional standards referred to as “best practice”. For 
example, with environmental management criteria, the classified firms are assessed on 
their 1) public policy, 2) management systems such as ISO14001 (ISO, 2014), and 3) 
public reporting. Therefore, the scoring framework is particular to the classification of 
the firm (high, medium or low). See the following table for details of the scoring 
framework. 
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Table 2.1. The environmental management scoring framework for inclusion in 
FTSE4good indices (FTSE & EIRIS, 2011) 
  Risk Level 3 - High Risk Level 2 - Medium Risk Level 1 - Low 
5 
Meets Best Practice for all Meets Best Practice for all 
Meets Best Practice for 
all 
• Policy • Policy • Policy 
• Management Systems • Management Systems • Management Systems 
• Reporting • Reporting • Reporting 
4 
Meets two at Best Practice and one at 
Good Practice 
Meets two at Best Practice 
and one at Good Practice 
Meets one at Best 
Practice and one at Good 
Practice 
• Policy • Policy • Policy 
• Management Systems • Management Systems • Management Systems 
• Reporting • Reporting 
 
3 
Meets Good Practice for all Meets Good Practice for all Meets at Good Practice 
• Policy • Policy • Policy 
• Management Systems • Management Systems   
• Reporting     
2 
Meets one at Good Practice 
Meets at least one underlying 
indicator 
Does not meet any 
underlying indicator 
• Policy 
• Management Systems 
• Reporting 
1 Meets at least one underlying indicator N/A N/A 
0 
Does not meet any underlying 
indicator 
Does not meet any underlying 
indicator 
N/A 
 
Table 2.1 shows that firms classified as high risk level 3 have more requirements to 
achieve the same score as firms of a lower classification. Each assessment criterion 
follows a similar framework with minor differences that suit the challenges in question.  
The next area of interest within the environmental criteria assessment is the level of 
risk associated with their current greenhouse gas emissions. Again, firms are 
organised into a risk classification and assessed accordingly. Assessments within the 
two environmental criteria are centred on strategies and targets for improving impacts 
related to their business activities. For example, within the climate change requirement 
for management and strategy, firms are required to make publicly available the 
quantifiable strategic goal for the reduction of their GHG emissions. This requirement 
follows a consistent theme across all other areas of assessment, namely a quantifiable 
measure of the firms’ actual strategic activities in mitigating the issues in question.   
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2.3.2.2 Social criteria 
Social responsibility is the second area of interest within the ESG assessment with 
sub-categories, human and labour rights, and supply chain labour standards. Firms are 
again initially assessed for risk based on their business activities and country of 
operation. FTSE4good have identified a list of countries that are of primary concern 
and highlight that the resource sector carries the highest risk of human rights abuse. 
Therefore, risk is classified in this regard, with level 3 or high risk being all resource 
based firms, and level 2 or medium risk being firms with significant operative 
involvement in the list of countries of concern. All others are placed in level 1 or low 
risk. The subsequent scoring is based again on areas pertaining to this theme such as 
equal opportunities, employee relations and scoring is more difficult or easier 
depending on the level of risk. 
Connected to the issue of human rights is that of supply chain labour standards where 
firms are classified and assessed according to 1) the products they sell, 2) where they 
are sourced from, and 3) over-exposure threshold. High risk, level 3 firms fit into all 
three categories and include agricultural goods such as sugar, tea, and coffee; as well 
as consumer goods that include clothing and electronics. To be classified as medium 
risk a firm must fit into a combination of two risk areas identified within the high risk 
class. Examples of products from firms that are automatically included in the medium 
risk sector are bed linen, watches and electrical components. Over-exposure is 
determined if more than £100million is generated in sales, or a third of firms profits 
come from a high risk product such as sugar or tea. Once classified, the thematic 
metrics are then used to assess the firm’s level of performance. Within this area, 
employment rights, working hours and wages are assessed. 
 
2.3.2.3 Corporate governance criteria 
The criteria for corporate governance measure each firm’s success in countering 
bribery and administering a range of corporate responsibilities. Again FTSE4good 
classifies firms according to the risk associated with their sector and country they 
primarily operate in. Firms are then assessed according to the transparency of their 
policies, ethical codes of practice regarding equality and remuneration.  
The systems used to assess the six areas of interest are consistent in their application, 
with classification of firms, an assessment through clearly defined good and best 
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practice, followed by a scoring framework that is fundamentally the same throughout 
the assessment criteria. To the author’s knowledge there is no literature that assesses 
the structure and validity of the inclusion criteria. Therefore, differences between the 
FTSE4good indices and their base universe will be in part a result of the method and 
criteria used to include and exclude firms.  
With respect to the aforementioned concepts and the application to ESG based 
investment there is a significant gap in the knowledge of which there is a clear interest 
(Anand et al., 2013; Ortas et al., 2013; Agrawal, 2010; Scholtens and Boersen, 2011). 
 
2.4 The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) 
The aims, objectives, research question, and subsequent event study methodology 
assume rationality and efficiency in the market place. This principle is central to the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and for the event study method to hold, through 
significant returns, the assumption is that stock prices always reflect the information 
that is available to investors (Mcwilliams and Siegel, 1997). Therefore, new, 
unanticipated events provide new information that is incorporated into the market 
place. It is however reasonable to assume that on some occasion information is 
released to investors over an extended period, causing a delayed response, and in 
some cases information is not available (Hayes, 2012).  
This effect is accounted for in EMH through three concepts that determine the level of 
efficiency. The strong form of EMH states that markets are efficient if all “privately” held 
relevant information is quickly and accurately reflected into the market place. The semi-
strong form states that markets are efficient if all “publically available” and relevant 
information is priced into the market quickly. The weak form of EMH implies that future 
prices cannot be predicted from historic prices and as such they follow a type of 
random walk, independent of past prices. This does not however imply that markets 
are priced in constant equilibrium where no advantage is possible or that prices are 
even correct, it actually refers to the fact that prices accurately reflect available 
information (Brown, 2011). This concept is central to the success of the FTSE4good 
and ultimately, the part of financial markets in driving the green economy. 
The empirical intuition behind the concept is that if the value of a stock or index is 
below or above what available information suggests it should be (inefficient), then the 
23 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
market would take advantage of the situation by either buying or selling the security for 
profit. This increased demand then alters the value of the security and accurately 
reflects the available information that moved it there (Hayes, 2012). In the context of 
this study the event generates new information for investors that is priced into the 
market according to relevance to the stocks and indices in question. Therefore, if 
FTSE4good’s screening process is effective and the market interprets FTSE4good’s 
“private” ratings as relevant in the valuation of stock values then a detectable and 
significant difference should be apparent.  
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3 Research aim and objectives  
Given the identified gaps in the knowledge base, the aim of this research is to: 
“Determine whether financial markets and constituent firms, based on ESG 
performance, are more resilient to shock events than their base universe.” 
To achieve this aim the following questions must be answered (sub-paragraphs 
summarise and point to the answers for each question):  
 What metrics are appropriate for measuring business resilience? 
o The meaning and rationale for measurement are outlined in chapter 2. 
Resilience aims to protect firm value and financial performance is therefore 
a core metric. 
 Given the identified metrics, what methods are most appropriate for testing whether 
“green” firms are resilient during shock events?  
o The method used for testing FTSE4good performance (chapter 4) and 
achieving the research aim (chapter 3) follows the quantitative event study 
approach to determine the impact of exogenous shocks on FTSE4good 
indices and constituent firms.  
 How does the market value the FTSE4good index series during shocks? 
o Chapter 5 compares the actual against the expected returns of the 
FTSE4good and FTSE All-Share during a range of shock events. 
 How does the market value ESG portfolio performance during shocks?  
o Chapter 6 compares firms that scored highest in FTSE4good respective E, 
S, & G assessment against those with the lowest respective scores across a 
range of shocks. 
 How does the market value ESG performance at the sector/firm level during 
shocks?  
o Chapter 7 compares firms included in FTSE4good against excluded firms, 
across a range of shocks but from the same industrial sector. 
 Are they an attractive investment prospect? Does ethical and green production 
pay? 
o Chapter 8 is a synthesis of what the results mean for green investment and 
what is needed to make ESG indices more effective?  
  
25 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
  
26 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
4 Methodology 
Chapter 4 presents the rationale behind the methodology followed by an explanation of 
the structure of an event study; then the event study overview that relates to the current 
analyses; followed by the asset selection process; and finally, the steps and calculus 
required to generate statistically robust results for the analysis of indices and firms. 
 
4.1 Rationale 
This study aims to determine whether FTSE4good fosters characteristics in associated 
firms that result in heightened performance during shock events compared with firms 
that are excluded or with relatively lower ESG performance. This follows the 
importance of resilience in protecting firm value (chapter 2); the importance of financial 
markets in driving a green and sustainable economy (chapters 2 & 2.2); and that event 
study methodology as the dominant means of testing whether FTSE4good 
performance results in a favourable abnormal return for investors (MacKinlay, 1997; 
Mcwilliams and Siegel, 1997; Aggarwal et al., 2012b). The event study market model 
tests whether an abnormal return in excess of an expected return is significant and 
therefore attributable to the event in question (section 4.7). The following figure is an 
illustration of the methodological design: 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Conceptual work flow schematic of the 5 outputs derived from this research 
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Figure 4.1 shows the steps taken to investigate the aim starting with the UK stock 
market index analysis in Chapter 5 where the FTSE4good Benchmark and FTSE4good 
UK 50 returns are compared to the returns of the FTSE All-Share; this leads into a 
decomposition of the firms within the index through a financial performance comparison 
of portfolios organised according to environmental, social and corporate governance 
performance in chapter 6; lastly in chapter 7, firms are further decomposed according 
to industrial sector and categorised by inclusion or exclusion from FTSE4good using for 
example, financial services for the financial crisis. At the industry sector level, each 
analysis utilises firms that are specific to the event in question and some events are 
only analysed in one area. For example, the Deep Water Horizon explosion utilises oil 
and gas industry firms and the horse meat scandal is used only at the food processing 
and retail sector firm level. Details of these models are outlined in associated chapters. 
The majority of studies define their own measures of CSR performance raising issues 
of subjectivity (Lu et al., 2014). This is not an issue within the current study due to the 
adoption of FTSE4good’ own assessment criteria that is empirically tested and 
available to stakeholders.  
 
4.2 The event study methodology structure 
A range of approaches were considered for this study, such as risk factor analysis 
(Fama and French, 1993), productivity, accounting measures (Choi et al., 2010) and 
variations of event study methodology (Sorokina et al., 2013). Risk factor measures 
focus on drivers of change to determine the value of the firm (Scholtens and Boersen, 
2011) and Mackinlay (1997) states that productivity measures require significantly 
longer periods of observation and are generally ineffective in event studies owing to the 
risk of capturing confounding effects from other unrelated events. Accounting and 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) methods were explored in-depth (see appendices 
C1, C2 and C3) but this approach proved inappropriate because of insufficient data, 
such as yearly and quarterly prices. Infrequent data diminishes accuracy and 
potentially captures confounding effects caused by other unknown events (Davidson 
and Worrell, 2003). 
In the context of this study the dominant method for testing the financial impacts of 
specific events is the event study method (Brown, 2011). The event study method 
utilises stock prices to reflect the market value of a firm because the market is 
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assumed to incorporate all relevant information and future cash flows (Sorokina et al., 
2013). Event studies test for significance in the market response to an event (Anand et 
al., 2013; Ortas et al., 2013; Curran and Moran, 2007; MacKinlay, 1997; Mcwilliams 
and Siegel, 1997; Erol et al., 2010).  In the current research, event studies are used to 
substantiate a causal link between a firm’s market value and the extent to which it 
conforms to FTSE4good’s ESG ratings. The event study methodology is useful in the 
application of multiple investigations as it is flexible and transcends many disciplines 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Graca and Masson, 2012; Krivin et al., 2003). Event studies follow a 
systematic procedure that can be altered according to the field of enquiry and 
characteristics of the event. The general process of a typical event study is to 
determine if the event has generated an abnormal return above or below its expected 
return value. Therefore, the method measures the deviation in the value of a firm or 
index away from its expected return as a result of an unforeseen event. In this respect 
the most common technique for calculating expected returns is the ‘market model’.  
 
4.3 Event study overview  
4.3.1 Event selection 
An event study begins by identifying key events of interest (Oberndorfer et al., 2013; 
Mcwilliams and Siegel, 1997); events were initially identified through a literature search 
of related studies the authors of which had outlined and rationalised the related 
timeline; the event dates were then cross-referenced with market values of the included 
assets to make a qualitative determination that an effect was present. Once identified, 
the indices were tested using the event study method to determine if any significance 
was present around the event. A number of events were tested and eliminated from the 
study (see appendices D). The remaining events used to test the FTSE4good are 
outlined in Table 4.1, showing the event title, start date, FTSE4good product tested, 
and the publications used as guidance. 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
Table 4.1. List of events used to test performance of the FTSE4good indices and firms   
Event Event Date Product Source 
Financial crisis  09/08/2007 Index/ESG/Sector 
(Anand et al., 2013; Ortas et al., 2013; 
The Guardian, 2012) 
Deep Water 
Horizon oil spill 
20/04/2010 Index/ESG/Sector 
(Sabet et al., 2012; Fodor and Stowe, 
2010) 
Iceland Volcanic 
Eruption  
15/04/2010  Index/ESG/Sector (Mazzocchi et al., 2010) 
Japan earthquake  11/03/2011 ESG/Sector 
(Gianfreda and Scandolo, 2013; Betzer 
et al., 2013) 
Oil price shocks  Multiple Index (Cunado and Perez de Gracia, 2013) 
Horse meat 
scandal 
15/01/2013 Sector 
(Food Standards Agency, 2014; Kong, 
2012) 
US Presidential 
Election Results  
06/11/2012 ESG (Goldenberg, 2012) 
EU ETS Prohibition 
Act, US 
(announcement) 
07/06/2011 Sector (Leggett et al., 2012; GreenAir, 2014) 
EU ETS Stop the 
Clock on Aviation 
12/11/2012 Sector “ 
 
Events were selected based initially on the assumed magnitude of impact. Literature 
(shown in source column of Table 4.1) on the events in question was sought as 
guidance in defining the event window and interval period. Therefore, some 
adaptations to length of sampling periods and frequency of interval period 
measurements were necessary to complete an effective analysis that was consistent 
with the characteristics of each event. Beyond the current, general explanation of the 
event study methodology, the nuances associated with each event in relation to the 
tested variable; index, portfolio or sector/firm(s) are outlined in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.8.  
After selection, events were tested for a significant response and those non-responsive 
events were excluded from the analysis, the results of which can be found in appendix 
D. This is based on guidance from Mcwilliams and Siegel (1997), and MacKinlay 
(1997) who state that an event must show signs of significance to robustly determine 
causality with the chosen assets. 
 
4.3.2 Estimation window and event window design 
Estimating a response to an economic event requires comparison against a 
counterfactual scenario. The counterfactual scenario is derived by a regression 
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between the asset in question and a reference asset throughout estimation window, 
which precedes the event window by up to 252 days (MacKinlay, 1997; Scholtens and 
Boersen, 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2012a; Aslam and Kang, 2013; Ye et al., 2013). Figure 
4.2 shows the relationship between the event window and the estimation window 
across a time-series dataset.   
 
 
Figure 4.2. Time-line for the event study showing estimation and event window 
 
The event window centres on the event day (t=o) with the surrounding days of T2 to T3. 
The estimation window T0 to T1 precedes T2 so as not to be influenced by the event. 
The estimation window is used to estimate the typical stock price movements relative 
to a reference index (FTSE 100). These estimations are then used to forecast expected 
returns during the event window. The difference between the expected returns and 
actual returns, known as abnormal returns, are the basis of determining the degree to 
which the event has impacted on the respective asset.  
The length of the event window and the interval periods are critical to the design of an 
event study so as to accurately capture all price movements caused by the event 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). The use of long event windows can reduce the power of 
certain test statistics, leading to false inferences as to the significance of an event 
(Karafiath, 2009). The main issue with using a relatively long window is the risk of 
capturing unrelated, confounding effects that may add to or diminish the investigation 
(MacKinlay, 1997). However, in some cases confounding effects are related to the 
event, and therefore a longer event window can be included to capture these known 
effects, as is the case with a number of studies (Ortas et al., 2013; Sabet et al., 2012; 
Kong, 2012). The interval periods must be designed on an ad hoc basis that either 
reflects the stages of an event or designed to capture unknown significant effects within 
the event window (Krivin et al., 2003). Regardless of event window length, a robust 
estimation of impacts can be established through short interval periods that reflect 
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different stages of an overall event. The event window can include days before the 
event in circumstances where the event is not entirely unexpected, such as class 
action law suits for insider trading. Where an event is considered to be entirely 
unexpected, such as a terrorist attack, then the event window usually begins with the 
event day [0] as they are unexpected and thus exogenous to investment decisions 
(Scholtens and Boersen, 2011; Krivin et al., 2003). Therefore, in accordance with the 
literature the event window time frequencies vary according to the characteristics of the 
shock as per the literature identified in Table 4.1. Interval period estimations are 
calculated within the event window to determine when the impact is priced into the 
market. For example, an event window of 0 to 15 days may consist of intervals [0, 2], 
[3, 9], [10, 15] (Ortas et al., 2013; Sabet et al., 2012).  
The investigations focus on a comparison of multiple assets, where, during each event 
the testing framework remains the same for each index, portfolio of firms, and industry 
grouped firms. For example, the testing framework for the financial crisis uses the 
same market model, estimation window, event window, and intervals for the index, 
portfolio and industrial sector analysis. The following sections outline the estimation 
and event window lengths that are unique to each event. Below is an overview (Table 
4.2) of the time frame for each event that includes an event identifier, estimation 
window and event window length; the timeframes reflect the event characteristics from 
the identified literature outlined in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.2 Event study time frames for estimation and event windows 
Event Estimation Window (days) Event Window (days) 
Financial Crisis 252 50 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 252 50 
Japan Earthquake & Tsunami 252 10 
Iceland Volcanic Eruption 252 6 
Oil Price Shocks 241 5 
Horse Meat Scandal 252 50 
US Presidential Elections 252 6 
EU ETS Prohibition Act 115 15 
EU ETS Stop the Clock 115 4 
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The tests of significance are central to the aims of this study (chapter 4.7) therefore, 
only periods with at least one significant abnormal return are ranked. The collection of 
ranked periods provides a performance classification between the indices, portfolios 
and sector based firms. The rankings are then tested for significance using Friedman’s 
Chi-squared test (see chapter 4.8). Given that ranking return performance will miss 
information relating to magnitude and volatility, descriptive statistics are generated to 
provide greater insight and potential differentiation between the included assets. 
 
4.4 Event description and design 
Event window and estimation window days reflect working days only, therefore 
weekends and holidays are excluded as is the case in the financial price data for all 
asset classes. 
 
4.4.1 The financial crisis of 2007/2008 
With guidance from Ortas et al (2013), Agrawal (2010) and the financial crisis time line 
published by The Guardian (2012), it was possible to configure an event window and 
interval periods that reflect the land mark occasions of the financial crisis. The first 
confirmation of the crisis started with the announcement by BNP Paribas of significant 
liquidity issues. This confirmation was reinforced by actions from the European Central 
Bank (ECB), United States Federal Reserve Bank (US Fed), and the Bank of England 
(BOE) as they injected liquidity into capital markets and cut interest rates in an effort to 
boost the economy (The Guardian, 2012). The restrictions on interbank lending also 
indicated significant difficulty in the financial environment reinforced by the run on UK 
bank, Northern Rock at which point the BOE stepped in with financial support. These 
events are all indicative of the crisis as a whole and integral to the design of the event 
window and interval periods. The event window covered 50 days from the BNP Paribas 
announcement on 9/8/2007 and consists of the following periods and associated 
characteristics: 
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Table 4.3. Financial crisis periods with corresponding dates and description 
Period Date Description 
[0, 50] 
 
Event window – accumulation of all events 
[0] 09/08/2007 Event start - BNP Paribas announce significant liquidity issues 
[0, 5] 09/08/2007 ECB liquidity injection in capital markets 
[6, 16] 17/08/2007 US FED cuts rates – seen as warning of threat to growth 
[17, 24] 04/09/2007 Interbank lending rate at highest since 1998 
[25, 28] 14/09/2007 Run on Northern Rock – first in 150 years as BOE steps in. 
[29, 50] 18/09/2007 FED cuts rates and BOE injects capital 
 
A 50 day window was used to capture the different stages of the crisis. Within the event 
window, the impact of landmark occasions is captured through relatively shorter 
interval periods. Despite being a financial event with an element of predictability it is 
well publicised that the crisis was globally unexpected and, therefore, the event window 
begins with the event day [0]. The response to the financial crisis was tested using the  
event study abnormal returns of FTSE4good indices against the returns of the FTSE 
All-Share, the base universe from which firms are selected; followed by an analysis of 
portfolios of the top and bottom 100 firms classified according to their FTSE4good 
based Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance performance; finally a sector 
analysis of 50 Financial services firms included in FTSE4good compared to the 
financial performance of 31 excluded firms.  
 
4.4.2 Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
The unexpected oil spill caused by the BP plc owned Deep Water Horizon rig explosion 
was taken as an environmental event. The works of Sabet et al. (2012) follow a case 
wise event study analysis of individual firms directly linked to the incident (almost 
entirely US based firms and their inclusion is therefore not applicable to a UK based 
study). They also provide a detailed timeline of the event, and this provides the 
framework for the design of the event window and subsequent periods. The study by 
Sabet et al. (2012) highlights the delayed response to the incident due to a shortage of 
information. Consequently, financial markets did not comprehend the magnitude of the 
event until 29/04/2010, seven days after the announcement of the incident by BP on 
22/4/2010. The delayed response was blamed on the location of the rig and the initial 
curtailment of information. However, as time went on and the magnitude of the event 
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grew, information via the US government then took precedence in the valuation of 
financial markets. At the time of the event, BP was included in the FTSE4good, and 
therefore BP’s value may have had an impact on the value of the assets. The timeline 
given in Table 4.4 also includes a government moratorium on drilling in the Gulf of 
Mexico and statements of intent by US president, Barak Obama; both of which threaten 
to alter the operative and subsequent economic environment of the industry: 
 
 
Table 4.4. BP oil spill event window and interval periods with corresponding dates and 
impact description 
Period Date Description 
[0, 50] 
 
Event window 
[0] 20/04/2010 Rig explosion 
[2, 6] 22/04/2010 BP announcement 2 days after the incident 
[7, 25] 29/04/2010 Recognition of the incident by financial markets 
[26, 34] 27/05/2010 First moratorium on oil drilling in Gulf of Mexico 
[35, 50] 09/06/2010 President Obama statement on responsibility for incident 
 
The intervals shown in Table 4.4, aim to prove that firms included in FTSE4good, with 
relatively higher ESG credentials, are favourable to investors in light of the issues 
associated with this event. For example, it could be expected that the severity of the 
statements by president Obama would be considered a negative for non-FTSE4good-
firms relative to the value of firms included in FTSE4good. Therefore, if the 
aforementioned is found then FTSE4good and derived portfolios/firms would provide 
resilience against an unexpected shock of this type. The estimation window for this 
event was 252 days immediately preceding the event window. The Deep Water 
Horizon event was used to compare the returns of the FTSE4good indices against the 
returns of the FTSE All-Share index; portfolios of the top and bottom 100 firms in terms 
of FTSE4good Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance performance; 
followed by an analysis of firms from the oil and gas (with and without BP plc), and 
alternative energy sectors that were included and excluded from FTSE4good. 
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4.4.3 Japan earth quake of 2011 
The Japan earth quake and subsequent nuclear disaster generated a number of 
widespread impacts in the supply of goods and services as well as a political sea-
change on the risks associated with nuclear power generation in Germany and Europe 
(Betzer et al., 2013). Many of the studies that focus on localised impacts use an event 
window of up to +30 days, but because of the distance between Japanese and UK 
markets, associations are diminished relative to firms that are more localised to Japan; 
furthermore there is a risk of detecting other events so a short event window of [0, 10] 
was used, as is the case in the short window scenario study by Gianfreda and 
Scandolo (2013). The aforementioned studies and works of Herold and Muck (2012), 
and Lopatta and Kaspereit (2014) were used to develop the time line for the event 
window periods that begin with the earthquake and tsunami that caused substantial 
damage to Japan’s eastern coastline and nuclear power facilities. The subsequent 
nuclear reactor leak caused Germany to announce that they were cancelling their 
nuclear energy programme. The time-line is outlined in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5. Japan earth quake event window and interval periods with corresponding 
dates and impact description 
Period Date Description 
[0, 10] 
 
Event window 
[0] 11/03/2011 Event day – Earth quake & nuclear reactor damage 
[0, 3] 11/03/2011 Event day and following week (excludes weekend) 
[1, 5] 14/03/2011 Monday and the first full week of trading 
[6, 10] 21/03/2011 Second trading week following disaster 
 
The event was tested for a significant impact using the indices but only the portfolios 
and relevant sectors showed evidence of an effect, therefore the index analysis is not 
included in this study but the results are available in appendix D. The portfolios were 
classified using FTSE4good ESG ratings history, comparing the financial performance 
of the top and bottom 100 in each respective pillar; for the sector based analysis 2 
included firms from the power utilities sector were compared to 3 excluded firms due to 
the impact relating to the reactor leak and the subsequent announcement by Germany; 
for the technology hardware and equipment sector 6 included firms were compared to 
5 excluded because of Japan’s prominence in the technology manufacturing field. 
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4.4.4 The 2010 eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland 
The eruption of the Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjallajökull, generated an unexpected cloud 
of ash that moved over Europe causing widespread disruption to UK and EU airspace 
(Miller, 2011). The impacts this event had on the European airline industry have been 
tested using event study methodology by Mazzocchi et al (2010); who tested the effect 
the event had on the share price of European airlines and a counterfactual group of 
land based travel firms who were thought to have gained from the event. This study 
and news reports provide the basis for developing a timeline needed for the event 
window. The event window and periods that match the characteristics of the event are 
outlined in the Table 4.6: 
 
Table 4.6. Iceland volcanic eruption event window and interval periods with 
corresponding dates and impact description 
Period Date Description 
[0, 6] 
 
Event window 
[0] 15/04/2010 Event day – Eruption of volcano 
[0, 1] “ Eruption to closure of airspace 
[2, 6] 19/04/2010 Re-opening of EU Airspace - Recovery period 
 
The reasons for the length of the event window were twofold; firstly the literature 
suggests that the value of effected firms returned to normality within a week of the 
disaster as EU airspace reopened on 19/04/2010 (Mazzocchi et al., 2010; Miller, 2011); 
secondly, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico occurred soon after the event with its 
effects showing up in financial markets 14 days after the volcanic eruption in Iceland. 
Therefore, a larger event window would include an un-associated confounding event. 
The Iceland volcanic eruption event was used to test the FTSE4good indices against 
the FTSE All-Share index; and portfolios of the top and bottom 100 firms in terms of 
FTSE4good’ Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance performance; followed 
by a sector comparison between 2 included and 2 excluded travel and tourism firms 
with the inclusion of 6 land based travel firms that Mazzocchi et al (2010) found to 
benefit significantly from the event. 
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4.4.5 Oil price shocks 
Fuel usage and efficiency are a fundamental aspect of the green economy. Therefore, 
oil price movements were used to determine if FTSE4good performance was relevant 
in the valuation of constituent firms. To account for an event, daily changes in the price 
of Brent Crude oil ($/brl) that exceeded 5% (40 events) and -5% (34 events) since the 
start of FTSE4good (2001) were classified as shocks in-line with studies by Aggarwal 
et al. (2012a) and Mohanty et al. (2013), an approach that was taken to clearly 
distinguish between extreme positive and negative price movements. To account for a 
lagged response between the event and the assimilation of information by markets, an 
event window of [0, 5] and interval periods [0], [1], [0, 1], [0, 2], [1, 3], [2, 4] and [2, 5] 
were used to determine a mean effect across positive and negative oil price 
movements. The estimation window of 241 days preceded the date of the first oil price 
shock, which was positive on 16/12/2002. Theoretically, firms included in FTSE4good 
should be viewed as less risky than excluded firms due to their environmental, climate 
change performance in reducing CO2 emissions that is consequently related to 
increases in multiple fuel efficiencies (Chen and Hu, 2012). 
 
4.4.6 Horse meat scandal of 2013 
During January 2013, the Food Standards Authority of Ireland (FSAI) found evidence of 
horse DNA in unrelated food products (Food Standards Agency, 2014). This prompted 
the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) to conduct investigations that also revealed 
evidence of horse DNA in unrelated food products. The presence of unidentified food 
ingredients raised questions regarding the origin and safety of the ingredients and 
whether they posed a risk to consumers. The impact of this event on firm value 
remains untested and therefore is useful in testing the markets perception of 
FTSE4good performance and whether it is relevant in valuing firms accordingly. A 
similar study by Kong (2012) looked at the impact of melamine contamination in the 
Chinese food chain and whether markets valued firms with Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) attributes favourably during this period. Findings from this study 
indicates that interest in the level of CSR activity increased compared to pre-event 
levels; suggesting that CSR can influence investor behaviour. This study and the 
timeline by the Food Standards Agency (2014) align with the framework required to test 
the value of FTSE4good over the horse meat scandal. An index response was tested 
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but eliminated from the study due to insignificance and inverse trending (see appendix 
D). The interval periods are presented below in Table 4.7 
 
Table 4.7. Horse meat scandal event window and interval periods with corresponding 
dates and impact description  
Period Date Description 
[0, 50] 
 
Event window – 50 working days  
[0, 1] 15/01/2013 FSAI & FSA announce possible horse DNA contamination 
[18, 21] 08/02/2013 FSA announces risks associated with possible presence of Bute 
[22, 24] 14/02/2013 Arrests made by police & Bute test results published 
[25, 26] 19/02/2013 FSA publishes report on scandal 
[27, 31] 21/02/2013 Test results published & firms withdraw food from sale 
[32, 37] 28/02/2013 Details of FSA sampling programme revealed 
[38, 50] 08/03/2013 FSA lifts ban on major slaughter house and test results revealed 
 
The interval periods reflect the major landmark findings and characteristics of the event 
(Food Standards Agency, 2014). This framework should allow for accurate tracking of 
firm price movements. The estimation window for this event is 252 days before the 
event window. The horse meat scandal was used to compare the FTSE4good indices 
against the FTSE All-Share index and the portfolios but without the presence of a 
significant return. Therefore, the event was used only at the firm level where the 
financial performance of 7 included food producing and retail firms was compared to 
that of 6 excluded firms.  
 
4.4.7  US Presidential elections of 2012 
After the BP oil of 2010 and its ongoing economic impact, environmental protection 
was high on the electoral agenda within these elections (Goldenberg, 2012). The 
results were announced on 6 November 2012 to which markets responded globally to 
differing degrees. Therefore, the event window for this study is dictated by a 
preliminary investigation to the market response following the announcement. An 
investigation showed that a majority of markets hit a post announcement low after two 
days followed by a full recovery in 4/5 days. Therefore the event for the event study 
was [-1, 5] with internal periods of [-1, 1], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 3], [0, 5] and [2, 5] with an 
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estimation window of 252 days. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney was cited as losing 
the election to Obama because of his stance against climate change (Zelman, 2012) 
and consequently the markets perception that a win for Obama may bring a relatively 
stronger environmental policy stance; particularly in light of the events surrounding the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil spill (Semeniuk et al., 2012; Humphries et al., 2012). 
 
4.4.8 The EU Emissions Trading System 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was introduced in 2005 to 
reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions from European industry through a “cap-
and-trade” based system. The system was introduced in three stages with increasing 
degrees of stringency starting with Phase I (2005 – 2007), Phase II (2008 – 2012), and 
Phase III (2013-2020) (Zhang and Wei, 2010).  Jong et al (2014) used an event study 
approach to determine if the EU ETS compliance announcement was relevant in the 
valuation of firms that participate within the system. This study focused only on a single 
period in 2006 and found that share prices increased as a result of falling allowance 
prices and increasing allowance holdings. Therefore, this study provides a useful 
framework and comparison for testing the impact of the EU ETS on the value of 
FTSE4good firms over the three EU ETS phases and the US Prohibition ACT of 2011 
(passed into law by US President Obama on 27/11/2012). No significant returns were 
detected around the three phases of the EU ETS. Therefore, these events were 
excluded from the study. Furthermore, only sector based returns were significant in 
response to the EU ETS Prohibition ACT and the EU ETS “Stop the Clock” event. 
The Prohibition ACT of 2011 was passed to prohibit US aircraft from participating in the 
EU ETS and subsequently prompted the exclusion of aviation from the EU ETS under 
the “stop the clock” agreement (Leggett et al., 2012). To understand if the market 
recognised the event in valuing firms differentiated according to inclusion and exclusion 
within FTSE4good, an event study was conducted testing market response to the 
announcement by the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) to propose 
government backed legislation, prohibiting American airlines from participating in the 
EU ETS on 06/07/2011 (GreenAir, 2014). For the prohibition act event study the event 
window [0, 15] included the day before the event to determine accuracy. A longer event 
window was inappropriate as this would impact on statistical robustness owing to the 
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risk of detecting other firm specific events because of the small sample size of firms. 
The estimation window was 115 days before event window. 
Following the Prohibition Act and global disagreement against paying the EU ETS 
aviation charges, the European Commission announced intention to only include intra-
European flights within the system. Informally referred to as ‘stop the clock’, all flights 
originating from and landing outside of the EU are excluded until 2016. The 
announcement was made on 12/11/2012 and was viewed as weakness by the 
administrators that may affect the entire scheme (Buyck, 2014). A four day event 
window was used to mitigate the impact of confounding effects in line with jong et al 
(2014). The event window includes the previous trading day to determine if the market 
prices the announcement in earlier than the event day, identifying potential leaks of 
information. The event window was defined as [-1, 3] with interval periods [-1, 0], [0], [0, 
1] and [1, 3]. This event was used to test firms classified by FTSE4good under the 
industrial sector with a sample of 58 included firms and 39 excluded. 
 
4.5 Firm and index selection criteria 
The two FTSE4good indices used for analysis consist of a tradable index (FTSE4good 
UK 50) and benchmark index (FTSE4good UK Benchmark). Constituents are only 
added to the FTSE5Good if they pass the predetermined environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria set by FTSE4good. Therefore, the FTSE4good Benchmark 
index includes all FTSE All-Share firms that meet the required ESG criteria and the 
FTSE4good UK 50 comprises the top 50 performing (in terms of market capitalisation) 
firms that have passed the criteria (FTSE, 2010a). The difference between the two 
FTSE4good Indices and the FTSE All-Share should therefore represent the difference 
in performance of firms that meet FTSE4good inclusion standards and those that do 
not.  
Data for all indices and constituent firms were collected from 2001 (the launch of The 
FTSE4good index series), to 2013 (most recent available data).  Daily market prices 
were downloaded from Thomson Reuters (2013) DataStream service.  
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4.6 Normal and abnormal return measurement 
The measure of abnormal returns (AR) is central to event study methodology. The 
abnormal return is the difference between the return within the event window for a 
given index or firm (daily/actual return) minus the expected return of a counterfactual 
scenario, which is determined using a regression model (known as ‘the market model’) 
during the estimation window. The expected return must be defined during the event 
window through an out of sample estimation. The price data for all indices and firms 
can be found in appendix E and F. 
 
Price Index (PI) was used as an indicator to calculate returns, as this is the 
standard data type for equities and represents the price of the equity or asset as a 
percentage of its value set at 100 percent on the base date that is set by the exchange 
and remains constant for all data. Productivity measures, such as return on assets 
(ROI), sales or value added, are an alternative to the use of financial securities.  
However, Mackinlay (1997) states that productivity measures require significantly 
longer periods of observation and are generally ineffective in event studies. Price index 
is calculated as follows: 
𝐼𝑡= 𝐼𝑡−1* 
∑ (𝑃𝑡∗𝑁𝑡)
𝑛
1
∑ (𝑃𝑡−1∗𝑁𝑡∗𝑓)
𝑛
1
 
(4-1) 
Where: 
𝐼𝑡 = index/firm value at day t 
𝐼𝑡−1 = index/firm value on previous working day (of t) 
𝑃𝑡 = unadjusted share price on day t 
𝑃𝑡 − 1 = unadjusted share price on previous working day (of t) 
𝑁𝑡 = number of shares in issue on day t 
𝑓  = adjustment factor for a capital action occurring on day t 
𝑛  = number of constituents in index 
 
After collecting PI data it was possible to calculate Daily Returns (DR), which is the 
percentage change in the Price Index (PI) between the close of the current day minus 
the close of the previous day using the following calculation: 
(Ri,t) = [(
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
)]*100 (4-2) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = daily return of an index/firm 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 = previous day value of an index/firm 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡  = current day value of an index/firm 
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Using the daily returns it is then possible to calculate Abnormal returns (AR), which is 
the difference between the daily percentage changes (previous equation) in the Price 
Index (PI) between two indices, portfolios, or a constituent firm and market: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡] (4-3) 
Where: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = abnormal return of an index/firm 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = actual daily return of an index/firm 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = expected daily return of an index/firm 
Ω𝑖,𝑡 = standard error of an index/firm 
 
Where: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return for index/firm 𝑖𝑖 on day t and 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] is the expected return 
generated from the market model on day t using ordinary least square parameters (αi 
and βi) of the regression between 𝑅𝑖,𝑡and 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 during the preceding estimation 
window. The expected return or otherwise known as the normal return is unconditional 
to the event but conditional to the off sample regression parameters of the estimation 
window. 
Following the calculation of the AR for each index or firm it is also useful to aggregate 
the abnormal returns to gain an overall assessment of the impact throughout the event 
window rather than just single days. This requires the calculation of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) for each period of interest within the event and the event 
window as a whole. For multiple observations the abnormal returns and cumulative AR 
can be averaged across the sample to produce average abnormal returns (AAR) for 
each day and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for periods with multiple 
days. The following section highlights the calculations required to complete the event 
study in-line with this framework. 
 
4.7 Event study using the Market Model 
The first step in an event study is to calculate the daily returns for the included indices 
and firms using the equation (4-2). Next, the estimation of how the expected returns 
vary according to changes in the daily returns of a benchmark market was calculated 
using the market model. The counterfactual index for the market model was the 
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FTSE100, applied during the estimation window, using ordinary least square (OLS) 
parameters that include the intercept (α) and slope (β).  
The regression parameters of the following regression model were applied to each day 
in the event window to generate the expected return: 
 
[E]𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α𝑖 + β𝑖𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡  (4-4) 
Where: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = expected daily return of index/firm 
α𝑖 = intercept of index and return model 
β𝑖 = slope of index/firm and return model 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = daily return of an index/firm 
𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = daily returns of return model index 
ε𝑖,𝑡 = error term of index/firm 
 
 
The expected return 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] is derived from the regression of index 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and market 
model index 𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡  (benchmark) daily returns on day t with ε𝑖,𝑡 as the error term. The 
linearity of the model assumes daily returns are normally distributed. This method is 
seen as the best way to assess market response as other proposed methods that 
assess volatility, such as GARCH models, are focused more on determining drivers of 
an event (Scholtens and Boersen, 2011). From the estimates of the market model, 
daily abnormal returns ARi,t for the index/portfolio are calculated using the equation 
(4-3). Using the daily abnormal returns, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during 
each interval (i.e. [0, 20]) within the event window are then estimated as follows: 
CARi(T1,T2) = ∑ ARI,t
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 (4-5) 
Where: 
CARi(T1, T2) = cumulative abnormal return of index/firm 
𝑇1     = return of an index/firm at start of interval 
𝑇2     = return of an index/firm at end of interval 
ARi,t    = abnormal return of index/firm at time t 
 
The sum of abnormal returns ARi,t over the start of the interval (𝑇1) to the end of the 
interval (𝑇2) generates the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the interval within 
the event window. When multiple events/indices/firms are accumulated then the 
following estimation is required for average abnormal returns (AAR): 
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𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(4-6) 
Where: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = daily average abnormal return of portfolio 
ARit = abnormal return of index/firm at time t 
 
Then, to calculate the cumulative average of the abnormal returns (CAAR) across time 
yields the following estimation is required:  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑖=𝑡1
 
(4-7) 
Where: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡= daily average abnormal return of portfolio 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = daily average abnormal return of portfolio 
 
To test the significance of the AR values a parametric t-statistic or z-statistic was 
utilised along with the event study specific, non-parametric Corrado rank test (Corrado, 
1989) and Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test for each day surrounding the 
event and the cumulative abnormal returns, at a significance of 1%, 5% and 10% in-
line with other event studies (Scholtens and Boersen, 2011; Graca and Masson, 2012). 
Significance is determined by the assumption that under the efficient markets 
hypothesis (Hayes, 2012; Salameh and AlBahsh, 2011) an unanticipated event will be 
priced into the market either immediately at the time of the event or soon after 
representing the strong and semi-strong interpretation of the efficient markets 
hypothesis. The t-statistic is the preferred measure of significance when there are 
fewer than 30 observations (n=<30) such as in the index analysis (Gujarati, 2011). The 
t-test for abnormal returns is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡t − Statistic =  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝜖
 
(4-8) 
Where: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = abnormal return of index/portfolio/firm 
𝜎𝜖 = standard deviation of estimation window abnormal returns 
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The t-test for cumulate abnormal returns is based on the following: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡t − Statistic(𝑡1𝑡2) = ∑
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝜖
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
  
(4-9) 
Where: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = cumulative abnormal return of index/portfolio/firm interval 
𝜎𝜖 = standard deviation of estimation window abnormal returns 
 
The standard deviation is calculated from the abnormal returns derived from the 
estimation window and are calculated as follows: 
?̂?𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 = 
1
𝑀𝑖 − 𝑑
 ∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
2
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡=𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
(4-10) 
Where: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = abnormal return of index/portfolio/firm 
𝜎𝐴𝑅𝑖 = standard deviation of estimation window abnormal returns 
 
𝑀𝑖 refers to the number of observed returns within the estimation window and 𝑑 are the 
degrees of freedom within the market model.  
Where samples are greater than 30 (n=>30), such as in the firm level analysis, then the 
z-statistic is used. The calculation for the z-statistic is based on the following equation: 
𝑧  =  
1
√𝑛
∑
[
 
 
 
∑
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
√𝑉𝑎𝑟∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
]
 
 
 
𝑁
𝑗=1
   
(4-11) 
Where: 
𝑡1 = first day of the interval period 
t2 = last day of the interval period 
N = number of observations 
 
The z and t statistics assume that the data are independently sampled and normally 
distributed. The data was tested in this respect and the results are shown in 
Appendices C3. If samples depart from the assumptions of independently sampled and 
normal distribution but sizes are large enough, then both tests will be robust (Gujarati, 
2011). Significance is based on confidence intervals, and extent to which the AR, AAR, 
CAR and CAAR can be attributed to the event (Rumsey, 2003). 
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Table 4.8. Confidence intervals for z & t test of significance in the abnormal returns 
Percentage Confidence t & z-statistic confidence levels p-values Significance identifier 
90% 1.64 p<0.1 * 
95% 1.96 p<0.05 ** 
99% 2.58 p<0.01 *** 
For non-parametric testing, the Corrado rank test allows for non-symmetry in the 
distribution of the returns and has proven power over the parametric tests for single-
day and short-term daily abnormal returns (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011). Its inclusion 
allows for a robust estimation of the significance in the AR values beyond parametric 
testing and was formulated specifically for use in event studies (Bailey et al., 2006; 
Fidrmuc et al., 2006) 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑂 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 = ∑𝐾𝑖𝑡/(𝑚 + 1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(4-12) 
Where: 
𝐾𝑖𝑡 = rank of the excess return 
𝑁 = number of included securities 
𝑚 = number of non-missing returns 
 
The Corrado rank test tests whether the average abnormal returns are equal to zero. 
The ranking of returns is determined asset by asset during the estimation and event 
windows, the time series of which are transformed into their respective ranks. Within 
the sector based analysis there is a risk of cross-sectional dependence in clustered 
market-model returns around the event date because the firms originate from the same 
industry (Brown and Warner, 1985). However, Boehmer et. al (1991) find that their 
standardised cross-sectional test is robust for clustering caused by same sector firms 
and is therefore useful in testing the significance of the sector and firm level returns in 
chapter 7. The specification of the test is as follows: 
Initially the returns are standardised under the following specification: 
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖) = √(𝑡2 − 𝑡1 + 1)
𝑀𝑖 − 𝑑
𝑀𝑖 − 2𝑑
 
(4-13) 
Where: 
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖) = Standardised cross-sectional abnormal return 
𝑡1  = First day of the interval period 
t2  = Last day of the interval period 
𝑀  = Characteristics of 𝑖 observation (regression) 
𝑑  = Degrees of freedom 
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The cross-sectional average of the CSAR must then be calculated as follows:  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑡1,,𝑡2) =
1
𝑁
∑𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑗=1
   
(4-14) 
Where: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = Cross-sectional abnormal return abnormal return 
𝑡1 = First day of the interval period 
t2 = Last day of the interval period 
𝑁 = Number of included securities 
𝑑 = Degrees of freedom 
 
The standard deviation of 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ must then be estimated from the cross section of the 
event window abnormal returns, shown in the following specification:  
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = √
1
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)
∑[𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑗=1
− 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑡1,,𝑡2)]
2   
(4-15) 
Where: 
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = Standardised cross-sectional abnormal return 
𝑡1  = First day of the interval period 
t2  = Last day of the interval period 
𝑁  = Number of included securities 
 
Finally the standardised cross-sectional test statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
CAAR are equal to zero is calculated as follows:  
𝑇𝐵𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑙 =
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑡1,,𝑡2)
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅)
   
(4-16) 
Where: 
𝑇𝐵𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑙 = Standardised cross-section test 
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = Standardised cross-sectional abnormal return 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  = Cross-sectional abnormal return abnormal return 
𝑡1  = First day of the interval period 
t2  = Last day of the interval period 
 
The test statistics are applied to the returns of each index, portfolio or sector to verify 
whether the event has a statistically significant and therefore causal impact on the 
assets. Large values do not automatically qualify as significant as the test relies on 
historical variance within the estimation window to determine if the abnormal return 
within the event window is significant 
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4.8 Performance ranking and descriptive statistics 
To gain an overall indication of FTSE4good performance, periods that contain at least 
one statistically significantly abnormal return was selected. Then, the abnormal returns 
during each period and for each counterpart asset (index, portfolio, and sector) were 
ranked according to their deviation away from the expected return. The rank for each 
asset across all periods was then aggregated to determine the number of times each 
asset was placed in a particular position. The following table is an example of the 
process for ranking periods with significant returns within a single asset class and 
before significance testing and descriptive statistics are generated.  
 
Table 4.9 Example of environmental portfolio ranking using returns for each portfolio  
Abnormal Returns 
 
Portfolio Ranking 
 
Rank Descriptive Statistics 
TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
 
TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
 
  TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
-11.42% -5.21% 
 
2 1 
 
1st 5 3 
-1.08% 0.61% 
 
2 1 
 
2nd 2 6 
2.42% 0.30% 
 
1 2 
 
Mean 1 2 
0.14% -0.44% 
 
1 2 
 
Count 8 8 
-0.70% -0.15% 
 
2 1 
 
   -1.49% -2.41%  1 2     
-0.97% -1.44% 
 
1 2 
 
   2.41% 1.17% 
 
1 2 
    
 
Using the ranking results, a Friedman test (Friedman, 1937) was conducted to 
determine the asymptotic significance (𝑋𝑟2 = Chi-squared) of the rankings. A Friedman 
test is a non-parametric test for a significant difference between random variables and 
is calculated through the following specification: 
 
𝑋𝑟2 =
12
𝑛𝑝(𝑝 + 1)
 ∑(∑𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
)2 − 3𝑛(𝑝 + 1)
𝑝
𝑗=1
  
(4-17) 
Where: 
𝑝 = Number of columns 
𝑛 = Number of rows 
𝑟𝑖𝑗 = rank in row 𝑖 and column 𝑗 
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The significance of the ranking confirms if the difference in performance, indicated by 
significant abnormal returns (AR, CAR), is the result of the markets recognition of 
FTSE4good ESG performance. The ranking method highlights consistency in 
performance but does not accommodate for the magnitude and distribution of each 
assets abnormal returns and the use of descriptive statistics accounts for this limitation. 
Also, where rankings are non-significant, the use of descriptive statistics provides 
deeper insight into the performance of each respective asset, as the ranking method 
fails to identify periods with substantially different returns. The descriptive statistics 
explain the distribution and main characteristics of the returns that provided either an 
increase or decrease in valuation. In line with Belghitar et al. (2014) the kurtosis and 
Skewness statistics are highlighted as important moments as investors have a 
preference for assets with positive Skewness and high kurtosis, and an aversion to 
negative skewness coupled with high kurtosis (Post et al., 2008; Dittmar, 2002). The 
following three points focus the aim of the study in determining the final conclusion; 
firstly the assets are tested across each event using the event study market model; 
secondly, each assets return (AR, AAR, CAR, CAAR) is ranked across all events; lastly 
the characteristics of the returns are defined using descriptive statistics.  
A complete set of the ranking and descriptive statistics can be found in appendix G. 
 
4.9 Limitations  
Event studies assume the rationality of the market, in-line with the efficient markets 
hypothesis (EMH) (Hayes, 2012). This assumes that the information arising from an 
event in relation to the information from FTSE4good is reflected promptly in the price of 
the asset (MacKinlay, 1997). However, if private information held by FTSE4good is 
unavailable to the extent that it is able to generate a significant difference in the market, 
the market would be inefficient in the strong EMH form as private information is not 
accurately and fully priced into the market (Hayes, 2012; Fama, 1965). 
Event studies use abnormal returns above or below the expected return in a 
counterfactual scenario, this takes into account, market, and idiosyncratic (firm specific) 
risk (MacKinlay, 1997; Scholtens and Boersen, 2011). This may not happen in reality 
for the index and portfolio analysis owing to the effects associated with diversification 
and the EMH. Diversification theory applies to portfolios and indices, where risk is 
reduced in-line with the level of diversification or mixture of firms across a range of 
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industries (Sharpe, 1994). The theory behind diversification is that negative returns in 
one asset are balanced by a positive response in another, for example, the asymmetry 
between fossil fuel and clean energy firms. 
The data relating to the classification of firms, either within their respective sector 
based case study or by ESG score portfolio, dates back only to 2007. Therefore, the 
events appropriate for firm level analysis must fall within 2007 to 2013 for an effective 
analysis; this discounts a substantial number of possible events. Furthermore, some 
industries contain a limited number of firms for an robust analysis of cumulative 
average abnormal returns (average returns across a population sample) and therefore, 
where firms are limited in number, a case wise analysis is used as is common within 
event studies (Curran and Moran, 2007; Sabet et al., 2012; Kong, 2012).  
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5 Does FTSE4good index provide resilience to ethical investors? 
This chapter presents the event study results of a financial performance comparison 
between two FTSE4good indices and the FTSE All-Share (See Appendix H). The index 
comparisons follow the event study framework presented in chapter 4. The structure of 
this chapter starts with the results for each event; followed by a discussion of the index 
analysis results. Table 5.1 shows the index ticker symbols used within this study  
 
Table 5.1 Index series and corresponding ticker identifiers 
Index Name Index ticker N 
FTSE4good Benchmark FT4GBUK 278 
FTSE4good UK 50 FT4UK50 50 
FTSE All-Share FTALLSH 672 
 
5.1 Results 
5.1.1 The 2007/08 financial crisis and FTSE4good index performance 
During the financial crisis the FT4GBUK underperformed the FTALLSH in all periods, 
reinforced by a significant event window [0, 50] cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -
1.9%, 82% below the FTALLSH at -1.04%. The FT4UK50 outperformed the FTALLSH 
with returns in line with expectations with a non-significant -0.55%. Figure 5.1 shows 
each indices CAR for the event window [0, 50], relative to their expected returns.  
 
Figure 5.1. Index abnormal returns during the financial crisis event window [0, 50]  
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The returns in Figure 5.1 show the departures from each indices expected returns 
during the event window [0, 50]. Differentiation is most evident from day 25, which 
coincides with the run UK bank Northern Rock. The following Table 5.2 shows the 
abnormal returns and statistical test results for the event window and interval periods. 
Table 5.2. Event window [0, 50] and interval period abnormal returns during the financial 
crisis  
[0, 50] (Event window) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -1.90% -2.9 0.00*** -2.45 0.01*** 
FT4UK50 -0.55% -0.74 0.46 -0.42 0.67 
FTALLSH -1.04% -2.13 0.03** -1.78 0.07* 
[0, 5] (09/08/2007 - BNP Paribas Announcement & ECB liquidity injection) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.39% -1.74 0.08* -1.72 0.09* 
FT4UK50 -0.28% -1.12 0.26 -1.36 0.17 
FTALLSH -0.21% -1.25 0.21 -1.5 0.13 
[6, 16] (17/08/2007 - FED cuts rates - warning of threat to growth) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.14% -0.47 0.64 -0.04 0.97 
FT4UK50 -0.18% -0.54 0.59 0.03 0.98 
FTALLSH 0.03% 0.12 0.90 0.92 0.36 
[17, 24] (04/09/2007 - Interbank lending at highest since 1998) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.25% -0.97 0.33 -0.82 0.41 
FT4UK50 0.11% 0.38 0.71 0.38 0.71 
FTALLSH -0.18% -0.95 0.34 -1.12 0.26 
[25, 28] (13/09/2007 - Run on Northern Rock and BOE intervention) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.58% -3.17 0.00*** -2.72 0.01*** 
FT4UK50 0.16% 0.77 0.44 1.10 0.27 
FTALLSH -0.58% -4.22 0.00*** -3.06 0.00*** 
[29, 50] (18 & 19/09/2007 - FED cuts rates and BOE injects capital) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.53% -1.23 0.22 -1.16 0.25 
FT4UK50 -0.35% -0.72 0.47 -0.65 0.51 
FTALLSH -0.10% -0.30 0.76 -0.60 0.55 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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The periods with significant average returns presented in Table 5.2 show that the 
FT4GBUK suffered the greatest losses relating to the BNP Paribas announcement and 
ECB liquidity injection [0, 5], and issues with interbank lending [26, 35]. During period 
[0, 5] the FT4GBUK generated the only significant negative abnormal return at -0.39%. 
Subsequently, during periods [6, 16] and [17, 24] all three indices generated returns 
that were non-significant and in line with expectations. However, during period [25, 28] 
both the FT4GBUK and FTALLSH generated a CAR of -0.58%, both significant at the 
1% level. During the same period the FT4UK50 generated a non-significant return of -
0.16%. The final period [29, 50] showed all index returns were negative but non-
significant despite intervention by the Bank of England’ (BOE). Under the 
circumstances of the time, interventions were viewed as positive within the market 
place (Labonte, 2011). Northern Rock was not a constituent of any index because it 
was nationalised and subsequently suspend trading on stock markets. 
A full recovery was not realised by any of the included indices over the period of 
analysis. The periods with significant returns indicate that the FT4GBUK was the 
lowest performer but the FT4UK50 showed evidence of greater performance above the 
FTALLSH. Therefore the returns of the event window and subsequent periods highlight 
the ability for the FTSE4good UK 50 to provide resilience for investors where the 
FTSE4good Benchmark index did not. 
 
5.1.2 Deep Water Horizon oil spill and FTSE4good index performance 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in 2010 
shows no significance for all three indices despite a clear trend over the event window 
[0, 50]. During this time a negative effect was detected in both FTSE4good indices with 
a return for the FT4UK50 of -1.17%, marginally significant in the t-test; the FTALLSH 
however, remained positive throughout but without statistical significance as the effects 
of the event had diminished and the indices returned to expected levels.  
The period including the event day and the announcement of the incident by BP [0, 6] 
produced no significant returns, which was expected because of the delayed release of 
information. Despite the statistical insignificance of the event window CAR, the pattern 
shown in Figure 5.2 shows a deviation from expected returns for both FTSE4good 
indices around day 35 that coincides with President Obama’s statements on drilling 
restrictions and environmental protection, the results of which are shown in Table 5.3. 
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Figure 5.2. Index analysis abnormal returns during the Deep Water Horizon oil spill event 
window [0, 50] 
 
The recognition of the magnitude of the incident by financial markets during period [7, 
25] caused downward pressure in the CAR of all three indices (see Figure 5.2). The 
FTALLSH was most resistant to these impacts with a CAR return of -0.09% compare to 
the FT4GBUK at -0.55%. However, none were statistically significant and therefore, did 
not demonstrate a difference between the indices. The first moratorium period [26, 34] 
and President Obama’s statements [35, 36] also had a minimal and statistically 
insignificant effect on the three indices as seen below in Table 5.3.  
Only the pattern of returns during the event window, as can be seen in Figure 5.2, 
shows the difference in performance between the three indices. Despite no statistical 
evidence based on the chosen periods, it is clear that the FTSE4good indices 
underperformed the FTSE All-Share. 
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Table 5.3. Index abnormal returns for the event window [0, 50] and all interval periods 
[0, 50] (Event Window) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.77% -0.74 0.46 -0.69 0.49 
FT4UK50 -1.17% -1.53 0.13 -0.93 0.35 
FTALLSH 0.35% 0.64 0.52 1.06 0.29 
[0] (Event day - Rig explosion) 
Index AR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.01% 0.10 0.92 0.24 0.81 
FT4UK50 0.03% 0.24 0.81 0.43 0.66 
FTALLSH -0.01% -0.07 0.94 -0.24 0.81 
[0, 6] (Oil rig explosion and BP announcement) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.01% -0.02 0.99 0.00 1.00 
FT4UK50 -0.15% -0.61 0.54 -0.62 0.54 
FTALLSH 0.08% 0.45 0.65 1.03 0.30 
[7, 25] (Recognition by financial markets) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.55% -0.86 0.39 -0.79 0.43 
FT4UK50 -0.47% -1.01 0.31 -0.57 0.57 
FTALLSH -0.09% -0.27 0.79 0.26 0.79 
[26, 34] (First moratorium) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.17% -0.39 0.69 -0.58 0.56 
FT4UK50 -0.43% -1.32 0.19 -0.97 0.33 
FTALLSH 0.06% 0.28 0.78 0.23 0.82 
[35, 50] (9-10 June President Obama statements) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.25% -0.43 0.67 -0.39 0.69 
FT4UK50 -0.25% -0.59 0.56 -0.38 0.70 
FTALLSH 0.19% 0.61 0.54 0.54 0.59 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
The results therefore indicate that FTSE4good’s screening yielded no benefit in risk 
mitigation and financial performance. BP was present within all three indices but as the 
size (diversification) of each index was reduced, the impact of BP’ negative returns 
increased, meaning that the FT4UK50 was most affected as its level of diversity was 
smallest.  
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5.1.3 The Iceland volcanic eruption and FTSE4good index performance 
The eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland, during 2010 caused considerable 
unexpected disruption to EU airspace. The market response indicated throughout the 
event window [0, 6] was positive and significant for both the FTSE4good indices at 
0.64% for the FT4GBUK and 0.44% for the FT4UK50. Both indices outperformed the 
FTALLSH, which traded through the entire event window period with returns close to 
expected. The event window CAR is shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The 2010 Iceland volcano eruption event window abnormal returns for two 
FTSE4good indices (FT4GBUK & FT4UK50) and FTSE All-Share (FTALLSH) 
 
The results in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the positive response by the market in 
valuing the two FTSE4good indices throughout the event window and above the 
FTALLSH which produced returns close to expected values during all periods. 
However, the market was slow to react to the developing crisis as on the event day 
only the FT4GBUK generated a positive return at 0.2%, significant at the 10% level in 
the Corrado rank.  
Period [0, 1] (shown in Table 5.4) showed the strongest evidence of differentiation with 
significant values at 0.4% for the FT4UK50 with a Corrado rank of 0.01 (significant at 
the 1% level) and the FT4GBUK at 0.36% with a Corrado rank of 0.02 (significant at 
the 5% level). This coincided with the eruption to the first day of EU airspace closure 
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and therefore covers the weekend between Friday [0] to the following Monday [1]. The 
results presented in Table 5.4 signify an increased valuation of the FTSE4good indices 
throughout the periods of EU airspace closure. Overall the results indicate that the 
market sees the closure of EU airspace as the principle source of information in 
differentiating between the respective indices.  
Table 5.4. Index event window [0, 6] and interval period abnormal returns during the 2010 
Iceland volcanic eruption  
[0, 6] (Event window) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.64% 1.66 0.10* 2.25 0.02** 
FT4UK50 0.44% 1.55 0.12* 1.4 0.16 
FTALLSH 0.27% 1.29 0.20 1.34 0.18 
[0] (Eruption of Iceland Volcano) 
Index AR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.2% 1.39 0.16 1.66 0.1* 
FT4UK50 0.17% 1.57 0.12 1.47 0.14 
FTALLSH 0.00% -0.01 0.99 0.05 0.96 
[0, 1] (Eruption to closure of EU airspace) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.36% 1.77 0.08* 2.3 0.02** 
FT4UK50 0.4% 2.63 0.01*** 2.2 0.03** 
FTALLSH 0.06% 0.57 0.57 0.76 0.45 
[2, 6] (Re-opening of EU Airspace) 
Index CAR t-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.27% 0.84 0.40 1.21 0.22 
FT4UK50 0.04% 0.17 0.87 0.26 0.79 
FTALLSH 0.2% 1.17 0.24 1.11 0.27 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
During the re-opening of EU airspace [2, 6] the FT4GBUK and FT4UK50 produced 
return values of 0.27% and 0.04% respectively. These continue a growth trend above 
the FTALLSH, which responded with a return of 0.2%. Overall the two FTSE4good 
indices significantly outperformed the FTALLSH despite the fact that aviation was 
represented evenly across all three indices. Therefore, FTSE4good screening 
appeared to provide resilience in the mitigation of risk in this particular event. 
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5.1.4 Oil price shocks and FTSE4good index performance 
The impact of oil price shocks between 2003 and 2011 was determined through 34 
shock decreases of at least -5% and 40 increases of at least 5% in the daily returns of 
Brent Crude Oil. The results show minor evidence of an inverse relationship between 
the two FTSE4good indices and crude oil returns. The FT4UK50 produced significant 
returns at the 10% level during period [0, 2] and marginal during period [0, 1]. Despite a 
negative response, the FT4GBUK showed no statistical significance resulting from 
positive oil price shocks and the FTALLSH showed significant positive return 
relationship with crude oil price increases.  
As shown in Table 5.5, the FTALLSH outperformed the two FTSE4good indices for the 
average abnormal returns indicative through a higher ratio of positive returns in all 
three periods followed by the FT4GBUK and FT4UK50 respectively. Periods that 
account for a potential lagged response, [1, 3], [2, 4] and [2, 5] were also tested but 
only one significant positive return was detected during period [2, 4] for the FTALLSH. 
In response to oil price increases the indices generated significant returns on 10 
different occasions. 
The relationship between index returns and negative oil price shocks are less 
consistent in comparison to price increases. During this analysis only 3 significant 
returns were detected; reflected by the marginal ratio of positive to negative returns 
across all assets and periods. The returns for the FT4GBUK indicate a marginally 
negative relationship to oil price decreases with a greater ratio of positive returns 
relative to negative and with marginal significance in the z-statistic, and the Corrado 
rank test at the 5% level during period [0]. The returns for the FT4GBUK during the 
event window were also significant at the 10% level in both tests. 
The results indicate through a lack of significance that the included indices are not as 
sensitive to negative oil price movements compared to positive oil price changes. 
However, a lack of statistical significance in both tests makes it difficult to determine 
any difference in performance, as only a directional observation was possible. 
Therefore, evidence suggests that the market does not see oil price movements and 
the screening of FTSE4good as fundamentally relevant in differentiating against the 
FTALLSH. 
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Table 5.5.  Index abnormal returns in response to positive changes in Brent crude oil 
returns in excess of 5% 
[0, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.04% 22:18 1.27 0.20 1.40 0.16 
FT4UK50 -0.06% 18:22 -1.10 0.27 -0.89 0.37 
FTALLSH 0.14% 28:12 3.07 0.00*** 2.93 0.00*** 
[0, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.01% 21:19 0.25 0.81 0.41 0.68 
FT4UK50 -0.06% 18:22 -1.77 0.08* -1.56 0.12 
FTALLSH 0.08% 28:12 2.98 0.00*** 2.95 0.00*** 
[0, 2] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.03% 21:19 -0.22 0.83 -0.03 0.98 
FT4UK50 -0.08% 11:29 -2.28 0.02** -2.20 0.03** 
FTALLSH 0.08% 29:11 2.59 0.01*** 2.61 0.01*** 
[1, 3] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.02% 21:19 0.08 0.94 0.24 0.81 
FT4UK50 -0.07% 16:24 -1.49 0.14 -1.46 0.14 
FTALLSH 0.06% 25:15 1.67 0.10* 1.52 0.13 
[2, 4] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.00% 19:21 0.49 0.62 0.66 0.51 
FT4UK50 -0.04% 18:22 -0.98 0.33 -1.11 0.27 
FTALLSH 0.05% 25:15 1.39 0.16 1.27 0.20 
[2, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.04% 19:21 1.38 0.17 1.43 0.15 
FT4UK50 0.00% 22:18 -0.09 0.93 0.01 0.99 
FTALLSH 0.06% 26:14 1.65 0.10* 1.50 0.13 
[0] 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.01% 19:21 -0.03 0.98 0.24 0.81 
FT4UK50 -0.02% 18:22 -1.60 0.11* -1.51 0.13 
FTALLSH 0.04% 27:13 2.39 0.02** 2.46 0.01*** 
[1] 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.00% 19:21 0.38 0.71 0.34 0.73 
FT4UK50 -0.03% 18:22 -0.91 0.36 -0.69 0.49 
FTALLSH 0.04% 27:13 1.83 0.07* 1.72 0.09* 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5.6. Index abnormal returns relative to negative returns in Brent Crude Oil in 
excess of -5% 
[0, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.02% 19:15 1.59 0.11* 1.63 0.10* 
FT4UK50 0.03% 21:13 1.21 0.22 1.47 0.14 
FTALLSH -0.01% 21:13 -0.16 0.87 1.23 0.22 
[0, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.01% 17:17 1.29 0.20 1.22 0.22 
FT4UK50 -0.01% 14:20 0.49 0.63 0.57 0.57 
FTALLSH -0.01% 17:17 -0.42 0.68 0.33 0.74 
[0, 2] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.00% 19:15 1.46 0.15 1.24 0.22 
FT4UK50 -0.02% 16:18 0.48 0.63 0.41 0.68 
FTALLSH -0.01% 24:10 -0.14 0.89 1.19 0.24 
[1, 3] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.03% 14:20 0.48 0.63 0.19 0.85 
FT4UK50 -0.05% 16:18 -0.57 0.57 -0.37 0.71 
FTALLSH 0.00% 21:13 0.13 0.90 1.63 0.10* 
[2, 4] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.02% 19:15 1.39 0.17 1.22 0.22 
FT4UK50 0.00% 18:16 0.45 0.65 0.77 0.44 
FTALLSH 0.05% 20:14 1.74 0.08* 2.33 0.02** 
[2, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.01% 16:18 1.04 0.30 1.13 0.26 
FT4UK50 0.04% 18:16 1.14 0.25 1.40 0.16 
FTALLSH 0.00% 19:15 0.09 0.92 1.27 0.21 
[0] 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK 0.04% 23:11 2.19 0.03** 2.28 0.02** 
FT4UK50 0.02% 18:16 1.24 0.22 1.27 0.20 
FTALLSH 0.03% 22:12 1.43 0.15 1.51 0.13 
[1] 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
FT4GBUK -0.03% 14:20 -0.36 0.72 -0.55 0.58 
FT4UK50 -0.02% 13:21 -0.55 0.58 -0.47 0.64 
FTALLSH -0.04% 16:18 -2.02 0.04** -1.04 0.30 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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5.1.5 Index Event study rankings and descriptive statistics  
The ranking and descriptive statistics summarise and quantify the main features of the 
index event study results (See Appendix G). Table 5.7 shows the ranking of each 
FTSE4good index returns compared (paired) with the FTSE All-Share during periods 
with at least one significant return, 19 from a total of 32 periods. The descriptive and 
Chi-squared significance statistics for the rankings are also presented. 
 
Table 5.7. Ranking and descriptive statistics for each FTSE4good index against the FTSE 
All-Share during periods with significant returns across all test events 
Rank FT4GBUK FTALLSH FT4UK50 FTALLSH 
1st 7 13 7 12 
2nd 12 6 12 7 
Rank Descriptive Stats. 
 
 
  
Mean rank 1.66 1.34 1.66 1.34 
Count (N) 19 19 19 19 
Chi-Square (𝑋2) 2.00 - 2.25 - 
Degrees of freedom (df) 1 - 1 - 
Significance (𝑝) 0.157 - 0.134 - 
 
Overall the FTSE4good indices showed evidence of under-performance across the 
included events but marginally without significance. Specifically, the FTSE4good 
Benchmark achieved a mean rank of 1.66, below the FTSE All-Share index that mean 
rank of 1.34; a result that was statistically non-significant in the Friedman test, as 
indicated by the Chi-Squared statistic, 𝑋2(2) = 2.0, and the subsequent p-value of 
𝑝 = 0.157, marginally outside the minimum 10% confidence p-value of 0.1. The 
FTSE4good UK 50 also achieved a mean rank of 1.66 compared to 1.34 for the FTSE 
All-Share that was again not statistically significant in the Friedman test because of the 
Chi-Squared statistic, 𝑋2(2) = 2.25, and the subsequent p-value of 𝑝 = 1.34, that is 
again marginally greater than the minimum 10% confidence p-value of 0.1. The 
significance of the ranking is therefore determined by the distribution of the returns in 
the descriptive statistics.  
The descriptive statistics for the 19 periods with significant returns confirm the relative 
underperformance of the FTSE4good Benchmark index and the neutrality in the 
performance of the FTSE4good UK 50 compared to the FTSE All-Share index. The 
FTSE All-Share was least effected by the events with a mean return of -0.03% 
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compared to the FTSE4good UK50 mean return of -0.06% and a widening return for 
the FTSE4good Benchmark at -0.13%. While the median for the FTSE All-Share shows 
the greatest positive value, the FTSE4good benchmark also has a positive mode 
despite generating the lowest return values of the three indices. This indicates the 
presence of outliers or extreme values within the periods that have skewed the overall 
performance of the index. This is supported by a standard error of 0.12% compared to 
0.07% for the FTSE All-Share. Therefore the FTSE4good Benchmark shows evidence 
of greater volatility throughout the 24 periods (see Table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8. Descriptive statistics of the index AR & CAR returns during the 19 periods with 
significant returns only 
  FT4GBUK FT4UK50 FTALLSH 
Mean -0.13% -0.06% -0.03% 
Standard Error 0.12% 0.08% 0.07% 
Median -0.01% -0.02% 0.04% 
Mode 0.04% -0.06% 0.06% 
Standard Deviation 0.53% 0.34% 0.31% 
Sample Variance 0.00003 0.00001 0.00001 
Kurtosis 7.12 5.93 6.58 
Skewness -2.27 -1.92 -2.37 
Range 2.54% 1.61% 1.39% 
Minimum -1.90% -1.17% -1.04% 
Maximum 0.64% 0.44% 0.35% 
Sum -2.41% -1.17% -0.62% 
Count 19 19 19 
 
While the FTSE4good UK 50 was lower than the FTSE All-Share in the mean returns, it 
managed to exhibit comparable stability throughout with a standard error of 0.08%, the 
smallest range of 1.61% and a minimum value of -1.17%. The sum of abnormal returns 
follows the same trend as the ranking and mean return statistic with a resounding 
under performance in the FTSE4good Benchmark at -2.41%, followed by the 
FTSE4good UK and FTSE All-Share at -1.17% and -0.62% respectively. Furthermore, 
the FTSE4good UK 50 produced the lowest moments of kurtosis and Skewness at 5.93 
and -1.92 respectively. The Skewness and kurtosis statistics for the FTSE4good 
benchmark and FTSE All-Share were comparable with kurtosis at 7.12 and 6.58 
64 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
respectively; and comparatively high negative Skewness in excess of -2 for both 
indices. 
Below are the descriptive statistics for the returns during all 32 periods that show 
confirmatory evidence of underperformance for the FTSE4good Benchmark and 
comparable performance for the FTSE4good UK 50 relative to the FTSE All-Share. 
 
Table 5.9 Descriptive statistics of the index returns during all 32 periods  
  FT4GBUK FT4UK50 FTALLSH 
Mean -0.13% -0.09% -0.01% 
Standard Error 0.075% 0.051% 0.043% 
Median -0.01% -0.03% 0.04% 
Mode 0.04% -0.02% -0.01% 
Standard Deviation 0.43% 0.29% 0.24% 
Sample Variance 1.809E-05 8.362E-06 5.949E-06 
Kurtosis 9.42 5.64 10.49 
Skewness -2.42 -1.66 -2.81 
Range 2.54% 1.61% 1.39% 
Minimum -1.90% -1.17% -1.04% 
Maximum 0.64% 0.44% 0.35% 
Sum -4.01% -2.85% -0.41% 
Count 32 32 32 
 
In summary, the link between FTSE4Good inclusion and financial performance, as 
represented by a comparison between the FTSE4good indices and the FTSE All-Share 
index, remains consistent with the additional insight of the descriptive statistics. 
Overall, the results are negative for the FTSE4good Benchmark and neutral/marginally 
positive for the FTSE4good UK 50. The following table presents the individual results 
for each event and the subsequent results from the ranking and descriptive statistics. 
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Table 5.10. Summary of index event study and statistical results using only periods with 
significant abnormal returns (comparison with FTSE All-Share) 
Event FTSE4good Benchmark FTSE4good UK 50 
Financial crisis  Negative Positive 
BP plc oil spill Negative Negative 
Iceland Volcanic Eruption  Positive Positive 
Oil price shocks Neutral Neutral 
Chi-Squared Test Negative Negative 
Descriptive Statistics Negative Neutral 
 
5.2 Discussion 
By comparing the FTSE4good indices with the FTSE All-Share, the current analysis is 
testing between financial performance and FTSE4good’s screening process, and 
whether this link provides adaptive resilience to firms and investors. FTSE4good is 
designed to be an index of leaders in the area of environmental, social and corporate 
governance performance. Coupled with the claim that green firms are less susceptible 
to the effects of unexpected events (HM Government, 2011a; UNEP, 2011b; Ortas et 
al., 2013; Nofsinger and Varma, 2014), evidence of this should be apparent in the 
market place if the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis are upheld and the 
sustainability inducing effects of FTSE4good’s screening criteria are present and 
assimilated by the market (Ortas et al., 2013; Hayes, 2012).  
 
5.2.1 The resilience of the FTSE4good indices 
The ranking of significant periods show that overall the FTSE4good Benchmark index 
underperformed with a mean rank of 1.66 compared to 1.34 for the FTSE All-Share. 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics reinforce the finding that the FTSE4good 
Benchmark underperformed with a mean return of -0.13% compared to the FTSE All-
Share return of -0.03%, a result that was confounded by the variance and range 
statistics that imply greater relative volatility in the FTSE4good Benchmark. The 
FTSE4good UK 50 proved to be neutral overall with underperformance in some 
aspects and outperformance in others. The return rankings were again non-significant 
and the descriptive statistics indicated a marginally lower return for the FTSE4good UK 
50 (-0.06% compared to -0.03%). However, the reduced risk inferred by lower 
skewness and kurtosis statistics suggest that on balance the FTSE4good UK 50 
66 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
cannot be differentiated from its base universe because of the inconsistent findings but 
the results for the FTSE4good Benchmark suggest that investors must pay a financial 
penalty. Therefore, with respect to resilience performance, it is evident that the 
FTSE4good Benchmark was less able to resist the effects of the events due to 
persistent downward returns below those of the FTSE All-Share; furthermore, the 
FTSE4good Benchmark showed no signs of a capacity for resilience in excess of the 
FTSE All-Share that would be evident in any return to expected return levels. 
A minority of studies find that SRI indices provide significant benefits to stock market 
performance during a shock event (Ortas et al., 2013; Brzeszczynski and McIntosh, 
2013; Ye et al., 2013). Only one found a positive link using FTSE4good; namely Ortas 
et al. (2013) who found the Spanish FTSE4good index carried less risk than the 
conventional IBEX-35 index during the 2007/08 economic crisis; a finding that is 
consistent with the event specific result for the FTSE4good UK 50 in the current 
analysis. However, Ortas et al, (2013) did not use any other events to test their 
hypothesis and the study was focused on Spanish equities only, hence the call for 
wider tests of the FTSE4good across a wider geographical area and multiple ESG 
dimensions. Opposing these findings, a more recent study by Belghitar et al. (2014) 
found evidence that a financial penalty was paid for investing in the FTSE4good UK 50 
over conventional investments, in this instance the FTSE-100; this study used weekly 
returns that may not accurately reflect volatility within the market, an interval sampling 
period that has proven loss of power compared to daily sampling (MacKinlay, 1997).  
The event specific results for the FTSE4good benchmark show that during the financial 
crisis and Deepwater Horizon rig explosion, the FTSE4good Benchmark 
underperformed relative to the FTSE All-Share despite lower representation within 
related sectors (see Table 5.11 and Table 5.12). Extreme heterogeneity among firms 
relating to their type of business has a significant effect on collective performance as 
this reflects the degree to which the asset is diversified (Cavaco and Crifo, 2014). The 
following tables (Table 5.11 and Table 5.12) therefore show the relative sector 
exposure for each index during the financial crisis and Deep Water Horizon rig 
explosion.  
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Table 5.11. Sector weightings for the FTSE All-Share and FTSE4good Benchmark during 
the financial crisis 
  
FTSE All-Share FTSE4good Benchmark 
Code Industry 
Number of 
constituents 
% 
Number of 
constituents 
% 
1 Oil & Gas 23 3 6 2 
1000 Basic Materials 28 4 7 3 
2000 Industrials 134 20 73 26 
3000 Consumer Goods 38 6 15 5 
4000 Health Care 27 4 14 5 
5000 Consumer Services 103 15 61 22 
6000 Telecommunications 9 1 7 3 
7000 Utilities 19 3 9 3 
8000 Financials 263 39 63 23 
9000 Technology 34 5 21 8 
  Total 678  100 277  100 
 
Table 5.12. Sector weighting for the FTSE All-Share and FTSE4good Benchmark during 
the Deep Water Horizon rig explosion and oil spill 
Code Industry FTSE All-Share % FTSE4good Benchmark % 
1 Oil & Gas 27 4 4 2 
1000 Basic Materials 31 5 8 3 
2000 Industrials 117 19 69 26 
3000 Consumer Goods 36 6 14 5 
4000 Health Care 17 3 10 4 
5000 Consumer Services 93 15 59 22 
6000 Telecommunications 9 1 7 3 
7000 Utilities 9 1 9 3 
8000 Financials 260 41 60 23 
9000 Technology 32 5 23 9 
  
630 100 263 100 
 
During the oil price shock analysis, although largely insignificant, the results point to 
lower performance during instances of oil price shock increases; again, a surprising 
result given the requirements to account for increased efficiency and decreased CO2 
emissions, characteristics that should reflect diminishing reliance on oil derived 
consumption (Chen and Hu, 2012). Published research on the CSR-CFP link using the 
UK FTSE4Good Benchmark is limited (Collison et al., 2008), and non-existent in 
instances of event crises. Collison et al. (2008) found that during long run periods of 
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normal trading, the FTSE4good Benchmark underperformed the FTSE All-Share using 
the risk-return CAPM. Whilst this finding does not reflect performance during a period 
of crisis, it does remain consistent with the findings of the current study.  
The oil price shock results showed non-significant deviations that are reflected in 
studies that find conventional stock market indices are relatively insulated from oil price 
movements, therefore accounting for the over performance of the FTSE All-Share 
(Kopytin, 2014; Scholtens and Yurtsever, 2012). However, a study by Ratti and Hasan 
(2013) indicates that index diversification can have a detrimental impact on risk 
exposure to oil prices depending on the industry weighting of the index. Owing to this 
relationship, it is more common to find studies relating oil price shocks to firm value 
within a specific sector such as transportation. This effect is based on the theory of 
diversification and the oil and gas sector representation for the FTSE All-Share is twice 
that of the FTSE4good Benchmark, perhaps explaining the positive relationship with oil 
price movements. Despite this, a clear difference could be seen between the event 
studies of positive and negative oil price shocks. The positive oil price returns showed 
a greater number of significant responses as the market valued the FTSE All-Share 
positively and the FTSE4good negatively. Therefore, the market showed evidence of 
greater interest in the cost implications associated with higher oil prices; with 
diminishing recognition within the results for decreasing oil shocks. This pattern 
therefore implies that the market did not see inclusion in FTSE4good as a sign of 
greater efficiency and decreased exposure to upward trending oil prices.  
Lastly, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill yielded results in favour of the FTSE All-Share 
index despite showing greater weighting in the oil and gas sector. The UK FTSE4good 
indices include the only UK firm directly associated with the incident, BP, and due to 
the comparatively small size of FTSE4good relative to the FTSE All-Share, this may be 
a direct consequence of underperformance; less firms result in less diversification and 
consequently greater relative exposure to the impacts inflicted by BP (Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006). It could have been expected that the announcements of moratoriums 
and changes to policy would have imposed downward pressure on related industries 
that would see their profits squeezed through higher operating costs and restrictions 
(Sabet et al., 2012; Fodor and Stowe, 2010).  
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5.2.2 The FTSE4good index performance, the impact of diversification and firm 
selection 
The index based results are perhaps a consequence of a range of fundamental factors 
relating to modern portfolio theory and the design of FTSE4good’s assessment criteria. 
Firstly, the mixture of firms in the population has a direct impact on the diversification of 
the indices. Particularly as CAPM theory implies that as portfolio diversification 
increases, risk adjusted returns increase (Sharpe, 1966). Therefore, testing for impacts 
related to a particular shock could be counteracted by associated firms or sectors 
within the index. Modern portfolio theory also argues that ESG indices are inherently 
more risky because of the bias caused by the inclusion of certain sectors and the 
reduced universe that in turn limits diversification (Barnett and Salomon, 2006). This 
would account for the varied response to the events used within the current study. That 
said, diversification cannot eliminate systematic risk (risks associated with the entire 
market) and, therefore, the sensitivity between the results of the FTSE4good indices 
and FTSE All-Share are likely to be limited to the risks associated with the excluded 
firms and therefore related to unsystematic risk (risk specific to the firms) (Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 5.4. The risk reducing effect of stock diversification in relation to stock frequency. 
The FTSE4good and FTSE All-Share indices are hypothetically positioned to reflect their 
size and the event study results. Adapted from (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Sharpe, 1966) 
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An interesting element in the response of the FTSE4good indices throughout the 
financial crisis of 2007-08 is that of FTSE4good’s wide range of required operational 
criteria (see section 2.3.2) where financial management is not included. Therefore, it 
should logically follow that FTSE4good firms would not outperform their base universe 
during the financial crisis. This may also be evidence of the issues associated with 
diversification, and the risk profile of the firms included in the FTSE4good and their 
exposure to the issues associated with the economic crisis; or an indirect result of the 
structural and cultural enhancements fostered by FTSE4good’s social criteria. 
However, during the financial crisis, financial services represented 39% of all firms 
within the FTSE All-Share; this compares to 23% in the FTSE4good Benchmark (see 
Table 5.11). A result that could be considered an anomaly in terms of what would was 
expected given the weighting. Therefore, the difference in performance must be 
accounted for by the markets perception of the remaining firms and how they are 
perceived to be affected by the events. 
Another interesting result is that green firms should be less wasteful and demand less 
energy, achieved through lower CO2 emissions (Munich Insurance Group, complete 
carbon neutrality at headquarters; Apple Computer Corp. 100% renewable energy at 
their data centres) (Callan and Thomas, 2009). However, there is no indication from the 
results that FTSE4good firms outperform the base universe when oil prices increase. 
This is interesting in light of the view of UNEP (2011b) that green firms carry less 
exposure to costly inputs such as energy.  Assuming the efficient markets hypothesis is 
upheld then the market would use the knowledge of greater efficiency in constituent 
firms and translate this into their market price in response to the most extreme oil price 
movements (<5% and >5%).  
 
5.2.3 Higher-order moments in the abnormal of the FTSE4good indices 
Lastly, an unusual relationship within the results centres on the level of index 
performance and the distribution of the returns characterised in the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics. Firstly, it would be expected that the lowest performers’ returns have 
a relatively lower negative skewness and higher kurtosis statistic that implies lower risk 
of extreme negative returns. However, the FTSE All-Share performed marginally better 
than the FTSE4good UK 50 in the mean returns but produced a high kurtosis (6.58) 
and the lowest skewness statistic (-2.37), greater than the lowest overall performer, the 
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FTSE4good Benchmark. Belghitar et al (2014) found that on average, conventional 
indices, the FTSE-100, showed 27% higher skewness and 15% lower kurtosis 
compared to the returns of SRI indices, in this instance the FTSE4Good UK 50. 
Therefore, whilst the FTSE All-share produced a more advantageous mean return over 
the event periods, investors would be less inclined to accept such a marginal benefit in 
the face of such relatively poor skewness and kurtosis values (Post et al., 2008; 
Dittmar, 2002). 
Therefore, whilst the FTSE4good UK 50 does not show clear signs of an advantage or 
disadvantage in terms of resilience, evidence does point to it being a more attractive 
investment than its base universe, the FTSE All-Share; a finding that is supported in 
another FTSE4good based study (Ortas et al., 2013). 
 
5.2.4 Limitations to the index analysis 
The limitations of the index based approach centre on diversification and the 
FTSE4good screening process. Firstly, by using indices in an event study, the level of 
ESG performance for included firms cannot be controlled. Therefore, the indices 
include firms according to a minimum threshold of collective ESG performance that 
may have been detrimental to the mean return performance of the indices and the 
FTSE4good Benchmark in particular. Secondly, as stated, there are issues in testing 
terms with diversification and the effect sector over representation has on the results. 
Therefore, the issues associated with ESG performance are contended with in Chapter 
6 by using FTSE4good’s ratings history where the best-in-class ESG performers are 
identified and tested against the lowest performing firms. The issue of diversification is 
then accounted for in Chapter 7 through a sector best analysis where events are tested 
against firms from the relevant sector. Furthermore, Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 show 
the industry weightings during the financial crisis and Deep Water Horizon events 
(NOTE: not weighted using market capitalisation). This highlights the potential risk of 
over-representation within an index and the potential for increased exposure between a 
particular sector and a related event, for example, financial services and the financial 
crisis of 2007/2008. 
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6 Does FTSE4good ESG ratings provide resilience for investors? 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter highlighted that the approach of comparing aggregate changes in 
indices may be inconsistent due to the effects of diversification and the potential for 
lower performing firms to be included in the series thus negating any detectable 
difference, evidence of which was shown in the results. This chapter therefore aims to 
select only the best performing firms to propagate a difference in performance that is 
detectable in the event studies. The following chapter subsequently looks at how the 
share price of firms grouped according to environmental, social and corporate 
governance performance compare to one another. The use of FTSE4good ratings as a 
means of classification has never been attempted before.   
A number of studies have however attempted to link SRI portfolios, constructed using 
subjective, researcher-led methods, with financial performance; some finding a 
negative or non-significant relationship (Brzeszczynski and McIntosh, 2013; Humphrey 
and Tan, 2014; Leite and Cortez, 2013; McPeak et al., 2010); and others a positive and 
significant link (Nofsinger and Varma, 2014; Janda et al., 2014; Chan and Walter, 
2014). The mixed findings across the literature reinforce the need to understand the 
relationship between investments and resilience as a critical component in the 
business case for driving the green economy (Stephenson, 2010). 
The following sections explain the steps taken to investigate the relationship between 
market values of the top and bottom 100 firms from FTSE4good ratings history across 
each ESG pillar. First, presenting the data used for the analysis and the rationale 
behind its use; followed by how firms were selected for each ESG group; a description 
of the indicators and event study method used to measure performance and compare 
results that are particular to the ESG portfolio analysis and beyond that of section 4; 
then the results for each portfolio followed by an overall discussion of the findings. 
 
6.2 Firm classification using FTSE4good ratings history 
FTSE4good publish bi-annual ratings of the FTSE All-Share constituents and how they 
score against the ESG assessment criteria (See Appendix I). Using FTSE4good’s 
historical ratings it was possible to identify and screen for the top 100 and bottom 100 
performing firms, within each bi-annual E, S and G pillar (See Appendix J). This 
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allowed for an analysis of the impact each shock event had on the top and bottom 
performing constituents and whether the market considered ESG performance in 
valuing these firms.  
To the author’s knowledge, this analysis of the FTSE4good data has not been 
attempted. Therefore, this represents a novel contribution to the literature.  
Investigation into this field of enquiry will clarify whether environmentally and socially 
conscious firms are more resilient to shocks, identified by their value within the market 
place. This is the first and only time to date that an ethical index administrators ratings 
have been used in this way. Previously, studies have relied on the use of the widely 
available and tradable index, the FTSE4good UK 50.  
 
6.3 Data collection 
DataStream and FTSE firm ticker mnemonics differ in many instances and are a barrier 
to swift data collection and analysis preparation, therefore, the correct firm ticker 
symbols were identified so that correct firm price data could be downloaded from 
DataStream. The top and bottom 100 firm lists from each ratings period and within 
each pillar can be found in appendix K along with price data in appendix F. Ratings are 
reviewed on a bi-annual basis; therefore, a firm’s current FTSE4good rating is based 
on its performance from the previous six month period. For example, the first published 
set of ratings were released in 2008, representing the firm’s performance since the 
second rating decision of 2007 until it is reassessed in the second rating of 2008. 
Identified firms were checked for full data availability for the estimation window and 
event window. If data was missing then deletions were made and the next ranked firm 
was included.  
FTSE4good produce ratings across a range of criteria. For the selection of firms the 
absolute scores for environmental, social, and corporate governance pillars were used 
(See Appendices J and K). 
 
6.4 ESG portfolio Event Study methodology 
The event window and estimation window for each event follows the same 
methodology presented in section 4.7, using the market model for estimation and the 
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event frame work for each individual event, details of which are found in section 4.3. 
For the analysis of firms based on ESG performance, the emphasis was on average 
abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) referred to 
as returns unless specifically stated (AAR are metrics for single days and CAAR for 
cumulative days). The average abnormal returns are calculated by dividing the sum of 
the abnormal returns by the number of observations (shown in equation 6-6); and the 
subsequent calculation of cumulative average abnormal returns are shown in equation 
(4-7). With each sample size of 100 firms the standard statistical significance tests 
used for this analysis are robust in line with comments from Gujarati (2011) and the 
event study literature (Curran and Moran, 2007; Aggarwal et al., 2012a; Aslam and 
Kang, 2013). For clarification the tests for statistical significance are the z-test and 
Corrado rank test (Corrado, 1989). 
The return results reflect the abnormal deviation from its expected result and not from 
another asset, such as a competing portfolio. For example, the tables showing AAR 
and CAAR for the portfolio of bottom 100 social firms represents the abnormal 
deviation from the expected return for the same portfolio of firms using the market 
model (Chapter 4.7). The returns for each portfolio are then compared within the tables 
highlighting significance and magnitude. 
 
6.5 Environmental portfolio performance results 
The following chapters present the results of a comparison of portfolios classified 
according to top and bottom 100 firms from FTSE4good’s environmental performance 
ratings history. Only periods with significant abnormal returns (CAR, AR, CAAR and 
AAR) are considered with the z-statistic and Corrado rank test p-values for indication of 
confidence that the event had a significant impact on the assets. Firms were selected 
from periods that correspond to the event in question and their financial time series 
data were obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream service. Each firm’s respective 
social, environmental or governance score is not a pre-requisite for inclusion in 
FTSE4good as some firms score highly in one or two pillars but are still excluded from 
because of a low score in the third pillar and subsequently their overall rating.  
All results are presented but a complete set can be found in appendix L. 
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6.5.1 The financial crisis and environmental portfolio performance  
The market response during the financial crisis event window [0, 50] shows the top 100 
environmental firms underperformed with a CAAR 105% below that of the bottom 100 
firms. The following results show evidence of underperformance in the returns for the 
environmental portfolios starting with the event window [0, 50]. 
 
Table 6.1. The financial crisis abnormal returns during the event window [0, 50] for firms 
classified by environmental performance  
[0, 50] (Event window) 
Portfolio CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -11.56% 17 : 83 -11.85 0.00*** -2.94 0.00*** 
BOTTOM 100 -5.64% 36 : 64 -4.72 0.00*** -1.22 0.22 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 6.1  and Figure 6.1, the event had a significant overall effect on the 
top 100 environmental firms with an average return of -11.56% compared to -5.64% for 
the bottom 100 environmental firms. Furthermore, of the top 100 firms produced 17 
positive returns against 83 negative compared to a 40:60 split for the bottom 100 firms. 
The returns for both indices were significant in the z-statistic p-value but only the top 
100 was significant in the Corrado rank test. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Abnormal returns for firms classified by environmental performance during 
the event window [0, 50] of the financial crisis 
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The AAR for the event day [0] produced no significant values but the period that 
includes the event day when BNP Paribas Announced issues with sub-prime debt, to 
the day when the ECB injected liquidity into capital markets [0, 5], a significant decline 
was detected at the 1% level in the CAAR for the top and bottom portfolios. The results 
for which are shown in Table 6.2. In this instance the top 100 firms outperformed the 
bottom 100 and both were significant in the z-test at the 1% confidence level but the 
bottom 100 had the highest ratio of positive to negative firm returns at 38:62. 
 
Table 6.2. Abnormal returns for firms classified by environmental performance during 
periods [0] and [0, 5] 
[0] (BNP Paribas Announcement) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.13% 46 : 54 -0.74 0.46 -0.21 0.83 
BOTTOM 100 0.17% 54 : 46 -0.17 0.86 0.39 0.69 
[0, 5] (BNP Paribas Announcement & ECB liquidity injection) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.97% 48 : 52 -2.73 0.01*** -0.44 0.66 
BOTTOM 100 -1.44% 38 : 62 -3.37 0.00*** -0.92 0.36 
[6, 16] (FED cuts rates - warning of threat to growth) 
Portfolio CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.53% 43 : 57 -1.43 0.15 0.02 0.98 
BOTTOM 100 -0.56% 42 : 58 -1.06 0.29 -0.11 0.92 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The following period [6, 16] shown in Table 6.3 represents the rate cut by the US 
Federal Reserve (FED) that implied a warning of a threat to growth but the market 
viewed this action to be beneficial and responded with positive returns in both 
portfolios. The top 100 traded at -0.53%%, compared to a marginally lower return for 
the bottom 100 at -0.56%%. This result was non-significant in the z-test and Corrado 
rank test.  
Around day 26 of the event window, the returns for both indices witnessed a substantial 
decrease over ten days that coincided with increasing difficulties with interbank lending 
as the majority of firm returns were negative as shown in the ratios. The returns for the 
period when interbank lending became a significant issue are presented in the 
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following table (Table 6.3) along with market reaction to the run on UK bank, Northern 
Rock during period [25, 28] and the US Federal Reserve Bank rate cut [29, 50]. 
The returns for period [17, 24] indicate a greater impact on the top 100 firms at -1.85% 
compared to -0.14% for the bottom 100. Only the Top 100 was significant at the 1% 
level in the z-test p-values. Confounding this effect was the run on UK bank, Northern 
Rock [25, 28] as out of the top 100 firm returns 80 were negative and a mean return of 
-4.2% and significant in both the z-statistic and Corrado rank test at the 1% level; the 
bottom 100 produced 72 negative returns with a total mean of 3.32%, also significant at 
the 1% level in the z-test and Corrado rank test. This widening relationship continues in 
the final period [29, 50] when the US FED cut interest rates again and the Bank of 
England (BoE) injected liquidity into UK capital markets. The bottom 100 responded 
with a return of -0.19% above expected with a marginally even split of positive to 
negative firms and no significance. The top 100 however, produced a CAAR of -4.01%, 
significant in both the z-test and Corrado rank test and a positive to negative firm ratio 
of 27 : 23. 
 
Table 6.3. The abnormal returns for firms classified by environmental performance 
during periods [17, 24], [25, 28] and [29, 50] 
[17, 24] (Interbank lending at highest since 1998) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.85% 29 : 71 -4.97 0.00*** -1.19 0.23 
BOTTOM 100 -0.14% 46 : 54 -0.29 0.77 -0.16 0.87 
[25, 28] (Run on Northern Rock) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -4.2% 20 : 8 -15.10 0.00*** -3.88 0.00*** 
BOTTOM 100 -3.32% 28 : 72 -9.63 0.00*** -3.67 0.00*** 
[29, 50] (FED cuts rates and BoE injects capital) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -4.01% 27 : 73 -6.17 0.00*** -1.9 0.06** 
BOTTOM 100 -0.19% 54 : 46 -0.4 0.69 0.36 0.72 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
While a discernible difference could not be established in the early stages, the pattern 
of returns in Figure 6.1 highlight a diverging trend that continued since the interbank 
lending issues during period [17, 24] to the end of the window on day [50]. Therefore, 
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the analysis indicates that the highest performing environmental firms did not provide 
resilience for investors over and above the lowest performing firms during the financial 
crisis.  
 
6.5.2 Deep Water Horizon oil spill and environmental portfolio performance 
Following on from the index analysis of the market response to the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill, FTSE4good firms were classified from the 2nd round of ratings in 2010 that 
covered the date of the incident. Overall, during the event window, the market 
response to the spill was greater for the bottom 100 firms who produced an inverse 
average return of -0.16% compared to the top 100 firms’ average return of 1.35%, both 
however were insignificant. The following figure (Figure 6.2) shows the development of 
the returns for the top and bottom firms respectively. Notably, the returns for the top 
100 remain above expected throughout and the returns for the bottom 100 turn 
negative when financial markets recognise the severity of the incident. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Development of the abnormal returns during the Deep Water Horizon oil spill 
event window [0, 50] for firms classified by environmental performance 
 
On the event day [0], the bottom 100 firms generated a negative non-significant 
average return of -0.44% that was below the top 100’ non-significant positive return of 
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0.14%. When the BP announcement was made [2, 6], both portfolios generated 
positive non-significant returns as the top 100 produced a CAAR of 0.07%, and the 
bottom 100 at 0.21%. The returns for the period when markets first took stock of the 
event [6, 26] showed a greater negative response for the bottom 100 with a non-
significant average return of -1.5% compared to a non-significant return for the top 100 
at -0.976%. The results are presented in Table 6.4 along with the first moratorium [26, 
34] and President Obama’s address to congress [35, 50]. 
 
Table 6.4. Abnormal returns for firms classified by environmental performance during the 
event window [0, 50] and all interval periods 
[0, 50] (Event Window) 
Portfolio   Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.35% 57 : 43 1.29 0.2 0.7 0.49 
BOTTOM 100 0.16% 49 : 51 0.81 0.42 0.76 0.45 
[0] (Event day - Rig explosion) 
Portfolio AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.14% 47 : 53 0.39 0.69 0.16 0.87 
BOTTOM 100 -0.44% 45 : 55 -1.67 0.1* -0.45 0.66 
[2, 6] (Oil rig explosion and BP announcement) 
Portfolio CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.07% 48 : 52 -0.72 0.47 -0.29 0.77 
BOTTOM 100 0.21% 51 : 49 0.54 0.59 0.27 0.79 
[7, 25] (Recognition by financial markets) 
Portfolio CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.97% 40 : 60 -1.04 0.3 0.04 0.97 
BOTTOM 100 -1.5% 46 : 54 -0.86 0.39 0.24 0.81 
[26, 34] (First moratorium) 
Portfolio CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.13% 61 : 39 2.49 0.01*** 0.62 0.54 
BOTTOM 100 0.19% 48 : 52 0.56 0.57 0.26 0.79 
[35, 50] (9-10 June President Obama statements) 
Portfolio CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.07% 61 : 39 0.59 0.55 0.33 0.74 
BOTTOM 100 1.05% 55 : 45 1.4 0.16 0.5 0.62 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
80 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
The first moratorium period [26, 34] showed significant differences between the two 
portfolios with returns at 1.13% for the top 100 and 0.19% for the bottom 100. The 
subsequent statements by President Obama produced a non-significant response in 
the top 100 with an average return of -0.07%, compared to another insignificant bottom 
100 return of 1.05%.  
The pattern of the CAARs throughout the event window and event periods indicate that 
firms selected on the basis of environmental performance provide a capacity for 
resilience in response to an environmental disaster of this type; this is despite BP’ 
inclusion within the top 100 group of firms. 
 
6.5.3 The Japanese earth quake and environmental portfolio performance  
The Japanese earth quake of 2011 was an unexpected and unprecedented event that 
moved global markets (The Telegraph, 2011). During the window for this event [0, 10], 
the top 100 significantly underperformed the bottom 100 with respective average 
abnormal returns of -1.04% and -0.37%. The only diversions between the two portfolios 
occurred during periods [0, 3] and [6, 10} respectively. The CAAR for the event window 
are shown below in Table 6.5 and the pattern of returns in Figure 6.3. 
 
Table 6.5. The Japan earth quake event window abnormal returns for firms classified by 
environmental performance  
[0, 10] (Two working week event window) 
Portfolio CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.04% 42 : 58 -2.37 0.02** -0.92 0.36 
BOTTOM 100 -0.37% 44 : 56 -0.73 0.47 -0.04 0.97 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The early stages of the event (shown in Figure 6.3) are the most pertinent as they 
reflect the immediate impact of the earthquake and the announcements regarding the 
Fukushima nuclear reactor leak, to which Germany responded by suspending their 
nuclear energy programme [0, 3].  
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Figure 6.3. Abnormal returns during the Japanese earth quake event window for firms 
classified by environmental performance 
 
Overall, Figure 6.3 shows a distinctly flat trend for the top 100 portfolio as the actual 
returns trade close to expected values but the average returns for the bottom 100 show 
a significant dip on day [2] with an AAR of -1.74, significant in both the z-statistic and 
Corrado rank test at the 1% level. The results for the event day show that the top 100 
responded with a greater negative average return of -0.47% that was significant at the 
1% level in the z-test and the 10% level in the Corrado rank test. The bottom 100 was 
less affected with an average return of -0.32%, significant in only the z-test. The 
average returns for the event day [0], the announcements of a reactor leak and 
suspension of Germany’s nuclear energy programme [0, 3] can be seen in Table 6.6. 
The periods that represent the first and second trading week following the disaster 
produced no significant average abnormal returns that perhaps reflects the diminishing 
effect of the event on UK financial markets as values quickly returned to trading in an 
expected price range. 
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Table 6.6. The abnormal returns for firms classified by environmental performance 
during periods [0], [0, 3], [1, 5] and [6, 10] 
[0] (Earth quake & announcement that nuclear power stations have been shut down) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.7% 33 : 67 -4.72 0.00*** -1.67 0.09 
BOTTOM 100 -0.15% 45 : 55 -0.61 0.54 -0.42 0.68 
[0, 3] (Announcement of nuclear reactor leak & Germany announces suspension of nuclear programme) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.38% 45 : 55 -2.6 0.01*** -0.62 0.53 
BOTTOM 100 -0.88% 44 : 56 -1.95 0.05** -0.59 0.56 
[1, 5] (First trading week following the Friday quake) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.55% 55 : 45 1.09 0.28 0.61 0.54 
BOTTOM 100 0.25% 50 : 50 0.41 0.68 0.25 0.8 
[6, 10] (Second trading week following the quake) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.93% 34 : 66 -2.85 0.00*** -1.1 0.27 
BOTTOM 100 0.51% 50 : 50 0.74 0.46 0.37 0.71 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The results from Table 6.6 and the pattern of returns in Figure 6.3 indicate that the 
effects of the event are not statistically significant for the top and bottom 100 firms until 
the announcement by Germany of a suspension in their nuclear energy plans. This 
effect is more localised for the UK and, therefore, statistically significant for both 
portfolios. Consequently, the results appear to show evidence that during an event of 
growing environmental severity, environmental screening provides resilience for 
investors. 
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6.5.4 The Icelandic volcano eruption and environmental portfolio performance 
The unexpected volcanic eruption of 2010 in Iceland proved relevant in the valuation of 
the top 100 environmental firms with an event window CAAR of 2.42%. The top 100 
significantly outperformed the bottom 100 with a z-statistic of 1% confidence and 10% 
in Corrado rank test but the bottom 100 generated a non-significant average return of 
0.3% (Figure 6.4 and Table 6.7). 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Abnormal returns during the Iceland eruption event window for firms 
classified by environmental performance 
 
The event day [0] produced no significant returns, as early on, the eruption appeared to 
be irrelevant in the valuation of both portfolios. The greatest effect was detected during 
period representing EU airspace re-opening where the only significant return was 
detected (see Table 6.7). During the EU airspace closure period [0, 1], the top 100 
firms’ produced a non-significant average return of 0.49%. The re-opening of EU 
airspace during period [2, 6] saw the top 100 outperform the bottom with a z-test and 
Corrado rank test significant return of 1.94% compared to a marginally expected return 
for the bottom 100 at 0.08%. 
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Table 6.7. Abnormal returns during the closure of EU airspace period for firms classified 
by environmental performance 
[0, 6] (Event Window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 2.42% 72 : 28 4.02 0.00*** 1.73 0.08* 
BOTTOM 100 0.3% 56 : 44 0.37 0.71 0.44 0.66 
[0] (Eruption of Iceland Volcano) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.1% 46 : 54 0.44 0.66 -0.01 0.99 
BOTTOM 100 0.06% 48 : 52 0.07 0.95 0.10 0.92 
[0, 1] (Eruption to closure of EU airspace) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.49% 47 : 53 1.15 0.25 0.31 0.76 
BOTTOM 100 0.38% 52 : 48 0.70 0.48 0.28 0.78 
[2, 6] (Re-opening of EU Airspace) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.94% 72 : 28 4.03 0.00*** 1.85 0.06* 
BOTTOM 100 -0.08% 46 : 54 -0.01 0.99 0.35 0.73 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Evidence therefore suggests that despite limited significance, the upper limits of 
environmental performance provided resilience due to excess performance in abnormal 
return generation of the top 100 environmental firms above expected values and the 
abnormal returns of the bottom 100 firms. This is despite even representation of the 
aviation and tourism industries within both portfolios. 
 
6.5.5 The US presidential election results and environmental portfolio 
performance 
The analysis of firms classified according to environmental performance yielded mixed 
results throughout the event window [-1, 5] as in the early stages the top 100 showed a 
marginal advantage that later diminished when the bottom 100 performed better in the 
later stages of the event window; at which point both portfolios returned to expected 
levels, with an event window return of -0.1% for the top 100 and -0.33% for the bottom 
100; the pattern of which can be seen in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5. The abnormal returns during the US presidential election event window [-1, 5] 
for firms classified by environmental performance 
 
The periods surrounding the presidential announcement [-1, 1] shows the market 
generated negative average returns for both portfolios that are significant in the z-test 
and the Corrado rank test. The bottom 100 firms generated the greatest negative 
impact with an average return of -2.41%, below the average return of the top 100 at -
1.49 (Table 6.8). These results indicate an advantage of resilience to the effects of the 
event in the early stages. 
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Table 6.8. Abnormal returns during the US presidential election periods for firms 
classified by environmental performance 
[-1, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.1% 53:47 -0.47 0.64 -0.23 0.82 
BOTTOM 100 -0.33% 50:50 -0.61 0.54 -0.58 0.56 
[-1, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.49% 31:69 -4.02 0.00*** -1.69 0.09* 
BOTTOM 100 -2.41% 30:70 -5.26 0.00*** -2.28 0.02** 
[0, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.47% 83:17 -5.63 0.00*** -2.55 0.01*** 
BOTTOM 100 -1.77% 30:70 -4.8 0.00*** -1.97 0.05** 
[0, 2] 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.83% 31:69 -5.74 0.00*** -2.67 0.01*** 
BOTTOM 100 -1.63% 32:68 -3.76 0.00*** -1.43 0.15 
[0, 3] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.42% 34:66 -3.74 0.00*** -1.55 0.12 
BOTTOM 100 -1.15% 40:60 -2.28 0.02** -0.79 0.43 
[0, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.08% 49:51 -0.92 0.36 -0.53 0.6 
BOTTOM 100 0.32% 51:49 0.29 0.77 -0.16 0.88 
[2, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.39% 61:39 2.86 0.00*** 1.16 0.25 
BOTTOM 100 2.09% 67:33 3.76 0.00*** 1.2 0.23 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Initially the response to the announcement of a winner for the presidential election was 
in favour of top 100 environmental firms, but this was short lived. The following period 
represents the event day down to the event window low [0, 2] during which both 
portfolios generated negative average returns. The top portfolio was most affected with 
a CAAR of -1.83% followed by the bottom 100 at -1.63%. This difference in 
performance continues for the remainder of the event periods with a negative return for 
the top 100 at -1.42% compared to the bottom 100 at -1.15% in period [0, 3]. During 
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the recovery period [2, 5] the bottom 100 sowed greater signs of resilience with positive 
average return of 2.09% compared to a top 100 return of 1.39%. All returns were 
significant at the 1% level in the z-test p-value. 
The results show a negligible difference between the two portfolios. However, period 
[0, 2] shows a significant advantage for the bottom 100 portfolio implying that the re-
election was viewed by the market as detrimental to firms with high environmental 
credentials but the inclusion of pre-event days such as the event window [-1, 5] 
suggests that markets anticipated the winner and began to value the firms accordingly. 
In this case the bottom 100 had already been valued negatively before subsequent 
periods and consequently the top 100 showed evidence of resilience in protecting 
shareholder wealth; whilst the bottom 100 showed greater evidence of resilience. 
 
6.5.6 Environmental portfolio rankings and descriptive statistics 
The following tables show the abnormal return rankings and descriptive statistics for 
each environmental performance portfolio using only periods with significant abnormal 
returns (See Appendix G). As was reflected within some events, the ranking of 
environmental portfolios indicates a mean equality between the two portfolio classes 
with even ranking and consequently a non-significant Chi-Squared statistic 𝑋2(1) =
0.00, with a 𝑝𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 1.00. Therefore, ranked periods imply that selecting firms using 
FTSE4good’ environmental ratings did not provide an advantage or disadvantage for 
investors. 
 
Table 6.9. Ranking statistics for periods with significant returns 
Rank Descriptive Statistics TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
1st 9 9 
2nd 9 9 
Mean 1.5 1.5 
Sum 27 27 
Count 18 18 
Chi-Square (𝑋2) 0.00 - 
Degrees of freedom (df) 1 - 
Significance (𝑝) 1.00 - 
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However, the descriptive statistics for periods with significant abnormal returns are 
more indicative, showing a resilient capacity for the portfolio of bottom 100 
environmental performance firms with a mean return of -0.9% compared to a top 100 
mean return of -1.4%. Furthermore, the top 100 showed greater volatility through a 
greater minimum and maximum score at -11.56% and 2.42% respectively (range = 
13.98%). This compares to the bottom 100 minimum and maximum statistic of -5.64% 
and 2.09% respectively (range=7.73%). The standard deviation and variance statistics 
for the top 100 also indicate that whilst the two portfolios ranked equally over the 
significant periods, the top 100 showed signs of greater volatility compared to a 
relatively more stable set of figures from the bottom 100. 
 
Table 6.10. Descriptive statistics for periods with significant returns of firms classified by 
environmental performance 
  TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
Mean -1.4% -0.9% 
Standard Error 0.729% 0.399% 
Median -1.01% -0.41% 
Standard Deviation 3.09% 1.69% 
Sample Variance 0.096% 0.029% 
Kurtosis 6.73 2.82 
Skewness -2.15 -1.21 
Range 13.98% 7.73% 
Minimum -11.56% -5.64% 
Maximum 2.42% 2.09% 
Sum -24.83% -16.52% 
Count 18 18 
 
The Skewness and kurtosis statistics show substantial differences that reflect 
performance. The top 100 produced the highest kurtosis value at 6.73 compared to 
2.82 for the bottom 100; and the Skewness statistics for the top 100 was -2.15 
compared to -1.21 for the bottom 100. Therefore, whilst the ranking of significant 
periods produced an equal and non-significant result, the descriptive statistics indicate 
that firms picked using FTSE4good environmental ratings history data set do not 
provide a capacity for resilience over the lowest rated firms.  
 
89 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
6.6 Social portfolio performance results 
The following chapter presents the results for the comparison between the cumulative 
average abnormal returns of the top 100 and bottom 100 firms classified according to 
FDTSE4good’s social ratings (See Appendix L).  
 
6.6.1 Financial crisis and social portfolio performance 
During the financial crisis, the top 100 firms outperformed the bottom 100 over the 
event window with an cumulative average abnormal return of -5.86%, 65% above the 
bottom 100 at -8.08%, both were significant in the z-test and the bottom 100 
additionally in the Corrado rank test (see Table 6.11). During the event day, the bottom 
100 generative negative returns at -0.42%, significant in the z-test at the 1% level; the 
top 100 generated a return close to expected and therefore with significance. Period [0, 
5] shows that the bottom 100 responded with a significant return of -2.33% compared 
to a non-significant return for the top 100 at -0.09%. The results for the event window 
[0, 60] and periods [0], [0, 5] and [6, 16] are shown below in Table 6.11. 
 
Table 6.11. Abnormal returns for firms classified by social performance during periods 
[0], [0, 5] and [6, 16] of the financial crisis 
[0, 50] (Event window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -5.86% 31 : 69 -6.49 0.00*** -1.87 0.06* 
BOTTOM 100 -8.08% 30 : 70 -6.69 0.00*** -2.15 0.03** 
[0] (BNP Paribas Announcement) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.02% 45 : 55 0.04 0.97 -0.13 0.90 
BOTTOM 100 -0.42% 44 : 56 -2.96 0.00*** -0.79 0.43 
[0, 5] (BNP Paribas Announcement & ECB liquidity injection) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.09% 46 : 54 -0.63 0.53 -0.18 0.85 
BOTTOM 100 -2.33% 38 : 62 -4.81 0.00*** -1.76 0.08* 
[6, 16] (FED cuts rates - warning of threat to growth) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.11% 47 : 53 -0.56 0.58 0.24 0.81 
BOTTOM 100 -0.38% 48 : 52 -0.58 0.56 -0.20 0.84 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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The period that represents the rate cut by the US Federal Reserve Bank [6, 16] shows 
the bottom 100 responded with an average return of 0.38% compared to the top 100 
return of just 0.11%. Figure 6.6 charts the cumulative abnormal return movements of 
both portfolios during the event window [0, 50] highlighting a difference in the 
cumulative performance that represents resilience from the impacts associated with the 
event. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. The abnormal returns during the financial crisis event window for firms 
classified by social performance 
 
Figure 6.6 shows a clear difference between the two portfolios throughout despite 
some similarities in the overall trend. The clearest indication of a difference occurs 
around the period when interbank lending was perceived as a substantial risk [17, 24]. 
During this period the bottom 100 portfolio was least affected by the change in 
interbank lending rates with an average non-significant return of -0.64%; this compares 
to a significant negative return for the top 100 firms who had a higher ratio of positive to 
negative returns and therefore produced an average return of -1.15%, significant at the 
1% level in the z-test and marginally close to 10% in the Corrado rank test (see Table 
6.12). 
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Table 6.12. Abnormal returns during periods [17, 24], [25, 28] and [29, 50] for firms 
classified by social performance 
[17, 24] (Interbank lending at highest since 1998) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.15% 27 : 73 -3.69 0.00*** -1.53 0.13 
BOTTOM 100 -0.64% 38 : 62 -1.23 0.22 -0.43 0.67 
[25, 28] (Run on Northern Rock) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -2.5% 30 : 70 -8.64 0.00*** -2.80 0.01*** 
BOTTOM 100 -3.03% 26 : 74 -9.04 0.00*** -3.17 0.00*** 
[29, 50] (FED cuts rates and BoE injects capital) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -2% 40 : 60 -3.25 0.00*** -0.81 0.42 
BOTTOM 100 -1.71% 45 : 55 -2.66 0.01*** -0.61 0.54 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 6.12 also shows the market response to the run on UK bank, Northern Rock, 
where the top 100 firms produced a negative average return of -2.5%, significant at the 
1% level in the z-test and Corrado rank, compared to the bottom 100 at -3.03%, 
statistically significant in both the z-test and Corrado rank test. The negative trend 
continued in period [29, 50] when as the bottom 100 performed best with a return of -
1.71% compared to the top 100 CAAR of -2%, both returns statistically significant in the 
z-test.  
Based on the evidence and despite a marginal difference in the later stages of the 
event, FTSE4good’s social screening fostered a capacity for resilience that investors 
can capitalise on as the top 100 outperformed the bottom 100. 
 
6.6.2 Deep Water Horizon oil spill and social portfolio performance 
The social performance portfolio response to the Deep Water Horizon oil spill indicates 
a marginal performance advantage for the top 100 firms with an event window average 
return of -0.8% compared to the bottom 100 at -0.95%. Despite this difference, both 
were statistically insignificant, leaving determination of differences down to the 
individual periods within the event window. The returns within the window showed 
volatility throughout, the pattern of which can be seen in Figure 6.7 and the 
corresponding results for the CAAR periods in Table 6.13. 
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Figure 6.7. Deep Water Horizon oil rig explosion event window abnormal returns for firms 
classified by social performance 
 
From Figure 6.7 it is evident that the event day produced no significant returns for 
either portfolio due to the lack of available information. The BP announcement period 
[2, 6] generated a positive return that were in line with expected for the top 100 at 
0.08% but non-significantly, and the bottom 100 at -0.48%, again non-significant. The 
results for the BP announcement period [2, 6], recognition by financial markets [7, 25], 
the first moratorium [26, 34], and the Obama statements [35, 50] are shown in Table 
6.13. 
The period of recognition by financial markets [7, 25] generated only a single significant 
return as the top 100 averaged -1.71%, marginal difference from the average return of 
the bottom 100 at -1.74%. The top 100 showed greater evidence of a stronger rebound 
in response to the news of the first moratorium with a significant return of 0.5%; and the 
bottom 100 responded with an non-significant CAAR of 0.3%. The Obama statements 
do not generate any significant returns despite a difference; at -0.47% for the top 100 
and 0.66% for the bottom 100. Furthermore, the difference between the two ratio of 
positive to negative firms are marginal. 
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Table 6.13. Abnormal returns for firms classified by social performance during all periods 
[0, 50] (Event Window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.8% 53 : 47 0.27 0.79 0.67 0.5 
BOTTOM 100 -0.95% 50 : 50 0.29 0.78 0.38 0.7 
[0] (Event day - Rig explosion) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.02% 50 : 50 0.35 0.73 0.19 0.85 
BOTTOM 100 -0.22% 45 : 55 -0.45 0.65 -0.27 0.79 
[2, 6] (Oil rig explosion and BP announcement) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.08% 47 : 53 -0.28 0.78 -0.21 0.83 
BOTTOM 100 -0.48% 42 : 58 -0.79 0.43 -0.17 0.87 
[7, 25] (Recognition by financial markets) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.71% 39 : 61 -1.70 0.09* -0.14 0.89 
BOTTOM 100 -1.74% 45 : 55 -1.27 0.20 -0.10 0.92 
[26, 34] (First moratorium) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.5% 57 : 43 1.72 0.09* 0.68 0.50 
BOTTOM 100 0.3% 55 : 45 0.79 0.43 0.31 0.76 
[35, 50] (9-10 June President Obama statements) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.47% 57 : 43 0.13 0.90 0.39 0.70 
BOTTOM 100 0.66% 60 : 40 1.31 0.19 0.39 0.69 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The results indicated that the selection of the highest socially responsible firms 
provides marginally better performance during a man-made environmental crisis of this 
type as the portfolio of top firms resisted the impacts of the shock throughout the event 
window.  
6.6.3 Japanese earth quake and social performance portfolio  
The response to the Japan earth quake in valuing the social portfolios followed a 
similar pattern to that of the environmental portfolio result of the same event (see 
chapter 6.5.3). Again the portfolio of top 100 firms marginally underperformed on the 
event day with an AAR of -0.46%, significant at the 10% level in the Corrado rank test, 
and the periods relating to the announcement by Germany are most representative of a 
difference. 
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Figure 6.8. Japan earth quake event window [0, 10] abnormal returns for firms classified 
by social performance 
 
For the bottom 100 Figure 6.8 shows a deviation away from expected levels the day 
following the event whilst the top 100 remained comparatively close to its expected 
returns. This pattern appears to relate to the announcement by Germany of an 
intention to cancel their nuclear energy programme. This would have both positive and 
negative implications for the utilities sector and firms linked to the supply of energy. 
However, the cumulative average abnormal returns for the event window do not reflect 
the announcement as the top 100 produced a mean return of -1.04% compared to the 
bottom 100 return of -0.37%. Only the return of the top 100 was significant in the z-test 
with a p-value of 0.02 denoting confidence at the 5% level. These results are shown in 
Table 6.14. 
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Table 6.14. Japan earthquake event window [0, 10] and event day [0] abnormal returns for 
firms classified by social performance 
[0, 10] (Two working week event window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.04% 42 : 58 -2.37 0.02** -0.92 0.36 
BOTTOM 100 -0.37% 44 : 56 -0.73 0.47 -0.04 0.97 
[0] (Earth quake & announcement that nuclear power stations have been shut down) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.47% 35 : 65 -3.51 0.00*** -1.71 0.09* 
BOTTOM 100 -0.32% 41 : 59 -1.65 0.1* -0.74 0.46 
[0, 3] (Announcement of nuclear reactor leak & Germany announces suspension of nuclear programme) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.61% 43 : 57 -2.85 0.00*** -1.08 0.28 
BOTTOM 100 -0.97% 42 : 58 -2.31 0.02** -0.58 0.56 
[1, 5] (First trading week following the Friday quake) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.25% 50 : 50 0.48 0.63 0.41 0.68 
BOTTOM 100 -0.01% 49 : 51 -0.22 0.82 0.23 0.82 
[6, 10] (Second trading week following the quake) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.82% 36 : 64 -2.42 0.02** -1.01 0.31 
BOTTOM 100 -0.04% 49 : 51 -0.12 0.91 0.04 0.97 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
During period [0, 3] the bottom 100 underperformed with an average return of -0.97%, 
below the return of the top 100 firms at -0.61%, both significant at the 1% level in the z-
test. The drop in CAAR for the bottom 100 coincides with the policy decision by 
Germany to cease all nuclear energy plans. The top 100 firms show consistency and 
relative stability albeit below expected levels throughout the periods shown in Table 
6.14 but a curtailment in performance occurs in the later part of the event window that 
is difficult to account for. 
Therefore, based on the results it is again marginal in determination of whether the 
highest performing socially responsible firms provide greater resilience for investors. 
However based on the significant periods surrounding the event, the top 100 social 
firms show limited evidence of a reduced exposure to the event, a conclusion that is 
reinforced by the pattern of returns in Figure 6.8 
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6.6.4 The Icelandic volcano eruption and social performance portfolio 
The market response to the volcanic eruption of 2010 in Iceland follows an almost 
identical pattern to the environmental portfolios. During the event window, the portfolio 
of top 100 socially responsible firms outperformed the bottom 100 with a return of 
1.59%, significant at the 1% level in the z-test with a p-value of 0.01. The event window 
results are shown Figure 6.9 and Table 6.15. 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Abnormal returns during the Iceland volcano eruption for firms classified by 
social performance 
 
For the event window the top 100 significantly out performs the bottom 100 but a 
greater disparity would be expected between in subsequent days because this 
represents the peak negative period of the crisis when the airspace above Europe was 
closed, grounding all aircraft. However, the results for the closure of EU airspace 
period [0, 1] produced no significant returns at 0.37% for the top 100 and 0.47% for the 
bottom 100. 
The difference between the two portfolios becomes substantial upon the re-opening of 
EU airspace [2, 6] with a return for the top 100 at 1.23%, significant in the z-test and 
the Corrado rank test. The bottom 100 returned to expected levels without a significant 
return at -0.32%. Based on the significant returns during the event window, and the re-
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opening of EU airspace [4, 6], evidence suggests that extreme social performance 
provides a resilient advantage in the returns for investors. 
 
Table 6.15. Abnormal returns during all periods of the Japan earth quake event study for 
firms classified by social performance  
[0, 6] (Event Window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.59% 59 : 41 2.63 0.01*** 1.44 0.15 
BOTTOM 100 0.15% 51 : 49 0.16 0.88 0.38 0.70 
[0] (Eruption of Iceland Volcano) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.17% 43 : 57 0.42 0.68 -0.10 0.92 
BOTTOM 100 0.27% 51 : 49 0.41 0.68 0.48 0.63 
[0, 1] (Eruption to closure of EU airspace) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.37% 45 : 55 0.32 0.75 -0.17 0.87 
BOTTOM 100 0.47% 52 : 48 0.56 0.57 0.44 0.66 
[2, 6] (Re-opening of EU Airspace) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.23% 65 : 35 2.91 0.00*** 1.81 0.07* 
BOTTOM 100 -0.32% 41 : 59 -0.17 0.86 0.18 0.86 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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6.6.5 The US presidential election and social portfolio performance 
Following the announcement that Barak Obama had won the US presidential election, 
the social screening by FTSE4good yielded a significant benefit for investors over a 
portfolio of relatively low performing social responsibility firms as the pattern of returns 
throughout the event window was significantly positive. These patterns are shown in 
Figure 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.10. The abnormal returns during the US presidential election event window [-1, 
5] for firms classified by social performance 
 
The periods surrounding the announcement show a significant decline in the value of 
the bottom 100 firms starting with [-1, 1] a negative CAAR of -3.03%, significant in both 
the z-test and Corrado rank test. This compares to a relatively stable top 100 average 
return of -0.85%. The following periods [0, 1], [0, 2] and [0, 3] follow the same trend as 
the bottom 100 portfolio is below the top 100 at a significance of 1%. Details of these 
results are shown in Table 6.16. 
During the recovery period [2, 5], the bottom 100 firms showed the greatest return at 
2.37% compared to the top 100 at 0.68%. This however is expected given the 
performance difference between the two portfolios throughout the event window and 
the market potentially seeing the return low as an opportunity to arbitrage causing the 
securities to rebound. 
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Table 6.16. Abnormal returns during all periods during the election event window for 
firms classified by social performance 
[-1, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.17% 02:50 -0.79 0.43 -0.35 0.73 
BOTTOM 100 -0.67% 18:58 -1.58 0.11* -1.11 0.27 
[-1, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.85% 36:64 -2.53 0.01*** -1.36 0.17 
BOTTOM 100 -3.03% 25:75 -6.66 0.00*** -2.8 0.01*** 
[0, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.93% 27:73 -4.27 0.00*** -2.25 0.02** 
BOTTOM 100 -2.02% 29:71 -6.04 0.00*** -2.62 0.01*** 
[0, 2] 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.24% 32:68 -4.41 0.00*** -2.33 0.02** 
BOTTOM 100 -2.42% 23:18 -6.34 0.00*** -2.61 0.01*** 
[0, 3] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.04% 37 : 63 -2.93 0.00*** -1.51 0.13 
BOTTOM 100 -1.84% 34 : 66 -4.48 0.00*** -1.88 0.06* 
[0, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.25% 43 : 57 -1.53 0.13 -0.72 0.47 
BOTTOM 100 0.35% 47 : 53 -0.49 0.63 -0.73 0.46 
[2, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.68% 53 : 47 1.14 0.25 0.71 0.48 
BOTTOM 100 2.37% 68 : 32 3.67 0.00*** 0.95 0.34 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Evidence suggests that the extremes of FTSE4good social performance provided 
consistency in the returns of the top 100 social performance portfolio over and above 
the returns of the bottom 100. It therefore follows that the social screening of 
FTSE4good showed evidence of resilience and resilience, protecting investor wealth in 
excess of firms at the extreme opposite of the social performance spectrum. 
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6.6.6 Descriptive statistics 
The ranking and descriptive results (See Appendix L) show evidence that portfolios 
formulated from the social performance ratings of FTSE4good provide a capacity for 
resilience above the portfolio of bottom 100 ranked firms. The top 100 portfolio ranked 
1st in twice as many statistically significant periods, produced a lower mean rank and 
sum that was statistically significant in the Chi-Squared test, 𝑋2(1) = 3.2, at the 10% 
level due to a 𝑝 = 0.074. Table 6.17 provides details of this result. 
 
Table 6.17. Ranking statistics for firms classified by social performance and during 
periods with significant returns  
Rank Descriptive Statistics TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
1st 14 6 
2nd 6 14 
Mean 1.3 1.7 
Sum 26 34 
Count 20 20 
Chi-Square (𝑋2) 3.2 - 
Degrees of freedom (df) 1 - 
Significance (𝑝) 0.074 - 
 
The descriptive statistics for periods with significant abnormal returns show the top 100 
outperformed the bottom 100 by more than 64% with a mean return of -0.83% 
compared to -1.36% for the bottom 100. The range, minimum and sum statistics all 
indicate an advantage for the top 100 social performance firms, indicating that the 
bottom 100 showed evidence of greater instability. The Skewness and kurtosis 
statistics are consistent with the other statistics. The top 100 produced a marginally 
favourable kurtosis statistic of 5.05, compared to the bottom 100 at 5.82. The returns of 
both portfolios are negatively skewed but the top 100 less so at -1.6 compared to 1.7. 
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Table 6.18. Descriptive statistics for periods with significant returns of firms classified by 
social performance 
  TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
Mean -0.83% -1.36% 
Standard Error 0.35% 0.46% 
Median -0.84% -0.82% 
Standard Deviation 1.57% 2.05% 
Sample Variance 0.025% 0.042% 
Kurtosis 5.05 5.82 
Skewness -1.6 -1.7 
Range 7.45% 10.45% 
Minimum -5.86% -8.08% 
Maximum 1.59% 2.37% 
Sum -16.50% -27.13% 
Count 20 20 
 
The findings within the social portfolio results show a significant advantage for the “best 
in class” firms from FTSE4good. The implications of which are significant within the 
investment domain. The table below shows the descriptive statistics for all event study 
periods relating to social portfolio significant and non-significant returns. The statistics 
within this table reflect the comparative performance of the returns of Table 6.18 
confirming an advantage for firms selected on the basis of social performance.  
 
Table 6.19 Descriptive statistics for the returns of firms classified by social performance 
during all periods 
  TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
Mean -0.60% -0.95% 
Standard Error 0.0025 0.0034 
Median -0.47% -0.42% 
Standard Deviation 0.014 0.018 
Sample Variance 0.00018 0.00033 
Kurtosis 7.66 7.90 
Skewness -2.10 -2.14 
Range 7.45% 10.45% 
Minimum -5.86% -8.08% 
Maximum 1.59% 2.37% 
Sum -17.28% -27.42% 
Count 29 29 
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6.7 Corporate governance portfolio performance results 
The corporate governance portfolios were formulated using the top 100 and bottom 
100 firms according to their absolute governance ratings published by FTSE4good 
(See Appendix J and K). Firms were selected from the ratings period that 
retrospectively corresponds to the event. The following chapter is a comparison of 
abnormal returns between the top and bottom 100 governance performers (See 
Appendix L). 
 
6.7.1 Financial crisis and corporate governance portfolio performance 
Overall the comparison of top and bottom 100 firms during the financial crisis follows a 
similar pattern to the event window returns of the environmental portfolios (see chapter 
6.5.1). Over the event window, the top 100 governance firms underperformed the 
bottom 100, generating 22 positive to 78 negative returns and a mean return of -8.81%, 
72% below the average return of the bottom 100 that generated a positive negative 
ratio of 35:65 and a mean return of -5.46%. The top and bottom 100 returns were 
significant at the 1% level in the z-test and only the top 100 was significant at the 1% 
level in the Corrado rank test (see Table 6.20). 
 
 
Figure 6.11. Financial crisis event window [0, 50] abnormal returns for firms classified 
according to corporate governance performance 
-10.00%
-8.00%
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 A
ve
ra
ge
 A
b
n
o
rm
al
 R
e
tu
rn
s 
(C
A
A
R
) 
%
 
Event window day 
TOP 100 Corporate Governance BOTTOM 100 Corporate Governance
103 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
 
Figure 6.11 shows two notable deviations between the portfolios; firstly, during period 
[17, 24] a widening gap between the returns of the two portfolios that follows through to 
period [25, 28], representing the run UK bank Northern Rock, at which point the top 
100 underperformed relative to the bottom 100.  
 
Table 6.20. Financial crisis abnormal returns f for firms classified according to corporate 
governance performance during the event window [0, 50] and periods 
[0, 50] (Event window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -8.81% 22 : 78 -9.23 0.00*** -2.62 0.01*** 
BOTTOM 100 -5.46% 35 : 65 -4.37 0.00*** -1.07 0.28 
[0] (BNP Paribas Announcement) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.33% 40 : 60 -2.05 0.04** -0.7 0.48 
BOTTOM 100 -0.04% 44 : 56 -1.41 0.16 -0.43 0.67 
[0, 5] (BNP Paribas Announcement & ECB liquidity injection) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.08% 44 : 56 -2.95 0.00*** -0.63 0.53 
BOTTOM 100 -0.98% 45 : 55 -2.23 0.03** -0.66 0.51 
[6, 16] (FED cuts rates - warning of threat to growth) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.16% 53 : 47 -0.59 0.56 0.31 0.76 
BOTTOM 100 -1.29% 36 : 64 -1.98 0.05** -0.48 0.63 
[17, 24] (Interbank lending at highest since 1998) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.79% 27 : 73 -4.81 0.00*** -1.44 0.15 
BOTTOM 100 0.14% 46 : 54 0.23 0.82 0.01 0.99 
[25, 28] (Run on Northern Rock) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -3.46% 23 : 77 -12.40 0.00*** -3.72 0.00*** 
BOTTOM 100 -2.04% 36 : 64 -5.75 0.00*** -1.99 0.05 
[29, 50] (FED cuts rates and BoE injects capital) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -2.32% 36 : 64 -3.92 0.00*** -1.42 0.16 
BOTTOM 100 -1.29% 51 : 49 -1.78 0.08*** -0.1 0.92 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The returns for the event day were significant only for the top 100 as it produced a 
return of -0.33% compared to the bottom 100’ close to expected return of -0.04%. The 
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effects of the event are apparent for both groups in period [0, 5] of Table 6.20 and 
Figure 6.11, where the top 100 produced a mean return of -1.08% compared to the 
bottom 100 at -0.98%, both significant in the z-test. The following period, when the US 
FED cut rates [6, 16], produced a significant decline for the bottom 100 at -1.29% 
compared to a close to expected return for the top 100 at -0.16%. Conversly, the 
following period, when interbank lending rates peaked [17, 24] it was the top 100 that 
produced the only significant negative return at -1.79% compared to the bottom 100’ 
close to expected return of 0.14%. The period when Northern Rock announced 
significant issues that subsequently caused a run on its deposits [44, 48] produced a 
significant decline away from expected values for both groups; however, the top 100 
was most effected with a significant return of -3.46% compared to the bottom 100 
return of -2.04% (see Table 6.20). 
The closing stages [29, 50] produced significant returns for both groups of frims as the 
top 100 continued its underperforming trend with a return of -2.32% that was significant 
in the z-test and underpinned by a positive to negative ratio of 36:64The bottom 100 
returns were also negative and significant in the z-test with an even positive negative 
ratio of 51:49 that still produced a return of -1.29%.  
Although the returns during the early periods were too close to distinguish, the event 
window [0, 50] and later periods [17, 24], [25, 28] and [29, 50] provide the clearest 
indication of a difference in performance. Therefore, portfolios based on the upper 
limits of FTSE4good corporate governance performance did not appear to provide 
investors with comparative resilience throughout the financial crisis. 
 
6.7.2 Deepwater Horizon oil spill and corporate governance portfolio 
performance 
The cumulative average abnormal returns for both portfolios (see Figure 6.12) show 
closely matched performance throughout the Deep Water Horizon event window [0, 
60]. With the exclusion of BP from the analysis the returns of both groups are largely 
close to expected with some minor exceptions. The interval periods the represent 
recognition by financial markets [7, 25] and the first moratorium [26, 34] provide some 
evidence of an impact and differentiation in performance between the portfolios that 
relate to FTSE4good corporate governance ratings. 
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Figure 6.12. Deep Water Horizon oil spill event window [0, 50] abnormal returns for firms 
classified according to corporate governance performance 
 
As with the other result of the same event, the event day [0] explosion did not have a 
significant effect on the portfolios. The period leading up to the announcement by BP 
[2, 6] was negative for the top 100 and positive for the bottom 100 but without 
significance. The top 100 has greater representation from oil producers.  This non-
significant result corresponds to the lack of information within the market place. The 
period immediately after the announcement when financial markets recognised the 
magnitude of the incident [7, 25], a period that sees substantial volatility and negative 
average returns for the top 100 at -1.74%, significant at the 10% level in the z-test 
compared to the average return of bottom 100 at -2.06%, close to significance (Table 
6.21). 
The following period reflects the first moratorium [26, 34] when the top 100 generated a 
significant positive average return of 0.66% compared to the bottom 100 positive 
cumulative average return of -0.78%, close to significance at the 10% level in the z-
test. The results for the first moratorium [26, 34] and the Obama statements [35, 50] 
are shown in Table 6.21. 
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Table 6.21. Abnormal returns for firms classified according to corporate governance 
performance during the Deep Water Horizon disaster 
[0, 50] (Event Window) 
Index CAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.95% 56 : 44 0.13 0.9 0.45 0.65 
BOTTOM 100 -0.42% 54 : 64 0.52 0.6 0.51 0.61 
[0] (Event day - Rig explosion) 
Index AR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.05% 45 : 55 -0.30 0.77 -0.11 0.91 
BOTTOM 100 -0.11% 46 : 54 -0.15 0.88 -0.06 0.95 
[2, 6] (Oil rig explosion and BP announcement) 
Index CAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.17% 43 : 57 -0.94 0.35 -0.33 0.74 
BOTTOM 100 0.48% 55 : 45 1.00 0.32 0.55 0.58 
[7, 25] (Recognition by financial markets) 
Index CAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.74% 39 : 61 -1.82 0.07* -0.31 0.75 
BOTTOM 100 -2.06% 39 : 61 -1.53 0.13 -0.29 0.77 
[26, 34] (First moratorium) 
Index CAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.66% 62 : 38 1.86 0.06* 0.76 0.45 
BOTTOM 100 0.78% 55 : 45 1.48 0.14 0.52 0.61 
[35, 50] (9-10 June President Obama statements) 
Index CAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.5% 60 : 40 0.4 0.69 0.30 0.76 
BOTTOM 100 0.01% 49 : 51 0.54 0.59 0.26 0.8 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 6.21, the Obama statements during period [35, 50] had little effect 
on the governance portfolios as neither produced a significant return. Therefore, 
considering only periods with significant returns, a substantive difference could not be 
established between the portfolios of top and bottom corporate governance firms 
implying neither an advantage or disadvantage for either classification of firms.   
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6.7.3 Japanese earth quake and corporate governance performance portfolio  
In response to the Japanese earthquake, the corporate governance performance 
portfolio of top 100 firms underperforms the bottom 100 throughout the event window. 
Starting with the AAR of first period [0] through to the CAAR of the event window [0, 
10], every result was in favour of the portfolio of bottom 100 firms, the pattern of which 
is shown in Figure 6.13. The event day produce a return for the top 100 of -0.52%, 
significant at the 1% level in the z-test and 10% in the Corrado rank test; compared to 
the bottom 100 return of -0.33%, significant at the 10% level in the z-test. 
 
 
Figure 6.13. Abnormal returns during the Japan earth quake event window for firms 
classified according to corporate governance performance 
 
Both portfolios rebound on the same event low during the announcement of a nuclear 
reactor leak and Germany’s suspension of their nuclear energy programme period [0, 
3] but the top 100 underperforms marginally at -1.37%, compared to the bottom 100 at 
-1.22%, both significant at the 1% level in the z-test (see Table 6.22) and therefore 
difficult to differentiate. Following this announcement, both portfolios began an upward 
trend with the top portfolio showing less consistency in return direction and therefore 
instability in confidence of the firms. Conversely, the bottom 100 portfolio recovers and 
plateaus at the end of the window, finishing with a positive CAAR in period [6, 10] 
signifying superior resilience (see Figure 6.13). 
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Table 6.22. The abnormal returns for firms classified according to corporate governance 
performance during periods [0, 10], [0], [0, 3], [1, 5] and [6, 10] 
[0, 10] (Two working week event window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.11% 43 : 57 -2.35 0.02** -0.76 0.45 
BOTTOM 100 -0.31% 47 : 53 -0.58 0.56 0.03 0.97 
[0] (Earth quake & announcement that nuclear power stations have been shut down) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.52% 33 : 67 -3.49 0.00*** -1.64 0.1* 
BOTTOM 100 -0.33% 41 : 59 -1.63 0.1* -1.04 0.3 
[0, 3] (Announcement of nuclear reactor leak & Germany announces suspension of nuclear programme) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.37% 43 : 57 -2.89 0.00*** -0.75 0.45 
BOTTOM 100 -1.22% 42 : 58 -2.87 0.00*** -0.78 0.43 
[1, 5] (First trading week following the Friday quake) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.59% 52 : 48 0.02 0.99 0.59 0.56 
BOTTOM 100 -0.51% 47 : 53 -1.22 0.22 0.09 0.93 
[6, 10] (Second trading week following the quake) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.00% 37 : 63 -1.93 0.05** -0.98 0.33 
BOTTOM 100 0.54% 57 : 43 1.08 0.28 0.43 0.67 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Despite the lack of a clear difference, the top 100 underperformed relative to the 
bottom 100 throughout with an event window return of -1.11%, significant in the z-test. 
This compares to a more resistant return for the bottom 100 at -0.31% but without 
significance (see Table 6.22). Based on the results, FTSE4good’s corporate 
governance screening process did not appear to foster novelty and resilience for 
investors as the top 100 portfolio underperformed in every aspect of the analysis. 
 
6.7.4 Iceland volcano eruption & corporate governance portfolio performance  
In response to the volcanic eruption of 2010 in Iceland, the corporate governance 
portfolios derived from the screening by FTSE4good, returned few significant returns 
throughout the event study. During the event window [0, 6] that covers the eruption, 
closure and re-opening of EU airspace, the top 100 firms generated the greatest 
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cumulative average returns at 1.61% that were significant at the 1% level in the z-test. 
The bottom 100 started the event window with a marginal advantage that was 
eventually lost with a non-significant average return of 0.59%. The patterns of returns 
are shown in Figure 6.14 where the cross over in performance takes place during the 
closure of EU airspace [1, 3]. 
 
 
Figure 6.14. Development of the abnormal returns during the Iceland volcano eruption for 
firms classified according to corporate governance performance 
 
There are no apparent significant returns for either portfolio in the early stages of the 
event. Only during the re-opening of EU airspace, did the top 100 significantly 
outperform the bottom 100. On the event day [0] both produce a CAAR close to 
expected and therefore without significance although the top 100 had a greater ratio of 
negative firm returns than the bottom 100 (40:60 compared to 49:51) (see Table 6.23). 
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Table 6.23. Icelandic volcano eruption abnormal returns during periods [0, 6], [0] [0, 1] 
and [2, 6] for firms classified according to corporate governance performance 
[0, 6] (Event Window) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.61% 64 : 36 2.68 0.01*** 1.39 0.17 
BOTTOM 100 0.59% 51 : 49 0.73 0.46 0.68 0.50 
[0] (Eruption of Iceland Volcano) 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.02% 40 : 60 -0.02 0.98 -0.18 0.86 
BOTTOM 100 0.3% 49 : 51 0.87 0.38 0.58 0.56 
[0, 1] (Eruption to closure of EU airspace) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.2% 45 : 55 0.11 0.91 -0.18 0.86 
BOTTOM 100 0.68% 58 : 42 1.45 0.15 0.84 0.4 
[2, 6] (Re-opening of EU Airspace) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 1.4% 62 : 38 3.10 0.00*** 1.76 0.08* 
BOTTOM 100 -0.09% 47 : 53 -0.05 0.96 0.27 0.79 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The period that includes the eruption and EU airspace closure also failed to produce a 
significant response in the market with the top 100 CAAR of 0.2% and the the bottom 
100 at 0.68%. The re-opening of EU airspace [2, 6] caused the top 100 to produce a 
positive average return, significant at the 1% level in the z-test, at 1.4% compared to 
the bottom 100 non-significant return of -0.09%. Results for the re-opening of EU 
airspace (recovery) are shown in Table 6.23. 
The parity of early period returns are insignificant and, therefore, excluded from further 
analysis. Conclusion is therefore determined by the returns during the closure of EU 
airspace when differentiation in performance was most evident. Therefore, the top 100 
significantly outperformed the bottom 100 by 172% during the event window, thus 
appearing to provide a resilient advantage for investors. 
 
 
111 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
6.7.5 US presidential election and corporate governance performance  
The market response to the value of the corporate governance portfolios during the US 
presidential elections shows a similar result to that of the environmental portfolio 
(Section 6.5.5) but in this instance the returns are marginally in favour of the top 100. 
The CAAR patterns are shown in event window period [-1, 5] shown in Figure 6.15. 
 
 
Figure 6.15. Abnormal returns during the US presidential election event window [-1, 5] for 
firms classified according to corporate governance performance 
 
The period [-1, 1] surrounding the event day shows a rapid and significant decline in 
the value of the bottom 100 firms at -2.22% compared to a more resistant -1.09% for 
the top 100. Both are significant in the z-test at the 1% and the Corrado Rank test. The 
event window low in the following period follows the same trend but the margin is 
reduced in comparison to the previous period, as shown in Table 6.24. 
The post announcement decline also shows a marginal advantage for the top 100 in 
period [0, 2]. Therefore, the top 100 potentially shows greater resilience to the impacts 
of President Obama’s re-election and potential policy stance on environmental 
protection. Following the impacts of the event the market priced a recovery for the 
bottom 100 at 2.19%, this compares to a recovery return of 0.83% for the top 100. All 
returns were significant in the z-test.  
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Table 6.24. US presidential election abnormal returns during all periods for firms 
classified according to corporate governance performance 
[-1, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.26% 06:46 -0.48 0.63 -0.26 0.8 
BOTTOM 100 -0.03% 02:50 -0.33 0.74 -0.93 0.35 
[-1, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.09% 34:66 -3.45 0.00*** -1.67 0.09* 
BOTTOM 100 -2.22% 33:67 -5.12 0.00*** -2.41 0.02** 
[0, 1] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.36% 83:17 -5.59 0.00*** -2.94 0.00*** 
BOTTOM 100 -1.62% 33:67 -4.65 0.00*** -2.19 0.03** 
[0, 2] 
Index AAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.63% 25:75 -5.39 0.00*** -2.78 0.01*** 
BOTTOM 100 -1.70% 33:67 -4.36 0.00*** -1.98 0.05** 
[0, 3] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -1.28% 35:65 -3.39 0.00*** -1.69 0.09 
BOTTOM 100 -1.36% 41:59 -3.06 0.00*** -1.54 0.12 
[0, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 -0.53% 50:50 -1.31 0.19 -0.79 0.43 
BOTTOM 100 0.57% 60:30 0.58 0.56 -0.57 0.57 
[2, 5] 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Corrado rank p-value 
TOP 100 0.83% 61:39 2.35 0.02** 1.11 0.27 
BOTTOM 100 2.19% 66 :34 4.00 0.00*** 0.85 0.39 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Based on the evidence within this event study, the periods with significant returns 
indicate that the corporate governance portfolio enhanced firm resilience and resilience 
and consequently protected stockholder wealth. 
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6.7.6 Descriptive Statistics 
The ranking statistics for the corporate governance portfolios during the 20 periods with 
significant abnormal returns show a marginal advantage for the bottom 100 firms due 
to a mean rank, sum statistic and close ranking placements that are not significantly 
according to the Chi-Square statistic (𝑋2(1) = 0.8, 𝑝 = 0.371) and subsequent the p-
value of 0.371, which is above the minimum confidence interval threshold of 0.1, or 
10% (See Appendix G). 
 
Table 6.25. Ranking statistics for periods with significant returns for firms classified 
according to corporate governance performance  
Rank Descriptive Statistics TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
1st 8 12 
2nd 12 8 
Mean 1.6 1.4 
Sum 32 28 
Count 20 20 
Chi-Square (𝑋2) 0.8 - 
Degrees of freedom (df) 1 - 
Significance (𝑝) 0.371 - 
 
Given that the ranking statistics failed to show evidence of a statistically significant 
difference then the descriptive statistics for periods with significant abnormal returns 
were identified. Firstly, the mean return of the bottom 100 implies greater capacity for 
resilience at -0.89% compared to -1.18% for the top 100. This is compounded by a 
smaller range, sum, variance and standard deviation statistic that denote less volatility 
and lower extreme return values for the bottom 100. Furthermore, the top 100 returns 
produced a relatively high kurtosis statistic of 7.63 compared to 3.05. The Skewness 
statistic for the top 100 was negative at -2.24 compared to -0.9 for the bottom 100. 
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Table 6.26. Descriptive statistics for firms classified according to corporate governance 
performance during periods with significant returns 
  TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
Mean -1.18% -0.89% 
Standard Error 0.49% 0.35% 
Median -1.10% -1.10% 
Standard Deviation 2.19% 1.57% 
Sample Variance 0.048% 0.025% 
Kurtosis 7.63 3.05 
Skewness -2.24 -0.9 
Range 10.42% 7.65% 
Minimum -8.81% -5.46% 
Maximum 1.61% 2.19% 
Sum -23.55% -17.77% 
Count 20 20 
 
Further to the descriptive statistics in Table 6.26, the following Table 6.27 confirms the 
observed, that the selection of firms using FTSE4Good’ governance ratings does not 
show evidence of resilience and no advantage is recognised within the market place. 
The top 100 underperform in all aspects of the descriptive statistics for all periods 
tested under the corporate governance performance. 
 
Table 6.27 Descriptive statistics for firms classified according to corporate governance 
performance during all event study periods 
  TOP 100 BOTTOM 100 
Mean -0.91% -0.58% 
Standard Error 0.0035 0.0026 
Median -0.53% -0.31% 
Standard Deviation 0.019 0.014 
Sample Variance 0.00035 0.00019 
Kurtosis 11.58 4.40 
Skewness -2.82 -1.39 
Range 10.42% 7.65% 
Minimum -8.81% -5.46% 
Maximum 1.61% 2.19% 
Sum -26.38% -16.80% 
Count 29 29 
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Table 6.28 provides a summary overview of each portfolios result in comparison to the 
respective bottom 100 firms. The chi-squared test of the ranking for each period with 
significant returns is also detailed along with the observed outcome of the descriptive 
statistics. A neutral result implies that neither portfolio showed evidence of an excess in 
relative performance which could be viewed as positive for the FTSE4good. Below is a 
table showing the descriptive statistics for all event study periods. 
 
Table 6.28. Summary of event study and statistical results using only significant 
abnormal return periods 
Event Environmental Social Corporate Governance 
Financial crisis  Negative Positive Negative 
BP plc oil spill Positive Positive Neutral 
Iceland Volcanic Eruption  Positive Positive Positive 
Japan earthquake  Positive Positive Negative 
US presidential election Negative Positive Positive 
Chi-Squared Test Neutral Positive Neutral 
Descriptive Statistics Negative Positive Negative 
 
6.8 Discussion 
6.8.1 The performance of ESG extremes 
Overall the results indicate that when the top and bottom 100 performing firms are 
separated into portfolios, during 10 out of the 15 events analysed, the top 100 portfolios 
generated higher returns relative to the bottom 100 portfolios. Individually, the event 
study tests of portfolios based on social performance show that FTSE4good’s 
screening of top 100 firms achieved higher rates of return consistently over the bottom 
100 firms during all five events. Two of the results were marginal but with support from 
the descriptive statistics, a positive result was concluded because of the comparative 
significance of the results and the significance of the Chi-squared analysis of significant 
period rankings. The portfolio of top environmental firms yielded higher returns in the 
events with a physical environmental impact but underperformed in all other non-
environment related shocks. This result was perhaps to be expected because the 
environmental screening criteria set by FTSE4good makes no provision for financial 
criteria and therefore, performance in events linked to these factors would be unlikely. 
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Coupled with the fact that inclusion within the top 100 portfolio does not necessarily 
mean inclusion in FTSE4good, and therefore the top 100 firms will be a mixture of 
broadly high performing ESG firms included in the index series along with firms that 
only perform well within the respective pillar. This would limit any crossover in 
performance by firms that perform in all three pillars. The corporate governance 
portfolios yielded mixed results with two events yielding higher rates of return for the 
top with a neutral result in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and two further events 
yielded lower rates of return in favour of the bottom 100. The ranking and descriptive 
statistics confirm a relative disadvantage associated with the highest performing 
corporate governance firms.  
6.8.2 Higher moments in the distribution of returns 
In all instances of higher performance the consistent characteristic that matches a 
greater or lower rate of return is that of Skewness and kurtosis. The top 100 
environmental and corporate governance firms and bottom 100 social firms all 
produced greater negative Skewness coupled with higher kurtosis. On average the 
returns of the FTSE4good environmental and governance firms have 57% lower 
skewness and 80% higher kurtosis than the lowest performing firms. This characteristic 
reflects a greater chance of extreme negative outcomes that is unattractive to investors 
due to heightened risk. This finding is fundamental to the economics and finance 
literature (Brealey, 2008), evidence of which is also found in a FTSE4Good related 
study by Belghitar et al (2014) the authors of which highlight the relationship between 
financial performance, skewness and kurtosis, albeit against the performance of the 
FTSE4good. Conversely, whilst the returns of the top 100 social firms were negatively 
skewed, the presence of a relatively lower kurtosis statistic suggests lower risk of 
generating extreme negative values for investors.  
6.8.3 Linking financial performance with FTSE4good ESG criteria 
The pattern of the results may be linked to FTSE4good’s screening criteria and the 
standards that are required to become constituents. These standards and the rigour 
with which they are enforced provide, in part, the link to each portfolio’s performance 
and how they are impacted by the events studied here (Cavaco and Crifo, 2014). 
Firstly, the environmental portfolios underperformed during the financial crisis and the 
US presidential election event studies. This result could be a consequence of the 
added cost of achieving the environmental standards set by FTSE4good, particularly 
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as the constituents are those with the highest ratings and, therefore, higher 
expenditure. This relationship is supported by previous studies that have shown the 
same negative relationship between environmental and financial performance (Barnett 
and Salomon, 2006; Belghitar et al., 2014; Sueyoshi and Goto, 2009; Rassier and 
Earnhart, 2010). Equally, studies have also shown evidence of a positive relationship 
between environmental and financial performance (Chong et al., 2006; Yang and Yao, 
2012; Pérez-Calderón et al., 2012). One study highlights that the varied findings across 
studies is caused by the relative exposure to environmental pressures (Pérez-Calderón 
et al., 2012). For example, a firm from the financial services industry will incur fewer 
costs to achieve CO2 reductions than a firm from the energy or engineering sector. 
Therefore, in some cases industry weighting may help explain why some indices 
perform better than others. Furthermore, it has been argued that environmentally and 
socially responsible indices perform better because they are populated by low impact 
industries such as financial services and information technology (Ratti and Hasan, 
2013). 
Where the top environmental firms achieved a higher rate of return, FTSE4good’s 
environmental management and climate change criteria impose standards that aim to 
mitigate associated risks which may have increased share price. For example, 
highlighting criteria that are relevant to the results; FTSE4good requires that board 
members are accountable for environmental management policy, the mitigation of 
environmental issues caused within their industry and public reporting. Whilst not 
explicitly tested for within the current study, accountability is fundamental to corporate 
resilience as it propagates a proactive business culture that is argued to have a 
positive relationship with financial performance (Weber, 2013; Brahimi et al., 2013; 
Agustinus, 2013). As a crisis hits a firm with high levels of accountability, management 
systems that are proactive are better placed to respond to threats (Agustinus, 2013). 
The current study provides evidence of FTSE4good’s standards promoting an 
operative environment that contributes to improved risk management. Chan and Walter 
(2014) found a stronger relationship between environmentally friendly firms and 
financial performance albeit not associated with the UK or FTSE4good. They found that 
from a sample of 748 environmentally friendly firms a statistically significant risk-return 
premium was evident.  
This idea of an improved culture of risk management extends into the results for the 
social performance portfolios. The portfolio of the top 100 social responsibility 
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constituents outperformed the bottom 100 during all 5 events, reinforced by the ranking 
and descriptive statistics. The standards set around human labour rights and supply 
chain labour standards foster benefits through relatively higher employment standards 
that propagate a more productive workforce (Anonymous2013; Hughes, 2007). 
Ensuring these standards exist throughout the supply chain for a firm also reduces 
exposure to damages from riskier enterprises that do not follow and adhere to the 
same standards (Hofmann et al., 2014).  
Despite the benefits implied by performance of firms selected using FTSE4good social 
ratings, higher wages, increased training and employee relations are all cost 
implications that many firms are unwilling to fully implement as they are viewed as a 
downside risk to shareholder value (Aras and Crowther, 2009). That said, 
FTSE4good’s social responsibility criteria is also rooted in accountability with a 
structural emphasis on communication, both of which are viewed as essential in the 
achievement of risk mitigation and successful response to a crisis (Hyslop and Collins, 
2013; Goffin et al., 2013; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; BRCCI, 2011). This finding is 
supported by a number of studies that indicate the value enhancement or lower risk 
perception of socially responsible firms (Humphrey and Tan, 2014; Girerd-Potin et al., 
2014). Girerd-Potin et al (2014) found that investors ask for a greater risk premium, 
above that of socially responsible funds, to hold non-socially responsible securities. 
Overall evidence from the current study suggests that investors penalise non-socially 
responsible firms and reward socially responsible ones. Humphrey and Tan (2014) 
found that screened and un-screened portfolios were no different in terms of return on 
risk and, therefore, a responsible fund does not lose or gain anything compared to un-
screened portfolios, despite the added pressure of socially responsible production. 
Conversely, the corporate governance results provide no evidence of a financial benefit 
or provision of resilience or resilience for investors.  
The screening process by FTSE4good aims to skew diversity in such a way that it 
reduces risks for investors. However, in-line with the majority of the literature, a sector 
based analysis should help isolate the effects of the shock and highlight the benefits 
induced by FTSE4good’s ratings. 
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7 The performance of FTSE4good firms based on an industrial 
sector 
This chapter presents the comparison of firms from the same industrial sector. Initially, 
the introduction provides a rationale for this course of enquiry, followed by the 
methodological adaptations required to make this stage of the analysis possible 
beyond the method presented in chapter 4. The results are then presented followed by 
a discussion of the results. 
7.1 Introduction 
This study initially focused on testing indices to determine the existence of adaptive 
resilience resulting from FTSE4good’s inclusion criteria and subsequent screening 
process. This approach covered investment strategies available to all, but the results 
provide little evidence of a benefit. The previous chapter focused on whether 
FTSE4good portfolios based on an upper and lower limit of environmental, social, and 
corporate governance performance produced different daily return performance over a 
range of events. The results indicate that over the majority of events the FTSE4good 
ratings had some power to provide investor with a tool for mitigating risk; and the 
results show that tailored properly, the FTSE4good index series has the potential to 
yield greater returns during adverse events. 
The previous two analyses are however limited by the effects of diversification in 
conclusively attributing causality to FTSE4good. Therefore, an analysis of firms from 
the same industrial sector classified according to inclusion and exclusion in 
FTSE4good mitigates the effects of diversification. Furthermore, this level of analysis 
using FTSE4good ratings has never been done. Therefore, evidence of a benefit 
contributes to the literature by highlighting the perception of the risk reducing benefits 
induced by FTSE4good reflected in daily abnormal returns across firms subject to the 
same pressures induced by the shock. Overall, this study would provide investors with 
evidence across multiple investment strategies/products. Furthermore, some events 
are only testable at the industry level as this chapter subsequently investigates how the 
share price of firms from the same industry responds to the identified events. Here the 
novelty of the analysis is that firms within the same sector will be compared, where 
some firms are included in the FTSE4good and others are excluded. Some additional 
events have been included that are sector specific, for example, food producers are 
tested using the horse meat scandal event of 2013. The premise of this chapter is to 
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further reduce the effect of fund diversification by including firms from the same sector 
thus isolating idiosyncratic risk (specific to an asset or group of assets). For example, 
an aviation focused event would have a greater impact on an index of aviation firms 
than an index with none. Furthermore, an index that has substitute industries, like car 
hire and land based transportation, would likely profit causing an asymmetric type 
response.  
 
7.2 Firm classification and data 
Firms were initially matched to an event, and grouped using FTSE industrial 
classification reference list (See Table 7.1) that classifies firms into 4 sectors (industry, 
super sector, sector and subsector) with increasing specificity. For example, BP was 
matched to the BP oil spill and is classified as Industry: Oil & Gas; Super sector: oil & 
gas; Sector: Oil & Gas producers; and Subsector: Exploration & production. Each 
classification has a unique code that was used within FTSE4good ratings history to 
identify all firms within the relevant sector. Once identified, their market data was then 
downloaded from DataStream. The classification and identification of firms that 
matches each testable event is outlined in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1. Identification and classification of firms for event testing 
Event Classification level Industry Name Code 
Financial crisis  Super Sector Financial Services 8700 
BP oil spill 
Sector Oil & Gas Producers 0530 
Sector Oil Equipment & Services 0570 
Sector Alternative Energy 0580 
Japan earthquake  Super sector Power Utilities 7500 
Sector Technology Hardware & Equipment 9570 
Iceland Volcanic Eruption  Subsector Airlines 5751 
Subsector Travel & Tourism 5759 
Horse meet scandal Sector Food Producers 3573 
Subsector Food Retailers & Wholesalers 5337 
EU ETS Prohibition Act, US Subsector Airlines 5752 
Subsector Travel & Tourism 5759 
EU ETS Stop the clock 
announcement 
Sector Industrials 2000 
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In some cases all firms are included or excluded from FTSE4good and in this instance 
the groups are split into an upper and lower limit according to their respective absolute 
score within the ratings history. Where a particular firm is linked with the event then 
their performance is highlighted and in some cases removed for retrospective insight 
into the performance of the group without the main protagonist, for example, BP plc. 
 
7.3 Event study methodology & UK industrial sectors 
The following sections provide details of the specific framework used for each analysis 
in addition to the method presented in chapter 4. For each event the market model was 
applied as specified for each analysis, and for new events the details are clarified 
below. For the sector based event studies the Corrado rank test is replaced by the 
Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test because it is more robust than other 
statistical tests in instances of event studies of firms from the same sector. Details of 
this test can be found in Section 4.7. 
 
7.3.1 Financial crisis & UK financial services sector 
The financial sector has significant representation within FTSE4good and accounts for 
17.9% of UK share of world exports (BIS, 2012). Therefore, its prominence within the 
UK economy and subsequent link to sustainability is substantial (Chapter 1.2). 
Furthermore, the financial crisis caused widespread damage to the UK economy 
against which the market should recognise the benefits of being included in 
FTSE4good and the financial sector provides an opportunity to test this idea. The 
analysis consisted of 50 financial services firms included in the FTSE4good and 31 
firms that were excluded. Firms were selected from super sector classification 
“Financial Services” with code 8700 as shown in Table 7.1. The estimation window, 
event window and subsequent periods follow the same framework as that of chapter 
4.4.1 and previous event studies. 
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7.3.2 Deep Water Horizon oil spill & the UK oil industry 
The industry focused stock market response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was 
tested using a number of sector classifications. Initially the oil industry analysis focused 
on a comparison of 4 firms included in FTSE4good against 11 excluded firms (see 
Table 7.1). BP was included in the FTSE4good at the time of the event and because it 
was the main protagonist of the shock, then an event study of firms was conducted 
both with and without BP. Additionally, two alternative energy sector firms were 
included in the comparison because of the potential benefit created by the shock and a 
flight to quality from risky oil based industry investments to cleaner and safer 
renewable energy firms. However, the alternative energy firms were excluded from the 
FTSE4good at the time of the event. PV Crystalox Solar were excluded due to a 0 
environmental score but scored high in both the social and governance pillars with 3 
and 4 respectively. The second of the two firms were excluded due to “non-disclosure” 
of FTSE4good requirements. The framework for the analysis reflects the details 
outlined in chapter 4.4.2. 
 
7.3.3 Japan earthquake and UK utilities and technology firms 
To test the sector based response to the Japanese earthquake of 2010 and 
subsequent nuclear reactor issues, firms from the power utilities and technology 
hardware & equipment sector were used with respective codes 7500 and 9570 (see 
Table 7.1). Technology sector firms were divided into two groups consisting of 6 firms 
included in FTSE4good and 5 excluded. All 5 power utilities firms were included in 
FTSE4good and therefore divided into two groups of high and low performing firms. 
The analysis follows the method from chapter 4 and the specific framework from 
chapter 4.4.3. The estimation window, event window and interval periods remain 
consistent following on from previous studies. 
 
7.3.4 Iceland volcano and UK travel sector 
The Icelandic volcano eruption of 2010 caused unprecedented air-travel chaos 
throughout Europe. Therefore, the airlines, and travel and tourism sector was thought 
to be most relevant to test the market response in line with previous studies 
(Mazzocchi et al., 2010; Miller, 2011). Using FTSE industrial classification benchmark, 
124 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
1 included and 1 excluded airline was identified along with 1 included and 1 excluded 
travel and tourism subsector firm with respective sector codes, 5751 and 5759. Each 
sector is equally represented but the sample size is considered low at 2 included, 2 
excluded. Additionally, 6 land based travel firms are included to account for a wider 
benefit appreciated by the industry as a result of the event. The counterfactual scenario 
is utilised to determine the positive spill over effects for a group of firms that include 
land based travel such as coach and car hire. Therefore, a case-by-case comparison 
was conducted following the estimation and event window framework of chapter 4.4.4. 
 
7.3.5 Horse meat scandal of 2013 & UK food producers 
The market response to the horse meat scandal of 2013 centred on the food producer 
and food retailer subsectors with industry codes 3573 and 5337 respectively. The 
sample consists of 3 food retailers and 4 producers for the 7 FTSE4good included firms 
and 1 retailer and 5 food producers for the 6 excluded firms. FTSE4good members 
Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Morrisons and Marks & Spencer account for over 55% of UK 
market share, providing the interface between food producers and 60 million 
consumers (Cabinet Office, 2008). Therefore FTSE4good policy that induces a positive 
effect on constituents in turn has a direct impact on the UK population. The 
methodology follows the framework presented in chapters 4 and 4.4.6. 
 
7.3.6 THE US, EU ETS Prohibition Act & UK aviation and travel sectors 
The EU ETS Prohibition Act that was passed by the US government in 2011 to exempt 
US based air travel from the European Union Emissions Trading System. Its passing 
had major implications for the systems credibility and for the aviation and travel sectors 
regulatory environment. The included subsectors were airline with code 5751 and 
travel and tourism with code 5759. To test the market response to the passing of the 
act, 3 firms included in the FTSE4good at the time of the event were identified along 
with 3 excluded firms. The analysis follows the method presented in chapter 4 and 
4.4.8. 
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7.3.7 EU ETS ‘stop the clock’ announcement 
Following the challenges faced by the EU ETS regarding carbon pricing and 
sovereignty, the European Commission opted to ‘stop the clock’ on including aviation in 
the scheme on 12/11/2012. This event caused substantial scepticism as to the future of 
the EU ETS as a whole (GreenAir, 2014). The event study used to test the market 
response centres on the industrial sector with code 2000. Included firms comprise a 
sample of 58 and a sample of 39 excluded firms. The window includes one day before 
the announcement to three days after (-1, 3). 
 
7.4 Results 
The following results present a comparison of cumulative average returns for included 
and excluded firms from the same industrial sector (See Appendix M). Inclusion and 
exclusion is based on the ratings history relevant to the event (See Appendix I). 
7.4.1 Financial crisis & the performance of financial services firms 
The returns of both groups show a consistent negative decline as a performance 
advantage switches from one group to another in response to the various stages of the 
event. Despite this, the included group show greater evidence of an underperformance 
disadvantage comparted to the excluded group of firms. The pattern of the returns 
throughout the event window can be seen in Figure 7.1. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Financial crisis event window [0, 50] abnormal returns for included and 
excluded financial services firms 
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The event window produced a significant decline in both groups but the included firms 
showed least capacity for resilience with a return of -12.80%, significant in both the z-
test and Boehmer et al. (1991) cross-sectional test This compares to the excluded 
firms return of -10.24% also significant in the z-test and Boehmer et al (1991) cross-
sectional test. The early stages were closely tied but the included firms showed greater 
resilience with a non-significant return on the event day of 0.23% compared to a 
significant return for the excluded firms at -0.54%. The results for the early stages in 
period [0] and [0, 5] are shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2. The financial crisis periods [0] and [0, 5] abnormal returns for included and 
excluded financial services firms 
[0, 50] (Event window) 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Boehmer et al. p-value 
Included Financial -12.80% 10 : 39 -9.95 0.00*** -5.98 0.00*** 
Excluded Financial -10.24% 4 : 27 -5.29 0.00*** -5.05 0.00*** 
[0] (BNP Paribas Announcement) 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Boehmer et al. p-value 
Included Financial 0.23% 24 : 25 0.47 0.64 0.24 0.81 
Excluded Financial -0.54% 12 : 19 -1.65 0.10* -0.83 0.41 
[0, 5] (BNP Paribas Announcement & ECB liquidity injection) 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg z-test p-value Boehmer et al. p-value 
Included Financial -0.86% 22 : 27 -1.89 0.06* -1.29 0.20 
Excluded Financial -1.92% 11 : 20 -2.67 0.01*** -1.99 0.05** 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The period of the BNP Paribas announcement [0, 5] shows significant negative returns 
for both groups with the included firms outperforming with a CAAR of -0.86%, 
significant in the z-test at the 10% level. However, the returns of excluded firms 
showed a continuing decline with a return of -1.92%, significant at the 1% level in the z-
test and 5% in Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test.  
The middle to later stages of the event window produced a reversal in performance 
starting with the US Federal Reserve Bank rate cut during period [6, 16] when the 
included firms underperformed with a significant return of -1.9% compared to the 
excluded firms non-significant return of 1.03%. Significant declines returned for both 
groups in the period that represents interbank lending issues [17, 24], when the 
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included group produced a significant return of -2.49% compared to the excluded firms 
non-significant return of -0.65%. Details of these results are shown in Table 7.3 along 
with the returns for the run on Northern Rock period [25, 28]. 
 
Table 7.3. The abnormal returns during financial crisis interval periods for included and 
excluded financial services firms 
[6, 16] (FED cuts rates - warning of threat to growth) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg patell z p-value Boehmer et al. p-value 
Included Financial -1.9% 15 : 34 -2.93 0.00*** -2.88 0.00*** 
Excluded Financial -1.03% 12 : 19 -1.00 0.32 -1.20 0.23 
[17, 24] (Interbank lending at highest since 1998) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg patell z p-value Boehmer et al. p-value 
Included Financial -2.49% 14 : 35 -5.55 0.00*** -4.84 0.00*** 
Excluded Financial -0.65% 12 : 19 -0.82 0.41 -0.64 0.52 
[25, 28] (Run on Northern Rock) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg patell z p-value Boehmer et al. p-value 
Included Financial -4.57% 9 : 40 -12.49 0.00*** -5.42 0.00*** 
Excluded Financial -3.05% 8 : 23 -5.26 0.00*** -4.31 0.00*** 
[29, 50] (FED cuts rates and BoE injects capital) 
Index CAAR Pos : Neg patell z p-value Boehmer et al. p-value 
Included Financial -2.97% 19 : 30 -3.41 0.00*** -3.01 0.00*** 
Excluded Financial -3.59% 11 : 20 -3.21 0.00*** -2.72 0.01*** 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The run on UK bank, Northern Rock [25, 28] produced the greatest returns for the two 
groups. The excluded group showed greater resilience with a significant return of -
3.05% compared to the included financial firm returns of -4.57%, significant in both 
tests at the 1% level of significance. The following period [29, 50] see a switch in 
performance with the excluded group generating a significant return of -2.97%, buit the 
excluded group produced a significant  return of -3.59% both significant in the z-test 
and Boehmer et al (1991) cross-sectional test. In summary, the market showed that 
during the financial crisis, FTSE4good ratings and subsequent inclusion were not an 
advantageous factor in the valuation of financial services firms. 
. 
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7.4.2 Deep Water Horizon oil spill & the performance of oil sector firms 
The Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and subsequent oil spill of 2010 in the Gulf of 
Mexico has thus far performed outside of expectations because of BP’s inclusion in 
FTSE4good. BP was included with an Environmental pillar score of 5 (highest 
possible), social score of 5, and a governance score of 3.6. Consequently, the market 
appeared to value relevant FTSE4good performance against the valuation of stock 
market indices and ESG portfolios. This, however, has been argued to be heavily 
influenced by diversification and the risk reducing benefits it bestows.  
Therefore, an analysis at the firm level aims to isolate specific relationships between 
the performances of FTSE4good firms in a sector related to the effects of the oil spill. 
The sector in question is the oil and gas sector of included and excluded firms with the 
additional counterfactual inclusion of alternative energy firms. Below are the event 
window [0, 50] returns for the grouped firms (Figure 7.2). 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Event window cumulative abnormal returns during the Deep Water Horizon oil 
spill for oil and gas sector firms and alternative energy firms 
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From the event window cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) it is clear that 
the alternative (renewable) energy firms, Hansen Transmissions (HSN) and PV 
Crystalox Solar (PVCS), while not included in FTSE4good, outperformed the oil and 
gas sectors over the event window. The market appears to have seen this event as a 
period of opportunity for the alternative energy sector and consequently valued the 
assets with a CAAR of 22.4% over the entire event window.  However, this was only 
marginally significant in the t-test at the 10% level, a result that is due to the method 
used to test for significance; large values do not automatically qualify as significant as 
the test relies on historical variance within the estimation window to determine if the 
abnormal return within the event window is significant. Therefore, if variance is high 
within the estimation window then high variance is expected within the event window.  
During the event window, the included oil producing firms (+BP) underperformed with a 
statistically significant (10% level) return of -6.09% compared to the excluded oil 
producing firms’ non-significant positive return of 2.27% (see Table 7.4). When BP was 
removed, the included group outperformed the excluded group over the event window 
with a CAAR of 7.67%, significant in the t-test and Boehmer et al. (1991) test at the 
10% level (p=0.1). At the time of the incident, BP was included in FTSE4good and 
heavily influenced the returns of this analysis with a CAR during the event window of -
61.1%, significant at the 1% level in the t-test and Corrado rank test. The chart below 
(Figure 7.3) shows returns during the event window for the oil producing firms. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Event window returns during the Deep Water Horizon oil spill for oil and gas 
sector firms, including and excluding BP plc. 
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The following table shows the CAAR for the grouped firms with the included group +BP 
along with significance test results. 
 
Table 7.4. Abnormal returns during Deep Water Horizon oil spill event window [0, 50] and 
subsequent periods for included, excluded, and alternative energy firms 
[0, 50] Event Window 
Index CAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Firms (+BP) -6.09% -1.62 0.1* -0.62 0.54 
Excluded Firms 2.27% 0.47 0.64 1.14 0.26 
Alt. Energy 22.4% 1.59 0.11* 0.60 0.55 
[0] Event day - Rig explosion 
Index CAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Firms (+BP) 0.39% 0.73 0.46 1.67 0.1* 
Excluded Firms 0.51% 0.76 0.45 1.38 0.17 
Alt. Energy -0.49% -0.25 0.8 -0.28 0.78 
[2, 6] Oil rig explosion and BP announcement 
Index CAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Firms (+BP) 2.07% 1.76 0.08 1.55 0.12 
Excluded Firms -2.34% -1.56 0.12 -2.98 0.00*** 
Alt. Energy 6.91% 1.57 0.12 13.64 0.00*** 
[7, 25] Recognition by financial markets 
Index CAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Firms (+BP) -2.14% -0.93 0.35 -0.89 0.37 
Excluded Firms -0.55% -0.19 0.85 0.11 0.91 
Alt. Energy 13.59% 1.59 0.11* 0.82 0.41 
[26, 34] First moratorium 
Index CAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Firms (+BP) -1.83% -1.16 0.25 -0.74 0.46 
Excluded Firms 0.49% 0.24 0.81 0.51 0.61 
Alt. Energy 2.09% 0.35 0.72 1.55 0.12 
[35, 50] 9-10 June President Obama statements 
Index CAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Firms (+BP) -4.14% -1.97 0.05** -0.77 0.44 
Excluded Firms 4.46% 1.66 0.1* 2.9 0.00*** 
Alt. Energy 0.12% 0.02 0.99 0.01 0.99 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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The event day [0] returns generated one significant return for the included group at -
6.09% as BP was at the time a constituent of the FTSE4good index series. When the 
was made public up to the point of publication in the Wall Street Journal [2, 6], all three 
groups produced significant returns; the included group generated a positive non-
significant return of 2.07%; the excluded group was negative at -2.34% and significant 
at the 1% level in the Boehmer et. al test; lastly the alternative energy firms returned a 
value at 6.91%, significant at the 1% in Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test. (see 
Table 7.4). 
During period [7, 25] only the alternative energy firms generated significant returns. 
However, during this period BP responded with a return of -13.95% that again weighed 
heavily on the included firm results with a non-significant return of just 2.14%. The 
following period [26, 34] reflects the impact of the first moratorium on drilling in the Gulf 
of Mexico but all returns were non-significant. The included firms generated a negative 
return of -1.83% followed by the excluded firms’ positive return of 0.49%, and the 
alternative energy firms at 2.09%. These returns were however surpassed by the 
subsequent period [35, 50] that represents the Obama statements, as the included 
firms produced a significant negative return of -4.14% compared to the excluded 
groups significant positive return of 4.46%. The alternative energy group returns were 
marginal to expected values.  
The results provide limited evidence of any significant sector specific returns despite 
the reduction of diversification. The power of FTSE4good is diminished largely by the 
effects of a minority of firms, namely BP plc. This is in fact a reality of investment as 
this incident could conceivably happen to any other oil producing firm (Reader and 
O'Connor, 2014). However, if BP is isolated from the results, the remaining included 
firms outperform the excluded firms. To begin, Figure 7.4 shows the returns for the 
included oil producing firms and the difference between BP and the other included 
firms is shown.  
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Figure 7.4. Cumulative abnormal returns of the included oil producers during the event 
window [0, 60] 
 
 
Therefore, when BP plc was removed from the aggregated returns of the included 
group of firms, the result turn from negative to positive and outperforms the returns of 
the excluded group. The removal means that the group of included firms outperformed 
the excluded firms in 4 out of the 6 periods but with limited significance.  
Overall the determination of benefits induced through FTSE4good is mixed as the 
sector based analysis initially shows some evidence of underperformance for firms 
included in FTSE4good. However, the influence of BP plc was apparent as when 
removed the remaining firms outperformed their excluded counterparts (not alternative 
energy) albeit with limited evidence of significance. There is consequently a conflict of 
reality in trading strategies, retrospective insight and the inclusion criteria set by 
FTSE4good. 
 
 
 
-70%
-60%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
C
A
R
 (
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 A
b
n
o
rm
al
 R
e
tu
rn
s)
 %
 
Event window day 
RDSA RDSB BG. PMO BP.
133 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
Table 7.5. Abnormal return averages for included firms but without BP, and the excluded 
oil sector firms. 
[0, 50] Event Window 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms (-BP) 7.67% 1.75 0.08* 1.89 0.06* 
Excluded Firms 2.27% 0.47 0.64 1.14 0.26 
[0] Event day - Rig explosion 
Group AAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms (-BP) 0.21% 0.34 0.73 1.06 0.29 
Excluded Firms 0.51% 0.76 0.45 1.38 0.17 
[2, 6] Oil rig explosion and BP announcement 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms (-BP) 2.94% 2.14 0.03** 2.31 0.02** 
Excluded Firms -2.34% -1.56 0.12 -2.98 0.00*** 
[7, 25] Recognition by financial markets 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms (-BP) 0.82% 0.31 0.76 0.01 0.99 
Excluded Firms -0.55% -0.19 0.85 0.11 0.91 
[26, 34] First moratorium 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms (-BP) 1.32% 0.71 0.47 0.75 0.45 
Excluded Firms 0.49% 0.24 0.81 0.51 0.61 
[35, 50] 9-10 June President Obama statements 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms (-BP) 2.89% 1.17 0.24 0.81 0.42 
Excluded Firms 4.46% 1.66 0.1* 2.9 0.00*** 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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7.4.3 Japanese earth quake & the performance of UK technology & power sector 
7.4.3.1 Technology sector response to Japan earth quake 
The Japanese earthquake and subsequent nuclear reactor issues produced markedly 
different responses in the UK technology and power utility sectors. Overall the 
technology sector showed no financial performance benefit linked to inclusion in 
FTSE4good. The pattern of event window returns for the UK technology sector is 
shown in Figure 7.5. The returns of both classifications are close until the later stages 
of the event window. 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Event window periods [0, 10] abnormal returns for included and excluded UK 
technology firms 
 
The event window shows a significant negative effect for the six technology firms 
included in FTSE4good with an average return of -5.02% compared to -1.23% for the 
five excluded firms. The following periods show a similar relative trend in the CAAR but 
with limited significance (Table 7.6.). 
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Table 7.6. Abnormal returns during event window [0, 10], and interval periods for 
included and excluded UK technology firms 
[0, 10] (Two working week event window) 
  CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Tech Firms -5.02% -1.67 0.09* -2.04 0.04** 
Excluded Tech Firms -1.23% -0.26 0.79 -0.51 0.61 
[0] (Earth quake & announcement that nuclear power stations have been shut down) 
  AAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Tech Firms -0.42% -0.47 0.64 -0.36 0.72 
Excluded Tech Firms 0.13% 0.09 0.93 0.2 0.84 
[0, 3] (Announcement of nuclear reactor leak & Germany announces suspension of nuclear programme) 
  CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Tech Firms 0.51% 0.28 0.78 0.19 0.85 
Excluded Tech Firms 2.50% 0.89 0.37 2.3 0.02** 
[1, 5] (First trading week following the Friday quake) 
  CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Tech Firms -1.08% -0.53 0.59 -0.56 0.58 
Excluded Tech Firms 1.02% 0.33 0.74 1.26 0.21 
[6, 10] (Second trading week following the quake) 
  CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. Al p-value 
Included Tech Firms -3.52% -1.74 0.08* -1.79 0.07* 
Excluded Tech Firms -2.37% -0.76 0.45 -2.14 0.03** 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The event day [0] produced no significant returns. The subsequent period [0, 3] did not 
yield any benefit in the included firms as they produced a return in-line with 
expectations at 0.51% compared to an excluded firm return of 2.5%, significant at the 
5% level in the Boehmer et al. cross sectional test. The first complete trading week 
following the incident that includes the Germany announcements produced non-
significant returns for both groups but negative for the included firms at -1.08% and 
1.02% for excluded firms. This period has previously been the focus of a difference in 
performance. The second week of trading is when the effects of the disaster take effect 
as the returns of both groups turn significantly negative. The included group was most 
effected at -3.52% compared to a less effected return of -2.37% for the excluded firms. 
The pattern of returns is shown in Figure 7.5. 
The comparison of firms within the UK technology sector implies that the market did not 
value FTSE4good performance in response to the Japan earth quake until the second 
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week of the disaster where the six included tech firms underperformed relative to the 
five excluded firms. This delayed response may be accounted for by firms taking time 
to recognise the impact the disaster had on its supply chain. 
 
7.4.3.2 Power sector response to Japan earth quake 
To eliminate the effects of a diversified supply chain, the UK power utilities sector 
provides an opportunity to test the response of the nuclear reactor issues, as has been 
done in a study of German energy firms (Betzer et al., 2013). The firms included within 
the analysis are all constituents of FTSE4good but split by an upper and lower limit of 
two Top and three Bottom performing firms according to their absolute rating. Over the 
course of the event window, the top power sector firms showed signs of a gradual 
inverse relationship compared with the three lower performing firms. Figure 7.6 
presents this pattern despite early parity in cumulative average abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, the inverse response occurs following the German announcement [0, 3] 
of a complete suspension in their nuclear energy plans.  
 
 
Figure 7.6. Event window periods [0, 10] abnormal returns for top and bottom FTSE4good 
UK power sector firms 
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Initially, on the event day [0], the Top power sector firms responded with a Boehmer et 
al (1991) significant negative return of -1.12%, below that of the Bottom firms at -0.42% 
and non-significant. The results for the event day [0] are shown in Table 7.7 along with 
the results for all periods ([0, 3], [1, 5], [6, 10] and [0, 10]). 
 
Table 7.7. Abnormal returns during event window and interval periods for Top and 
Bottom UK listed power sector firms. 
[0] (Earth quake & announcement that nuclear power stations have been shut down) 
 Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
TOP Power Firms -1.12% -1.54 0.12 -1.77 0.08* 
BOTTOM Power  Firms -0.42% -0.36 0.72 -0.87 0.38 
[0, 3] (Announcement of nuclear reactor leak & Germany announces suspension of nuclear programme) 
 Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
TOP Power Firms -1.64% -1.12 0.26 -0.64 0.52 
BOTTOM Power  Firms -2.28% -0.98 0.33 -1.53 0.13 
[1, 5] (First trading week following the Friday quake) 
 Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
TOP Power Firms 2.92% 1.79 0.07* 5.25 0.00*** 
BOTTOM Power  Firms -0.28% -0.11 0.91 -0.23 0.82 
[6, 10] (Second trading week following the quake) 
 Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
TOP Power Firms -0.68% -0.42 0.68 -0.56 0.58 
BOTTOM Power  Firms -2.44% -0.94 0.35 -1.42 0.16 
[0, 10] (Two working week event window) 
  CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
TOP Power Firms 1.12% 0.46 0.64 19.25 0.00*** 
BOTTOM Power  Firms -3.13% -0.81 0.42 -1.46 0.15 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Following the event day, period [0, 3] which represents the announcement by Germany 
shows a change in the performance of the returns for each group. The top rated power 
firms show greater resilience to the effects of the announcements and its implications 
with a return of -1.64% compared to the bottom rated power firms at -2.28%. Both were 
however insignificant but indicative of a changing trend as the returns develop 
throughout the event window. The following period [1, 5], which represents the first 
week of trading, shows a resilient response from the top performing firms with a 
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positive significant return of 2.92% compared to the bottom power firms return of -
0.28%. The second trading week continues the trend for the bottom rated firms with a 
marginally significant negative return of -2.44% compared to the top rated firms’ non-
significant return of -0.68%. The pattern of returns throughout the event window is fully 
representative of the event window periods as the top firms returned a positive CAAR 
of 1.12%, significant in the Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test at 1% compared 
to the bottom firms negative return of -3.13%, marginally significant in the Boehmer et 
al. (Boehmer et al., 1991) cross sectional test. The pattern of returns is shown in Figure 
7.6 with a downward trend for the bottom firms and asymmetric growth trend for the top 
performing FTSE4good firms. 
Therefore, whilst limited by sample size, the returns for the top performing FTSE4good 
power utility firms show evidence of enhanced resilience relative to the lower 
performing firms from the same industrial sector.  
 
 
7.4.4 Icelandic volcanic eruption of 2010 and the financial performance of UK 
aviation and travel 
In all previous analyses the market response to the volcanic eruption of 2010 has 
returned a significant benefit for ethical investors in excess of a conventional 
investment. These analyses were based on large, diversified samples and 
subsequently this study asks whether the beneficial trend extends into individually 
selected and smaller samples of stocks. Therefore, two airline and two travel firms 
were selected to test the market response and whether their inclusion or exclusion is 
specifically relevant in their valuation within the market against the risks associated 
with the shock. A further comparison of a counterfactual group of firms is also 
conducted on the basis of spill-over effects. For example, during this period it could be 
expected that land based travel would witness a comparable rise in value.  
The two firms included in the FTSE4good are British Airways and TUI Travel; the two 
firms excluded from the FTSE4good are Easyjet and Thomas Cook Group; finally the 
counterfactual firms are all included in FTSE4good and consist of Stagecoach Group, 
Go-Ahead Group, National Express Group, First Group, Carnival and Avis Europe. The 
pattern of average returns for the aforementioned firms are shown in Figure 7.7 
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Figure 7.7. Event window abnormal returns for included, excluded and substitute travel 
firms during the Iceland volcanic eruption 
 
The event window returns for the three groups show a distinctly differently response 
over the event window. Despite inclusion in FTSE4good, the two travel firms generated 
returns below that of both the two excluded firms and the land based travel group. 
During the event window [0, 6] period, the alternative group produced a significant 
positive return of 4.85% and the included firms produced a significant negative return of 
-3.73%; the excluded group traded around expected throughout the event window 
when in produced a non-significant positive return of 1.58% (see Table 7.8). 
The event day [0] period returned no significant values as the effects of the event were 
not fully assimilated into the market until the disruption to EU airspace (Mazzocchi et 
al., 2010). However, on the event day [0], the excluded group out performed both with 
a positive return of 1.66% compared to 0.06% for land based travel and -0.44% for the 
included group. The closure of EU airspace [0, 1] generated a significant response as 
the counterfactual firms returned a significant value of 0.98%, compared to the the 
included firms at -0.63%, and the excluded firms 1.01%. 
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Table 7.8. The abnormal returns during Iceland volcanic eruption event window [0, 6] and 
periods [0] and [0, 1] for included, excluded and land based travel firms 
[0, 6] Event Window 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Travel Firms -3.73% -0.98 0.33 -3.66 0.00*** 
Excluded Travel Firms 1.58% 0.46 0.64 0.76 0.45 
Land Based Travel Firms 4.85% 1.86 0.06* 4.91 0.00*** 
[0] Eruption of Iceland Volcano 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Travel Firms -0.44% -0.3 0.76 -0.54 0.59 
Excluded Travel Firms 1.66% 1.28 0.2 1.22 0.22 
Land Based Travel Firms 0.06% 0.06 0.96 -0.11 0.91 
[0, 1] Eruption to closure of EU airspace 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Travel Firms -0.63% -0.31 0.76 -1.43 0.15 
Excluded Travel Firms 1.01% 0.55 0.58 0.66 0.51 
Land Based Travel Firms 0.98% 0.7 0.48 2.61 0.01*** 
[2, 6] Re-opening of EU Airspace 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Travel Firms -3.1% -0.96 0.34 -5.61 0.00*** 
Excluded Travel Firms 0.58% 0.2 0.84 0.53 0.59 
Land Based Travel Firms 3.86% 1.75 0.08* 3.97 0.00*** 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The reopening of EU airspace generated significant returns for the included and 
counterfactual (land based) group of firms. The included firms generated a negative 
CAAR of -3.1% compared to 0.58% for the excluded firms and 3.86% for the 
counterfactual firms, significant in the Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test at 1%. 
From these results the value performance of firms included in FTSE4good is lower than 
those that were excluded. This is despite evidence of benefits within other event 
studies and the theoretical risk mitigation benefits that FTSE4good provides. Larger 
sample groups would potentially provide a different result but in the empirical context of 
this study, a UK focus yields no benefit to investors in a sector based selection of 
individual firms in response to a natural disaster with wide reaching economic 
consequences. 
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7.4.5 Horse meat scandal & the performance of food producers 
Over the course of the event window the horse meat scandal produced negative 
periods for the included group of firms in comparison to the returns of the excluded 
firms. This effect was skewed by the returns of one FTSE4good member, Premier 
foods, who produced returns in excess of -50% over the course of the event. Premier 
Foods plc inclusion ratings were 3.4 for environment, 4.3 for social and 4 in 
governance. This aside, the remaining firms would still have produced an aggregate 
return below that of the excluded firms and, therefore, in the context of this study and 
for empirical robustness Premier Foods remained within the group. The pattern of 
event window cumulative average abnormal returns is presented in Figure 7.8 and 
Table 7.9. 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Horse meat scandal event window [0, 50] abnormal returns for included and 
excluded food producers and retailers 
 
Figure 7.8 indicates that from the event day [0] to day 8 a positive relationship was 
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significant 0.27% CAAR. The following period [18, 21] which represents the 
announcement of a Phenylbutazone (Bute) contamination risk shows the group of 
included firms produced another positive return of 0.51%, significant at the 10% level in 
the Boehmer et al (1991) cross sectional test, and in excess of the excluded group 
return of 0.38%. Furthermore, despite the exclusion of premier foods, the included 
group of firms still underperformed those of the excluded group, albeit with positive 
returns. 
 
Table 7.9. Abnormal returns during horse meat scandal periods [8, 10], [23, 24] and [26, 
27] for included and excluded food producer and food retail sectors 
[0, 50] Event window 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -2.42% -0.49 0.63 1.14 0.26 
Excluded Firms 6.96% 2.20 0.03** 3.13 0.00*** 
[0, 1] FSAI & FSA announce possible horse DNA contamination 
Index CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms 0.27% 0.27 0.79 0.77 0.44 
Excluded Firms 0.97% 1.55 0.12 1.8 0.07* 
[18, 21] FSA announces risks associated with possible presence of Bute 
Index CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms 0.51% 0.37 0.71 1.69 0.09* 
Excluded Firms 0.38% 0.43 0.66 1.06 0.29 
[22, 24] Arrests made by police & Bute test results published 
Index CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -2.29% -1.91 0.06* -1.93 0.05** 
Excluded Firms 0.63% 0.83 0.41 1.91 0.06* 
[25, 26] FSA publishes report 
Index CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms 1.97% 2.01 0.04** 1.19 0.23 
Excluded Firms 1.13% 1.81 0.07* 1.56 0.12 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Only when arrests were made (Sky News, 2013) and the Bute contamination tests 
were published did the market begin to recognise the magnitude of the event in period 
[22, 24]. In this instance a negative response was recorded only for both the included 
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firms at -2.29% that was significant in the t-test and Boehmer et al. (1991) cross 
sectional test; compared to an non-significant excluded group positive return of 0.63%. 
On the 25 day the FSA published a report [25, 26] that the market perceived as positive 
for the included group of firms at 1.97% and the excluded group at 1.13%, both 
significant in the t-test at the 5% and 10% level respectively. Despite the positive 
reaction to the FSA report the market still felt that the issues associated with the 
scandal were not fully transparent and priced into the market (The Telegraph, 2013). 
During period [27, 31] the included firms resumed negative trading with a CAAR of -
0.69% compared to the excluded group return of -1.39% as shown in Table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10. Abnormal returns during horse meat scandal periods [26, 27], [28, 30], [33, 39] 
and [40, 50] for included and excluded food producer and food retail sectors 
[27, 31] Test results published & firms withdraw food from sale 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -0.69% -0.45 0.65 -0.68 0.5** 
Excluded Firms -1.39% -1.40 0.16 -2.78 0.01*** 
[32, 37] Details of FSA sampling programme revealed 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -1.22% -0.72 0.47 -0.18 0.86 
Excluded Firms 0.77% 0.71 0.47 1.47 0.14 
[38, 50] FSA lifts ban on major slaughter house and test results revealed 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms 2.56% 1.02 0.31 1.73 0.08* 
Excluded Firms 2.05% 1.28 0.20 1.49 0.14 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Period [27, 31] represents a time when the FSA published test results and food items 
were withdrawn from sale. During this period the returns of both groups were non-
significant. The following period [32, 37] however produced a significant negative return 
for the included firms at -1.22% when the FSA announced the results its sampling 
programme. The excluded firms were in-line with expectations with a non-significant 
positive return of  0.77%. The concluding period [38, 50] when the FSA lifted its ban on 
a major slaughter house and publishes further test results, shows the market 
responded positively for both groups with an included firm return of 2.56%, significant 
in both the t Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test, compared to the excluded 
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group positive return of 2.05%, significant also in the Boehmer et al. (1991) cross 
sectional test only.  
Throughout the event the included group generate returns constantly below those of 
the excluded group, in many cases with significance. Therefore, the standards set by 
FTSE4good were not interpreted by the market as useful in the valuation of the 
included group of firms in mitigating the risks associated with the event. The implication 
being that selection of firms from the same sector, based on FTSE4good inclusion 
does not offer resilience in the face of a sector related crisis. 
 
7.4.6 EU ETS Prohibition Act & performance of UK aviation and travel 
The results for the EU ETS prohibition act event study indicate significant differentiation 
by the market, between the three included and three excluded firms in response to the 
announcement of the intended implementation date on 06/07/2011. Over the event 
window, the CAAR for firms excluded from the FTSE4good are significantly lower than 
those of the included firms at -18.02% and -5.55% respectively. The event window 
return patterns are shown in Figure 7.9 and the CAAR for period [0, 15] indicate that 
the start [0] accurately reflects the event date.  
 
 
Figure 7.9. EU ETS prohibition act event window [0, 10] abnormal returns for included 
and excluded airline and travel firms 
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The CAAR from Table 7.11 show a progressive and significant decline in the value of 
the excluded and included firms from the event start through all periods. However, days 
11 and 12 show a minor recovery for the excluded firms into a flattening of the returns 
for both groups, indicating an end to the market decline. The excluded firms produced 
significant returns that underperformed the included firms in all periods after the event 
day [0]. 
 
Table 7.11. EU ETS prohibition act event window [0, 15] abnormal returns for included 
and excluded airline and travel firms 
[0, 15] 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -5.55% -1.74 0.08* -1.94 0.05** 
Excluded Firms -18.02% -3.25 0.00*** -0.90 0.37 
[0] 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -0.40% -0.5 0.62 -0.14 0.89 
Excluded Firms -1.45% -1.04 0.3 -1.41 0.16 
[0, 1] 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -3.34% -1.7 0.09* -2.46 0.01*** 
Excluded Firms -3.74% -1.55 0.12 -1.58 0.11* 
[1, 5] 
Group CAAR t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -5.63% -3.16 0.00*** -2.35 0.02** 
Excluded Firms -16.00% -5.16 0.00*** -1.44 0.15 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The results therefore indicate that in this non-firm specific event, inclusion in 
FTSE4good provided resilience against the impacts associated with the event and 
resilience soon after.  
 
7.4.7 EU ETS “Stop the clock” and industrial sector performance 
Following the decision to “stop the clock” on including aviation in the EU ETS, the first 
announcement of this intention on the 12/11/2012 was tested using the industrial sector 
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firms from FTSE4good’s ratings history. Firms were divided into two groups of 58 
included and 39 excluded industrial sector firms. Throughout the event window the 
CAARs show that the excluded group underperform the included group for the duration 
of the event window apart from during day 3. The event window CAARs are shown in 
Figure 7.10. 
 
 
Figure 7.10. Event window returns for included and excluded industrial sector firms 
during in response to the EU ETS stop the clock announcement. 
 
The event window results show a non-significant return for both groups as the excluded 
firms returned to normality by day 3 and the included group never deviated significantly 
from expected levels. Interval period [-1, 0] does indicate that the market anticipated 
the announcement with a return of -0.82%, significant in the t-test at the 1% level and 
the Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test at the 5% level. The event consequently 
produced further downward pressure for the excluded group and the AAR for the event 
day [0] that was significant in the t-test at the 5% level, indicating that with 95% 
confidence the return of -0.4% was the result of markets interpretation of the excluded 
firms’ value in relation to the EU ETS “Stop the clock” announcement. The following 
period [0, 1] continued this trend but with increasing significance for both groups. The 
included group returns were 50% higher than those of the excluded group at -0.5% and 
1.01% respectively.  
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Table 7.12. EU ETS stop the clock interval periods [-1, 3], [-1, 0], [0], [0, 1] and [1, 3] 
abnormal returns for included and excluded industrial sector firms 
[-1, 3] 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms 0.3% 10:24 0.46 0.65 0.64 0.52 
Excluded Firms -0.28% 17:22 -0.75 0.46 -0.8 0.43 
[-1, 0] 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -0.07% 01:33 -0.35 0.73 -0.51 0.61 
Excluded Firms -0.82% 14:25 -2.73 0.01*** -2.13 0.03** 
[0] 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -0.1% 00:34 -0.66 0.51 -0.97 0.33 
Excluded Firms -0.40% 17:22 -2.00 0.05** -1.27 0.2 
[0, 1] 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms -0.5% 19:39 -1.74 0.08* -2.34 0.02** 
Excluded Firms -1.01% 13:26 -2.33 0.02** -1.87 0.06* 
[1, 3] 
Group CAAR Pos : Neg t-test p-value Boehmer et. al p-value 
Included Firms 0.37% 11:23 0.87 0.38 1.03 0.3 
Excluded Firms 0.54% 21:18 1.26 0.21 1.61 0.11* 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The period that includes the return to normality [1, 3] shows the excluded firms 
generated the greatest return of 0.54%, marginally significant at the 10% level in the 
Boehmer et al. (1991) cross sectional test. This pattern of performance appears to be a 
trend within this analysis where an arbitrage between the two securities causes the 
lowest performer to return to normality with higher relative returns. Given that this only 
brings the excluded firms back in-line with the included firms, the observation has no 
impact on the final conclusion. 
The EU ETS “stop the clock” event study provides evidence that the market viewed the 
announcement by the European Commission as fundamental in the valuation of the 
excluded firms. Consequently the included group showed resilience in protecting 
shareholder value that was otherwise lost in the excluded group of firms. 
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7.4.8 Descriptive statistics 
The ranking statistics for the sector analysis of included and excluded firms during the 
periods with significant abnormal returns show an even match between the included 
and excluded firms. The ranking of 1st to 2nd was 18 for each classification out of 36 
significant periods (total of 50 periods). Consequently, the chi-squared test indicates 
that the rankings were not significantly different (𝑋2(1) = 0.00, 𝑝 = 1.00) and therefore 
consistent with other findings of neutrality (See Appendix G). 
 
Table 7.13. Ranking statistics for sector analysis during periods with significant returns 
Rank Descriptive Statistics Included Excluded 
1st 18 18 
2nd 18 18 
Mean 1.5 1.5 
Sum 54 54 
Count 36 36 
Chi-Square (𝑋2) 0.00 - 
Degrees of freedom (df) 1 - 
Asymptotic Significance (𝑝) 1.00 - 
 
To account for this neutral result, the descriptive statistics for periods with significant 
abnormal returns were generated. However, these reinforce the non-significant Chi-
Squared ranking result due to the marginality of the mean cumulative abnormal return 
at -1.29% for the included firms compared to -1.2% for the included firms; the median 
statistic indicates that a greater number of the excluded firms abnormal returns were 
relatively more resilient than those of the included firms; lastly, the sum statistic 
remains consistent as the included group generated a total of -46.48% compared to -
43.22% for the excluded firms. However, the distribution of the returns suggest 
otherwise, as indicated through the variance and standard deviation because while the 
excluded firms generated marginally favourable returns their distribution around the 
mean was wider implying greater volatility.  
This is compounded by a greater minimum and subsequent range statistic that shows 
the excluded group generated greater volatility in returns (see Table 7.14). The final 
reinforcement of the risk associated with the abnormal returns is expressed by the 
skewness and kurtosis statistics. The excluded firms generated returns that were 
negatively skewed at -2.029, below that of the included firms at -0.552; coupled with a 
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higher kurtosis value at 130% higher, the excluded firms carry a greater risk of extreme 
negative values. Therefore, the excluded firms show evidence of greater risk in 
achieving cumulative abnormal returns across the tested events. 
 
Table 7.14. Descriptive statistics for the performance of industrial sector firms during 
periods with significant returns 
  Included firms Excluded firms 
Mean -1.29% -1.20% 
Standard Error 0.60% 0.81% 
Median -0.78% -0.48% 
Mode 0.51% 2.27% 
Standard Deviation 3.58% 4.85% 
Sample Variance 0.13% 0.23% 
Kurtosis 2.36 5.45 
Skewness -0.552 -2.029 
Range 20.47% 24.98% 
Minimum -12.80% -18.02% 
Maximum 7.67% 6.96% 
Sum -46.48% -43.22% 
Count 36 36 
 
The table below (Table 7.15) summarises the findings of the comparison between firms 
included in FTSE4good against firms excluded from FTSE4good. The column titled 
retrospective denotes the result of an event study where the main culprit for the event 
was removed from a retrospective analysis, for example, BP plc. 
 
Table 7.15 Overview of the industry event studies results of a comparison between firms 
included and excluded from FTSE4good. 
Event Sector analysis Retrospective 
Financial crisis  Negative N/A 
BP plc oil spill Negative Positive 
Iceland Volcanic Eruption  Negative N/A 
Japan earthquake  Negative Positive 
Horse meat scandal Negative Neutral 
EU ETS Prohibition announcement Positive N/A 
Chi-Squared Test Neutral   
Descriptive Statistics Negative   
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7.5 Discussion  
7.5.1 Financial crisis and FTSE4good industrial sector performance 
Overall, the relationship between financial performance and inclusion in FTSE4good 
firms from the same industrial sector has proved to be broadly negative. During five of 
the six events, the included group of firms failed to out-perform the excluded firms as 
shown in the ranking of significant periods albeit non-significant Chi-Squared statistic. 
This could however be viewed as a neutral result given that significance was not 
determined in favour of the excluded group. The mean return and range statistics also 
show evidence of heightened performance from excluded group. Despite the initial 
signs, the included group showed evidence of lower risk in the standard error, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis of returns. Only when protagonist firms were 
removed retrospectively from the included groups (see Table 7.15) did event specific 
evidence emerge of superior performance in FTSE4good, albeit with limited 
significance. The skewness and kurtosis suggest that investors would carry greater risk 
of extreme negative values relative to the included firms. This does not explain the 
mean return performance but instead suggests that a minority of firms generated 
extreme values away from the groups mean. Therefore, investors may not be willing to 
buy and hold firms that present an extreme risk to overall returns.  
 
7.5.1.1 The financial crisis and financial services sector 
The first event in question was the financial crisis of 2007/2008. The response by 
investors in valuing financial services firms during the financial crisis provides evidence 
that overall, inclusion in FTSE4good did not foster resilience in share value. Taking into 
account the periods with significant returns only; the excluded group of firms showed 
greater relative resilience to downward price pressure over firms included in 
FTSE4good. This reflects the FTSE4good Benchmark index response to the same 
event (chapter 5.1.1), which is also based on inclusion and exclusion using an overall 
score across environmental, social and corporate governance criteria. These findings 
contradict the findings of the FTSE4good UK 50 within the current study and those of 
Ortas et al (2013) who also found the Spanish FTSE4good index carries a lower risk 
profile. More applicable in the sector context but using older and non-FTSE4good 
related data is a study by Simpson and Kohers (2002) who found a positive relationship 
between CSR performance and the financial performance of US based banks pre 
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2002. However, the authors utilised a subjective measure of social performance over a 
different financial event, within a different geographical area and most notably using 
annual return on assets data; a sampling interval that has a proven reduction in power 
relative to daily data (MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
7.5.1.2 The Deep Water Horizon oil spill and oil and gas industry 
This complex exposure to multiple dimensions of risks is also apparent in the results for 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill where the included firms underperformed the excluded 
firms only because BP plc was detrimental to the returns of the group as a whole. As 
shown in Figure 7.2, when BP was retrospectively removed, the market viewed the 
remaining firms to be a more attractive investment prospect in the face of oil industry 
risks born from the Deep Water Horizon explosion and subsequent oil spill. 
Furthermore, alternative energy firms showed significant benefit in the growth of 
cumulative abnormal returns above that of expectations generated from the market 
model. The market therefore showed evidence of a valuation shift away from lower 
performing ESG firms, excluding BP; firstly in favour of included FTSE4good firms 
followed by a substantial interest in alternative energy. The reality, however, is that 
despite relatively high ESG scores for BP plc (Environmental=5, Social=5, and 
Governance=3.6), FTSE4good failed to mitigate the risks directly associated with the 
event resulting in BP’s erroneous inclusion in the index series. This error is not likely to 
be an oversight with respect to FTSE4good’s inclusion standards; instead it is 
potentially evidence of a discrepancy in the inclusion criteria set by FTSE4good.  
 
7.5.1.3 The Japan earthquake, technology and power utility sector performance 
The sector based response to the Japanese earthquake indicated that UK based 
technology firms that were included in FTSE4good were more exposed to the effects of 
the event than the excluded technology firms. The included firms underperformed 
throughout the event window [0, 10] and second trading week [6, 10] with significant 
negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, during the announcement of a reactor leak [0, 
3] the excluded group generated a significant positive return of 2.5% compared to that 
of the included group at 0.51%, almost 80% lower in cumulative abnormal return 
performance over the same period. For the energy sector, the returns for firms included 
in FTSE4good show evidence of heightened performance over excluded firms. Despite 
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the negative return during the industry announcement on Germany’s nuclear energy 
plans, the included group moved into positive territory soon after, finishing with a 
significant event window return of 1.12% compared to -3.13% for the excluded group. 
Therefore, the market viewed inclusion in FTSE4good as a less risky alternative to the 
excluded firms when faced with the prospect of changing energy policy that emerged 
from the Japanese disaster. Betzer et al (2013) tested the equity value response of 
German energy firms to the announcement of changes in policy on the provision of 
energy from nuclear sources; an event study found that the change in policy was 
detrimental to firm stock values in Germany. Therefore, the outperformance by energy 
firms included in FTSE4good could potentially reflect relative exposure to nuclear 
energy thus providing protection to investors against higher risk energy strategies. 
 
7.5.1.4 The Iceland volcano eruption and travel sector performance 
During the volcanic eruption in Iceland and subsequent disruption to travel, the market 
did not indicate a significant preference to firms that were either included or excluded 
from FTSE4good. Instead, the market favoured land based travel firms that include car 
hire, bus and rail companies, all of which were included in FTSE4good. This flight to 
quality produced cumulative abnormal returns that were substantially above those of 
the included and excluded firms. The most significant response was associated with 
the disruption to air based travel. Therefore, it could be argued that FTSE4good could 
not be expected to impose standards that would fully mitigate the risks associated with 
an abrupt shift in travel demand. Evidence of which is shown in a lack of differentiation 
between the included and excluded firms. The clearest benefit however, was enjoyed 
by the land based travel sector as the market recognised the short-term increase in 
returns that would result in an increased demand in land based travel due to airspace 
closure; this result was also concluded by Mazzocchi et al (2010) who looked at the EU 
airline industry without the classification of FTSE4good inclusion and exclusion.  
 
7.5.1.5 The horse meat scandal and food industry performance 
The horse meat scandal of 2013 transcends social responsibility and corporate 
governance issues that FTSE4good’s inclusion criteria aims to correct. The event had 
a substantial impact on the way society views the manufacturing, supply, and safety of 
food which manifested in consumer behaviour that was consequently detrimental to 
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sector returns (The Telegraph, 2013; Abbots and Coles, 2013). The catalyst for this 
event originated from improper governance in the supply chain where firms should 
have ensured transgressions were mitigated through proper due-diligence and checks 
(Pendrous, 2013). Therefore, it was expected that a change in share market values for 
related industrial sector firms would be evident. Consequently, the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the included group of firms indicate that the market did not value 
FTSE4good performance favourably throughout the event; particularly in the case of 
Premier Foods plc who were most affected by the event and responsible for the 
negative abnormal return trend for the whole group despite high social (4.3), and 
governance (4) pillar scores. However, even following the removal of Premier Foods, 
the included group of firms still under performed relative to the excluded group albeit 
without significance. The event window and interval periods indicate that with or without 
the offending firm, financial markets did not recognise inclusion in FTSE4good as a 
means of valuing firms favourably in the face of contraventions related to the meat. 
Like the oil industry response to the Deep Water Horizon event study, the Horse meat 
scandal results were heavily influenced by one firm. The reoccurrence of such a result 
highlights potential inadequacies in the supply chain governance within the offending 
firms that should have been mitigated through proper adhesion to FTSE4good 
standards (Pendrous, 2013). Lin-Hi and Blumberg (2011) found that oil industry 
governance and subsequent violations are negatively correlated; stating that “deficits in 
the institutional environment foster the pursuit of quick wins through violations of 
corporate governance”. The standards set by FTSE4good should therefore mitigate 
this type of pursuit and ideally the market would be aware of this provision and the 
degree to which it is adhered to as per the ratings; evidence of which would also be 
seen in financial performance.  
 
7.5.1.6 The EU ETS, travel and industrial sector performance 
The final two events used to estimate a difference in the financial performance of 
included and excluded firms related to the EU ETS. Given the negative nature of both 
events, namely a change in policy that turns in the face of environmental protection, it 
could reasonably be expected to be positive for excluded and lower performing firms 
who do not advocate a relative interest in ESG standards and environmental protection 
more specifically. However, both included sectors outperformed the excluded firms. 
Firstly, the announcement that the US intended to prohibit it’s aviation industry from 
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participating in the EU ETS saw markets recognise inclusion in FTSE4good as positive 
in their valuation with an event window cumulative average abnormal return of -5.5% 
compared to the excluded firms -18%. While both groups produced negative returns, 
the market interpreted the announcement and related information as being detrimental 
to the excluded group of travel firms. Secondly, the announcement of the European 
Commission’ intention to exclude aviation from the EU ETS produced returns in favour 
of the included group of industrial sector firms. In both events the market showed 
evidence of recognising inclusion in FTSE4good as a positive advantage in their 
valuation in excess of excluded firm returns.  
 
7.5.1.7 Conclusion 
During the sector based analysis, where diversification is limited to inherent firm 
activity, evidence suggests that the market did not conclusively differentiate between 
FTSE4good inclusion and exclusion in valuing the respective assets. It must also be 
clarified that a single event is not the only factor in the valuation of a firm and therefore, 
this study relies on the inclusion of significance statistics to quantify the likelihood that 
the event has impacted on prices. The assumption is that with a degree of confidence, 
ranging from 90% to 99%, the deviations in abnormal returns are associated with the 
events in question. Whether or not these deviations accurately reflect all available 
information is open to debate given the restricted access to FTSE4good’s ratings data.  
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8 Synthesis 
8.1 Introduction 
This research aimed to establish whether a positive relationship existed between 
corporate social performance and corporate financial performance during crisis events. 
To establish this link, FTSE4good was used as a proxy to CSP and green 
performance. Firstly, FTSE4good’s index products were compared to the performance 
of the FTSE All-Share; secondly, firms were classified and compared according to an 
upper and lower limit of ESG performance; and finally, firms were selected from 
industrial sectors, classified and tested according to inclusion in and exclusion from 
FTSE4good. Following on from the discussions that relate to each analysis, the 
following chapter is a synthesis of the overall findings and how they compare to the 
literature. In response to the results, limitations of both the research and FTSE4good 
are identified and subsequent recommendations are made at all-time linking back to 
the literature. 
8.2 Linking FTSE4good with financial performance during market crisis 
This study makes a novel contribution to the literature by analysing the effect to which 
FTSE4good’ E (environmental), S (social) or G (governance) screening criteria impacts 
on share value in response to a shock event; to the author’s knowledge no other study 
exists on the performance of firms from FTSE4good selected according to their 
respective performance within each ESG domain and classified under industrial 
sectors.  
All FTSE4good based studies have instead focused on indices such as the 
FTSE4good UK 50 and whether it outperforms a conventional index (in most cases 
either the FTSE All-Share or FTSE-100). The results from this literature are at best, 
mixed (Ortas et al., 2013; Curran and Moran, 2007; Collison et al., 2008; Belghitar et 
al., 2014; Brzeszczynski and McIntosh, 2013; Collison et al., 2009). Furthermore, the 
wider literature on the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate 
financial performance (CSR-CFP) is also mixed (Tebini et al., 2014), driving continued 
research to achieve consistency in the findings. Overall, the findings of the current 
study also produced mixed evidence during the specified events but some findings are 
consistent with the literature that is in rare cases FTSE4good specific. 
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Firstly, the mean effect of the events on the returns of the indices (chapter 5) suggests 
that the FTSE4good benchmark significantly underperformed the FTSE All-Share 
index; a result that was reinforced by the performance ranking and descriptive statistics 
(chapter 5.1.5). This finding is supported by Collison et al. (2008) who also found, 
without significance, that the FTSE4good Benchmark underperformed relative to the 
FTSE All-Share; albeit using a different method, namely the risk return ratios of the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Conversely, the FTSE4good UK 50 showed 
evidence of superior performance above the returns of the FTSE All-Share; a finding 
that is supported by Belghitar et al. (2014) but other studies have found significant 
evidence of a financial penalty for investing in the FTSE4good UK 50 (Belghitar et al., 
2014) albeit using a different method, longer interval periods (weekly) and compared 
against the FTSE-100. Therefore the FTSE4good benchmark failed to provide 
resilience to investors and actually showed signs of heightened risk relative to the 
FTSE All-Share. The FTSE4good UK 50 was marginally neutral in providing resilience 
to investors due to the returns relative to the FTSE All-Share, however an observation 
on the risk profile of the FTSE4good UK 50 suggests that it carries far less risk than the 
FTSE All-Share, a finding that potentially tips the balance of an advantage in favour of 
the FTSE4good UK 50.  
The subsequent analyses of best in class firms classified according to FTSE4good 
ESG performance also produced mixed results with a neutral/negative finding for both 
the environmental and governance portfolios. Whilst no supporting evidence exists 
directly relating financial performance to portfolios constructed using the FTSE4good 
ratings, research has been conducted into SRI portfolios that support this 
neutral/negative finding (Brzeszczynski and McIntosh, 2013; Humphrey and Tan, 2014; 
Leite and Cortez, 2013; McPeak et al., 2010). For the social portfolios a positive 
relationship was found in the average firms returns, and finding that has support within 
the literature (Nofsinger and Varma, 2014; Janda et al., 2014; Chan and Walter, 2014). 
In all instances the descriptive statistics support the finding of the mean return ranking. 
Finally, the sector focused analysis of firms included and excluded from FTSE4good 
showed evidence of a financial penalty for investing in included firms; a finding that 
again cannot be supported directly by equivalent research into FTSE4good, but the 
findings of (Park and Lee, 2009) provide support, albeit within a sector not represented 
within the current study. The majority of studies suggest that sector focused social 
responsibility has a positive relationship with financial performance (Simpson and 
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Kohers, 2002; Serwinowski and Marshall, 2010) again this association has never been 
made with FTSE4good.  
Overall the variations within the existing literature can be accounted for by the range of 
methods used to test performance. In some cases classification and the rating of firms 
has been subjective and undertaken by the researcher; and in others, such as in the 
current study, this has been exogenous to the authors’ decisions as classification has 
been made by an external entity, such as FTSE4good (Lu et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
Cavaco and Crifo (2014) highlight that research into this field is plagued by issues of 
model misspecification due to inappropriate interval periods (weekly, monthly), small 
samples, old data, extreme firm heterogeneity and the direction of causality. All of 
which the current study aimed to address in the design of the event study methodology 
or at least highlight in the discussion of the results.  
Like the compendium of existing research, the results within the current study have 
also been varied, a consequence of the multiple constructs that are the foundations of 
CSR, ESG and SRI; which as Cavaco and Crifo (2014) state, the multi-dimensional 
constructs of CSR, in this case ESG, need to be considered simultaneously to 
effectively make a connection with financial performance. Therefore, evidence 
suggests that variations in performance might be the consequence of faults in 
FTSE4good’s inclusion standards and over-representation by firms that excel within a 
particular pillar of environmental, social, or corporate governance performance. An 
issue highlighted by Fowler and Hope (2007) and Barnett and Salomon (2006), who 
found that firms included primarily on the basis of strong environmental performance 
had an economic disadvantage because of the increased costs of meeting new 
regulatory standards. This may account for the underperformance of the environmental 
portfolios and industry sector firms included in FTSE4good. Furthermore, FTSE4good 
risks eliminating entire industries due to the reduced universe created by ESG 
screening (Fowler and Hope, 2007). Therefore, compared to both FTSE4good indices, 
the FTSE All-Share is always more diversified (Fowler and Hope, 2007) evidence of 
which is shown in the sector weightings during the financial crisis and Deepwater 
Horizon event studies that can be seen in Table 5.11 and Table 5.12.  
The majority of research into the CSR-CFP link during crisis has focused on market 
events with little to no connection to the environmental, social or corporate governance 
standards employed by FTSE4good and other sustainability indices. The most 
prominent events used for testing are the financial crisis of 2007/08 and relevant news 
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releases. Within these studies mixed results have been found on the benefits of 
investing in ethical indices during such events and conditions; some have been positive 
(Ortas et al., 2013), and others negative (Belghitar et al., 2014). The two 
aforementioned studies have however focused on the FTSE4good indices as a means 
of classifying CSR performance, given the comments by Cavaco and Crifo (2014) that 
highlight CSR is multi-dimensional, this approach may not be the most effective 
method for establishing a causal link. This in part provides rationale for the analysis 
into firms and their respective ESG performance and how this relates to financial 
performance. The findings of this study also support the argument from modern 
portfolio theory (Ortas et al., 2013), that ESG screening does reduce the benefits of 
diversification due to the elimination of entire sectors that consequently impacted on 
the relative performance of the FTSE4good indices and portfolios. 
The only significantly positive result within the current study centres on firms classified 
according to FTSE4good’ social ratings, as seen in the portfolio analysis in section 
6.6.1, which proved resilient to the effects of the events when compared to lower 
performing firms. Nofsinger and Varma (2014) also found that during market crisis, 
firms with relatively higher ESG attributes outperform, in an asymmetric pattern, 
conventional, lower performing firms; and that firms selected through positive 
screening, the likes of which are used by FTSE4good, are the main drivers of 
performance. Whilst a truly asymmetric response was not witnessed within the current 
study, the social portfolio results also concur with Kempf and Osthoff (2007) who found 
that maximal abnormal returns were achieved by selecting the best in class firms in 
terms of extreme social performance. Whilst this was not a study based on 
FTSE4good’ social ratings, it is consistent with the findings of the current study and 
confirmatory of the best in class approached used to classify ESG performance. 
Previous evidence has suggested that financial performance of the social portfolios 
reflect a quality workforce that is better positioned to market products and services, 
creating an economic advantage for the firm (Greening and Turban, 2000). 
Furthermore, research into the financial performance of firms relative to ethical CEO 
leadership has also proved positive, linking with FTSE4good and potentially explaining 
the superior performance of the best socially responsible firms (Eisenbeiss et al., 
2014). Aras and Crowther (2009 p.282) support this notion, highlighting that 
organisational culture is fundamental to the sustainability concept and defines it as the 
“relationship between the corporation and internal stakeholders”. Otherwise referred to 
as stakeholder management theory, significant positive relationships have been found 
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between the employee characteristics of CSR related firms and financial performance 
(Clarkson, 1995).  
Social performance is only one aspect of the CSR construct that FTSE4good aims to 
promote through its ESG standards, and the mixed results of the other event studies 
are therefore contentious in advocating the financial security of a green economy. The 
following illustration (Figure 8.1) delineates the areas of sustainability and the areas of 
focus that corporations apply their resources, inherently and proactively.  
 
Figure 8.1 Corporate social responsibility model (adapted from Aras and Crowther (2009) 
by author) 
The model shown in Figure 8.1 reflects FTSE4good’ ESG criteria but highlights a 
missing fundamental component from within their criteria, finance, and the ability for a 
FTSE4good firm to maintain output whilst managing variability within other areas of 
their business (McDonald, 2006). Therefore, as all the included events transcend the 
areas highlighted within Figure 8.1 it would seem appropriate to comprehensively 
include all aspects of CSR to mitigate associated risks.  
Consequently, the results appear to show that investors are able to identify a portfolio 
of firms from FTSE4good’ social responsibility ratings that are able to provide resilience 
through heightened performance over conventionally constructed portfolios during 
shock events. However, the omission of certain standards, namely economic (finance), 
may have contributed to the underperformance of the FTSE4good overall. A 
suggestion that is supported by Porter and Kramer (2006a) in their scathing 
assessment of CSR ratings. However, despite the environmental and corporate 
governance portfolios failing to generate returns above lower performing firms, these 
results were not significant, therefore, FTSE4good are well positioned to develop a 
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stronger ethical investment model, particularly within their indices. Firstly, a study by 
Bello (2005) found that socially responsible mutual fund characteristics are no different 
to the characteristics of conventional funds; a result that was skewed by the inclusion 
of firms with a level of ESG performance that hindered the overall performance of the 
FTSE4good Benchmark index. The issue being that the score threshold employed by 
FTSE4good allows the inclusion of firms that are in part homogenous to the excluded 
group of assets, therefore, creating a group of firms whose ESG characteristics cause 
their financial performance to potentially overlap. Therefore, the index and sector 
based results are likely to be impacted by an inclusion score threshold that is too low to 
yield a significant and conclusive benefit that is detectable across the included events. 
However, if the top 100 social portfolios are able to provide increased benefits then this 
indicates that a higher inclusion score threshold could yield greater benefits for the 
FTSE4good Indices, making the products a more attractive investment prospect that 
drives the green investment. This finding of a negative influence by firms with a middle 
ground ESG performance is supported by Barnett and Salomon (2006) and Fowler and 
Hope (2007) who state that the funds which utilise a relatively higher number of 
screens that are more stringent tend to eliminate financial underperformance; whilst 
funds that utilise the fewest social screens or just negative screening also perform 
higher due to increased diversification.  
A number of additions could serve to bolster the criteria set by FTSE4good to directly 
mitigate the impacts associated with events such as the financial crisis. One such 
requirement would be transparency and disclosure on a firm’s ability to meet any calls 
on its liquidity, and the extent to which a firm is invested in derivatives would also 
constitute a significant part of the SRI domain (Sarra, 2012; Chatterji and Levine, 
2006). The primary aim is to isolate short-term profit maximising firms that impose risk 
on third parties or the entire economic system. Furthermore, compensation structures 
could be introduced to negate excessive risk taking by firms and to encourage 
confidence in third parties to invest knowing that if a contravention should occur, like 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, then some compensation would be paid to investors 
(Perez, 2011; Sarra, 2012). 
Administering greater precautionary standards would require greater investment in 
individuals with technical proficiency in the high risk areas within which firms operate, 
such as geological and engineering experts (Porter and Kramer, 2006a). The same is 
true for financial risk, the standards of which would be set and assessed by finance 
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experts. Particularly as many of the returns generated by FTSE4good were severely 
hindered by single firms, the actions of which should have been mitigated by 
FTSE4good. In support of this link, Kim et al (2014) found that firms engaged in 
heightened transparency through CSR were less exposed to stock price crash risk. 
It must however be stated that exposure to high yielding sectors such as oil and gas 
and financial services also brings substantially high risks (Walsh, 2012; Reader and 
O'Connor, 2014). The results indicate that the influence of FTSE4good standards is 
diminished when a sector specific incident occurs within a high risk sector such as oil 
and gas. For example, environmental incidents are infrequent but when they do occur 
they have a substantial impact on associated firms. Therefore, while FTSE4good might 
reduce risk, as shown in the social portfolio results (Section 6.6), its influence is 
severely diminished if a related sector specific disaster occurs. Therefore, investors 
should recognise that investment in an FTSE4good firm is never entirely risk free. 
Cavaco and Crifo (2014) identify some of the biases and issues associated with 
previous work in establishing a link between CSR and CFP; highlighting that significant 
firm heterogeneity invalidates cross-sectional analyses; a statement that potentially 
renders the majority of CSR-CFP research defective. Therefore, a further novelty of 
this study and a second contribution to the literature is the sector based analysis that 
aimed to further moderate the effect of diversification that is seen in the index and 
portfolio analyses. Analysing two groups of firms from the same sector, one included in 
FTSE4good and the other excluded, this study aimed to identify whether inclusion 
offered a competitive advantage. The results of this analysis showed that industry 
securities included within the FTSE4good, do not outperform those of excluded firms 
during an industry related shock event. The ranking and descriptive statistics suggest a 
marginal disadvantage for FTSE4good firms, although this was not statistically 
significant. Despite the heterogeneity issues within other studies, few have attempted 
to investigate the CSR-CFP link within specific sectors, satisfying an implied need for 
homogeneity of firms. The literature points to conflicting evidence of the relationship 
between financial performance and corporate social responsibility in a sector focused 
analysis (Simpson and Kohers, 2002; Serwinowski and Marshall, 2010). 
Central to the event study method is the assumption that markets are efficient in 
assimilating available information into the price of assets (Tuck, 2005). However, as 
Brown (2011) points out, the price is not necessarily correct as it only reflects the 
information that is available. In support of this it must be clarified that the ratings history 
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by FTSE4good is prescription only from FTSE and therefore not readily available to all 
market participants, hindering FTSE4good’ effectiveness as a signal of risk to the 
market as a whole. Subsequently, if the market is not aware of the ratings available 
from FTSE4good then it is difficult to be priced accurately into the market. Therefore, a 
recommendation for the administration of FTSE4good is that the ratings of all FTSE All-
Share firms be made readily available to the investing community. This would increase 
accountability and open the ratings for wider interpretation and likely see a change in 
the price response of listed firms. Given this potential issue and the absence of 
significance in this study and the wider literature; is CSR a causal function of financial 
performance or is CSR attained due to financial performance, a link that has been 
tested in the literature (Waddock and Graves, 1997). This implied misdirection of 
causality is however not conclusive as Scholtens (2008) states, interactions vary 
according to the CSR dimension.  
The limitations of the overall method centre on the effectiveness of the event study 
market model and the omission of risk-adjusted-returns associated with volatility; an 
inference made possible through CAPM analysis using the Sharpe (1994) ratio for 
example. Another limitation to the analysis was the sample size during some of the 
industrial sector event studies. To account for this, future studies could include firms 
from a wider geographical area; this would however move the focus of any study away 
from the UK which would have an effect on the events that could be used to test for 
ESG related performance.   
The issues associated with establishing a causal link between FTSE4good and market 
value are thought to be due to the subscription basis of the ratings. Therefore, any 
future study should establish what percentage of the market subscribes to this 
information? This information can then be linked to the efficient markets hypothesis in 
determining how inefficient markets are in relation to FTSE4good’ privately held ratings 
data. Only when the markets are efficient to the ratings can causality be tested in 
linking FTSE4good performance to resilience performance within the market. This 
could be tested further through agent-based modelling where a market is created to 
simulate the FTSE All-Share for example and the addition of rules indicate how current 
uptake of FTSE4good ratings, followed by increases in uptake impact on interactions 
and performance. The autonomous conditions of these behaviours can be used to 
assess multiple aspects of ESG performance and the impact on the system as a whole. 
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9 Concluding remarks 
The findings of the current study show mixed results regarding the resilience of green 
firms as is broadly reflected within the literature. Overall, it cannot be said that green 
firms are more resilient to shocks than non-green firms. Firstly, the distinction between 
green and non-green is contentious as firms operate on many levels of green 
performance. Secondly, green refers to a wide range of characteristics that are present 
within some operative and administrative systems but not in others; for example, 
FTSE4good and DJSI employ different management frameworks with distinctly 
different criteria. Thirdly, and continuing on from the subjective variability of green 
characteristics; as shown in the results some aspects of green performance, namely 
social responsibility, are able to provide resilience whereas, classification in other 
areas, namely corporate governance, does not. Consequently, green investments, 
ESG or SRI are too broad a term to accurately reflect the link between CSR and CFP 
during a shock event. 
Therefore, when asked if green firms are more resilient to shocks, it could be said that 
green, CSR and many other references to socially responsible investing are too broad 
to identify with a single investment strategy. However, the results indicate that broadly 
speaking green firms are not more resilient to shocks but the social performance 
results and the identification of a range of systematic challenges suggests that under a 
revised administrative system and ESG performance classification, firms selected from 
the upper limits of ESG performance have the potential to mitigate related risks and 
thus provide investors with a capacity for resilience over and above their counterparts, 
evidence of which is shown in the FTSE4good UK 50 and social portfolios. 
For the green economy to develop through green investment, firms must be 
acknowledged and known to be green. This can only be done with the release of 
relevant information such as the FTSE4good ratings. Investors can then utilise the 
ratings to select the highest performing firms that reflect the areas of risk they are most 
interested in mitigating, accepting that not all risks can be alleviated. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A : Systematic review of the green economy 
(2011) 
Given the uncertainty of impacts that a green economy could have on economic activity 
and ultimately human progress, a robust, best evidence based characterisation and 
definition is required. Much that has been written on green economies is largely 
underpinned by theory without any reference to empirical and applied conditions. 
Therefore, this section undertakes a systematic review of the green economy concept 
to provide a consensual, clear and comprehensive definition for practitioners, 
government and business leaders to effectively formulate, communicate and implement 
their ideas.  
The aim of the review is to: 
 Delineate and define all meanings and characteristics of a “green economy”. 
 Identify the obstacles that hinder the progress towards a green economy. 
 Identify gaps in the knowledge around green and environmentally friendly 
economies for further research. 
The Systematic review method was initially founded and most commonly used within 
the medical research field (Tranfield et al., 2003). A systematic review is used to 
thoroughly locate, select and critically appraise all relevant knowledge while providing 
consistent and accurate findings, synthesised to meet the reviewer’s aims and 
objectives (Cuevas, 2006). It is designed to provide an organised framework that 
informs decision makers with unbiased evidence based knowledge. 
Because of the growth in information technology there has been a rapid increase in 
published articles (2 million annually in biomedical sciences alone), a systematic 
literature review is therefore a fundamental means for collecting and evaluating 
previous work given the magnitude of information available (Tranfield et al., 2003) A 
traditional narrative review is thought to be open to bias, lack of critical assessment and 
insufficient scope of knowledge used for synthesis (Cuevas, 2006). 
The systematic review process is performed through a methodical framework that is 
transparent for researchers and practitioners to follow and reproduce Therefore, the 
systematic review minimises bias by use of an extensive and explicit literature search 
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together with a record of the researcher’s decisions, procedures and conclusions. The 
robustness of the review process ultimately forms the basis for informed decision 
making (Tranfield et al., 2003). 
Systematic reviews have intrinsic benefits for both qualitative and quantitative research 
where the aim is to determine consistency across the knowledge base (Tranfield et al., 
2003). A systematic literature review is, therefore, a useful method in any research 
project attempting to define and delineate the “green economy” and all adjoining 
definitions.  
Due to the qualitative nature of the proposed literature review on “green economies”, 
the management based works of Tranfield et al (2003) and Cuevas (2006) served as 
guidance to the systematic review methodology via the following steps: 
1. Outline the aims and objectives of the review. 
2. Select a review panel and determine member responsibilities. 
3. Perform a scoping study to determine search terms. 
4. Search and screen for all potentially relevant articles. 
5. Critically determine which information is relevant in a clear and reproducible 
manner. 
6. Evaluate selected research and strength of findings and conclusions. 
7. Appraise individual studies using specified framework. 
8. Communicate results in a transparent and comprehensive report. 
The following sections follow this process. 
 
Aims and Objectives of the review 
Scoping Study 
A scoping study was performed to assess the relative size of the subject area, bound 
and determine the focus of the review topic by identifying search terms and keywords. 
Reading was initially focused around definitions and broad characteristics of a green 
economy presented in the articles returned from the “green economy” search term 
online and within citation database, Scopus. It is initially clear that no single, unbiased, 
best evidence based definition for a green economy exists. The environmental 
awareness media website OneWorld (2012), states that “there is no consensual 
186 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
definition” for a green economy. Attempts to define a green economy are often 
confused with clean energy economies, accountancy methods that could be used to 
measure a green economy and definitions from potentially biased sources that have an 
ideological, subjective interest. It also seems that there is cross use of terms that 
causes confusion, for example: Are low carbon; circular economy and green 
economies all one in the same?  
 
Methodology / Review Protocol 
The methodology for the systematic review follows the framework of Tranfield et al. 
(2003) and Cuevas (2006) where the procedures used to collect, critique and 
synthesise the evidence in support of the aims of the review are presented in more 
detail.  
 
The Review Panel 
A review panel was formed to approve key elements of the review process as 
appropriate, such as the keywords used for the search string and inclusion criteria for 
source selection. The review panel consists of the reviewer / researcher, the senior 
academic supervisor and lead. Both supervisors are experienced in the use of 
systematic review processes and, therefore, qualify to advise and steer the review 
through regular consultation.  
 
Table 1: Systematic review advisory panel 
Panel Member Role / Title and Affiliation 
Myles Donnelly Reviewer, PhD Student, Cranfield School of Applied Sciences 
Dr Andrew Angus Academic Supervisor, Cranfield School of Applied Sciences 
Fiona Lickorish PhD Supervisor, Cranfield School of Applied Sciences (CERF) 
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Search Strategy 
Information Sources 
Data sources for the systematic review are shown in Table 2 and include journals from 
citation databases and media publications. Manual searches through the internet were 
also carried out to locate further relevant sources such as government reports, theses 
and conference papers.  
Table 2: Data sources used for the literature review 
Data source Description 
Citation Databases 
Scopus (18’500 journals, 425 trade publications, 325 book series, 250 conference 
Proceedings): 
  Science Direct
  EBSCO
  Web of Knowledge
  Proquest
ENDS – Environmental Data Services 
Specific Journals 
Energy Policy 
Energy Economics 
RPR (Review of Policy Research) 
Economics Management and Financial markets 
Journal of Environment & Development 
Ecological Economics 
Natural Resources Forum 
Media publications 
Printed: Electronic: 
  Times Online
  YouTube (UNEP – United Nations 
Environment Programme)
  The Economist   Oecd.org
  FT
  Guardian.co.uk/environment/green-
economy
  TIME  
Reports 
  HM Government (2011a) “Enabling the Transition to a Green Economy: Government 
and business working together”
  UNEP (2011b) “Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development 
and Poverty Eradication – A Synthesis for Policy Makers”
Bibliographic A wide range of books relating to search terms and focus of review. 
Expert opinion Information provided by industry and academic experts 
Thesis Systematic Review Papers: (Tranfield et al., 2003; Cuevas, 2006) 
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Search terms 
Because of the ambiguity of the subject area, an extensive range of search terms and 
keywords were initially formulated from the scoping study and tested individually within 
the citation database to ascertain the number of returned articles. Those that returned 
no relevant articles were removed along with terms that returned the same articles. 
Both British and American spellings were considered to ensure all available literature 
was located.  
The search terms outlined in the search string box were entered into the aggregators 
shown in Table 2 on April 2012. The following search string was developed without any 
exclusion criteria to net as many articles relating to green and eco-friendly economies 
and adjoining terms so as to conform to the wide reaching principles of a systematic 
literature review.  
Search string used April 2012. 
“Green economy” “Circular economy” “Green strategy” 
“Green growth” “Low carbon economy” “Big society” 
“Green deal” “Sustainable economy” “Carbon plan” 
“Green economics” “Ecological modernization” 
“Ecological 
modernisation” 
“Clean energy economy” “Green jobs” “Green business” 
 
The search string returned 2’806 articles from Scopus and the terms were utilised as 
appropriate to generate relevant material for the review before screening. Coupled with 
the bibliographic search and other sources of information, the total amount collected for 
screening was 2’856. 
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Screening and selection criteria 
The results from the search string were exported into a spread sheet that included 
information on the author, article title, year, source title, abstract and keywords. Using 
this information, studies were screened through a multi stage process comprising of 
selection by relevance and quality assessment, which identified the most appropriate 
and significant, high quality sources available at the time of the search. Studies that 
met the inclusion criteria would be included for review. Studies that conflict with the 
inclusion criteria would be excluded. 
 
Search and selection protocol 
The general scope of the review was to understand the concept and literature around 
green economies with a view to define the system, highlight challenges and gaps in the 
knowledge. The scoping study indicated significant interest in the field with little 
empirical evidence regarding the costs and benefits of transitioning to a green 
economy. Given the contemporary nature and limited amount of research, an open 
time frame was adopted so that all opinions and theories could be considered in 
defining a green economy. English only was selected given that the UK and EU publish 
all their material in this language. Again, so as not to eliminate any relevant sources of 
information, all disciplines where considered. The search protocol is outlined below in 
Table 3 and delineates the search into a manageable and focused process.  
Table 3: Scope of the systematic literature review 
Component Description 
Focus 
Define and delineate the meaning and characteristics of a green 
economy, highlighting gaps in the knowledge 
Time Frame All dates within the available data sources 
Language English only 
Discipline 
Primarily social sciences but all literature is considered dependent 
on relevance to green economies and their characteristics 
 
Screening and selection by relevance 
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Initially, the primary method for screening was to scan the citation title, abstract and 
keywords. The literature had to clearly indicate relevance to the subject of “green 
economies” or related search terms and show evidence of descriptive emphasis. At this 
stage the screening process reduced the collection down to 300. The second stage 
consisted of a more comprehensive evaluation of the title, abstract and text body. At 
this stage studies were included if they inform of key characteristics of a green 
economy or those thought to be closely related. Studies that are appropriate to review 
generally have pertinent research questions with a detailed and high quality 
methodology (Tranfield et al., 2003). At this point the collection was reduced to 141. 
 
Quality assessment selection 
The final stage in the selection process informs of a papers internal validity in achieving 
the author’s aims and objectives. Because of the contemporary and qualitative nature 
of the research on green economies, selection by quality assessment is challenging as 
qualitative studies are by nature non-standard, complex and open to the author’s 
subjective opinion and experience (Mulrow, 1994). The relevance of each individual 
source was assessed based on its quality and excluded if it failed to meet a minimum 
standard as judged by the author against a set of criteria outlined in Table 4. 
Table 4: Quality assessment selection criteria 
Variable Description 
Transparency Are the aims and purpose of the study clearly stated? 
Theoretical 
robustness 
Is the study consistent with existing theory? Are the arguments 
compelling and justifiable? 
Design Is the design fit for the purpose/aims of the study?  
Analysis 
Are the methods used for analysis suitable and accurately 
described? 
Conclusion 
Do they follow on from the purpose and aims of the study? Are they 
significant within the context of economic systems? 
Empirical 
relevance 
Is the study useful within a real environment? 
Overall quality 
score 
Overall feel for the study? 
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Synthesising strategy for literature review 
Descriptive analysis methodology 
An overall picture and organisational structure of the field of enquiry is ascertained by 
generating descriptive analysis tables that inform of the relevant, homogenous or 
heterogeneous aspects of the review sources (Cuevas, 2006). Table 5 provides 
detailed information on the variables used for the descriptive analysis.  
Table 5: Variables used for the descriptive analysis 
Variable Description 
Type of study Theoretical, empirical, quantitative, qualitative, mixed etc. 
Methodology What methods were used to explore the subject area? 
Journal/Organisation From where did the work originate? 
Chronology Year the sources where published? 
Geopolitical focus What is the geopolitical focus of the study? 
Economic Orientation What type of “green” economy does the study focus? 
Theoretical 
framework 
What are the main theories that underpin the study? 
Rationale What does the study aim to achieve? 
Key findings What are the main conclusions and research gaps? 
 
Thematic analysis methodology 
The final part of the systematic review involves an in depth analysis where the literature 
is broken-down into its principle components. Tranfield et al. (2003) state that the 
relevant components are then synthesised into a new arrangement that provides 
consensual or a non-confirmative narrative. Given the contemporary and qualitative 
nature of the subject area, a narrative synthesis will be adopted to generate the best 
evidence for defining a green economy and highlighting the gaps in the literature.    
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Descriptive Analysis of the review 
Results of the systematic review 
Using the search string terms, the citation databases outlined in Table 6 returned a 
total of 2’806 references with an additional 55 reports and publications from a manual 
search via the internet. The 2’856 references where then reduced to 300 through 
selection by relevance screening where source title, abstract and keywords were 
assessed accordingly. A more in depth review of the remaining sources was conducted 
to ascertain relevance which reduced the number to 141. The final selection process to 
ascertain quality reduced the sources for a final review to 41 thus rejecting 100 due to 
quality, irrelevance and non-access. The descriptive analysis is based on the remaining 
41 references. 
Table 6: Search statistics 
Search Variable Qty 
Databases searched 5 
Key words used 14 
References returned (including manual search) 2856 
After applying relevance selection criteria 300 
After applying in-depth relevance selection criteria 141 
Final review list 41 
 
The 41 sources were categorised according to the primary orientation of the study, 
indicated in Table 7 below. 20 sources were classed as qualitative, 12 as mixed, 9 as 
theoretical and 0 were classified as primarily quantitative. 
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Table 7: Classification of study type 
Study classification Qty 
Qualitative 20 
Mixed 12 
Theoretical 9 
Quantitative 0 
 
The methodological underpinning of all the studies included for review was largely 
descriptive and thematic as they followed a qualitative narrative in addressing their 
aims and objectives. Some studies did however tackle the issues with some statistical 
emphasis whilst some utilised futures methods to explore possible trends and 
scenarios. Table 8 shows the primary methodological emphasis of the studies included 
for review. 
Table 8: Methodological orientation of the review sources 
Study classification Qty 
Descriptive/Thematic 32 
Descriptive/Thematic/Statistical 6 
Descriptive/Thematic/Statistical/Scenarios 3 
 
The following table (Table 9) outlines the origins of who published the review sources. 
With publications from a large number of high profile organisations and within high 
impact journals, the importance of the green economy is evident. 
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Table 9: Journal and Organisational origin of review sources 
Journal/Publisher Qty 
UN 2 
UNEP 2 
OECD 2 
HM Government UK 2 
European Commission 2 
International Journal of Green Economics 2 
GAIA - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society 1 
Sustainable Europe Research Institute 1 
Sustainability Science 1 
Sustainable Development Commission 1 
Scientific American 1 
Problemy Ekorozwoju 1 
OECD Observer 1 
NIGP 1 
Natural Resources Forum 1 
Journal of Material Cycles and Waste Management 1 
Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 1 
Journal of Cleaner Production 1 
International Journal of Sustainable Development and World 
Ecology 
1 
Intereconomics 1 
Indiana Business Review 1 
Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 1 
Global Environmental Change 1 
Futures 1 
Ecological Economics 1 
Earth Charter Commission 1 
Development and Change 1 
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 1 
CDKN (Climate & Development Network) 1 
BioResources 1 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1 
Aldersgate Group 1 
Conference Paper 1 
International Union for Conservation and Nature (IUCN) 1 
European Environment Agency (EEA) 1 
GAIA – Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society 1 
Stake Holder Forum 1 
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Chronological results 
No date restrictions were applied to the search, as the origins of all modern sustainable 
economic thinking were considered. The majority of references originate from between 
2007 and 2012 with a single article before 2000. Figure 1 shows the chronological 
distribution of the sources used for review. 
 
Figure 1: Chronological distribution of the review sources. 
 
Geopolitical focus of the literature 
The geopolitical focus of the review sources are indicated in Figure 2 below with a 
global majority of 30 (72%). The OECD, EU and UK each contribute 3 (7%) references 
to the review with China contributing 2 (5%). The results show a largely 
macroeconomic interest in the subject area. 
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Figure 2: Geopolitical focus of the review sources by region. 
 
Economic orientation of the review sources 
The majority of sources included for review were primarily related to the green 
economy with 36 (88%) references. The remaining two economic themes consist of a 
circular economy and ecological modernisation that contribute 3 (7%) and 2 (5%) 
references respectively. Figure 3 below shows the subject focus of the review sources. 
 
Figure 3: Economic orientation of the review sources by theme. 
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Theoretical framework of the review sources 
The sources included for review consist mostly of sustainable development (SD) at 25 
(61%). Contributing 5 (12%) is a mix of sustainable development and neoclassical 
economic (SD/NCE) theory. Futures and sustainable development (SD/F) along with 
Ecological Economics (EE) account for 2 references each (5%) respectively. The 
remaining theoretical mix consists of 1 (2%) reference with a theoretical mix indicated 
below in Figure 4. The theoretical mix in addition to those already indicated consists of 
ecological modernisation (EM), Keynesian, Pigouvian, Schumpeterian (K/P/S) theory.  
 
Figure 4: Theoretical mix of the sources used for review. 
 
 
Figure 5: Subject area of publications included in the review. 
Figure 5 highlights the subject area of the sources included within the review, 
highlighting a dearth of economic application. 
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Appendix B : Literature review of the green economy 
 
Visions of a Green Economy 
UNEP (2011) defined a green economy in terms of its outcomes, an economy “that 
result in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing 
environmental risks and ecological scarcities”. Based on its macroeconomic models, 
UNEP also suggest that a green economy would achieve greater rates of GDP growth 
than a “fossil fuel based, business-as-usual (BAU) economy”, in addition to protecting 
natural capital and achieving development goals (Victor and Jackson, 2012). However, 
Victor and Jackson (2012) argue that the UNEP macroeconomic models are flawed in 
that their scenarios fail to differentiate between geographic regions and income 
inequality. A report by UNDESA (2012) highlights the prevailing conflict in how the 
green economy should be expressed with the eight definitions published in the 
appendix. Brockington (2012) refers to UNEP’s expression of a green economy as a 
“general statement”, implying a lack of critical detail with a perceived disconnect with 
reality in what the definition conveys relative to the economic status quo, as discourse 
has been likened to a “science fiction novel”.  
Despite this, the OECD and EC base their vision of a green economy on the UNEP 
definition. The OECD (2011) argues that: “green growth” is about fostering economic 
growth and development while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the 
resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies. It is also about 
fostering investment and innovation which will underpin sustained growth and give rise 
to new economic opportunities”. The European Commission (2010) defined a green 
economy as “a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of 
employment, productivity and social cohesion.” 
Csaba (2010) argues that the definitions and strategies set out by the EC and OECD 
are mission statements to set the scene for policy makers rather than operational 
documents. The OECD (2011) also adds in their “Towards Green Growth” report, that 
“there is no one-size-fits-all prescription for implementing strategies for green growth”. 
By focusing on the outcomes, the above definitions fail to explain the mechanics of 
achieving a green economy that is distinct from the business-as-usual (BAU) system 
(Brockington, 2012).  
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Brand (2012) states that the issues around adopting a green economy are not new as 
like sustainability discourse the visions and strategies remain contradictory to others 
within the same framework. Pochet (2010) highlights some of the contradictions in 
achieving EU2020 (European Commission, 2013), an example of which is the 
importance of utilising technology in the protection of the environment but intellectual 
property rights prevent its dispersion and consequent effectiveness. Conflicts are 
largely associated with growth and the underlying production and consumption habits 
ingrained within society, all of which are covered in the following section. 
 
Economic problems 
Growth and environmental degradation 
Economies and the factors within are part of a large, autarkic, complex and organic 
global system. This system is bounded by the Earth’s life support system and natural 
capital and must, therefore, be appropriately reflected within green economic strategies 
(Kosoy et al., 2012). Particularly as, despite the majority of the population being well-
fed, clothed and housed, new demands continue to be created. New technology, 
fashions, and adaptations to existing products help drive demand to unprecedented 
levels beyond the actual “needs” of society (Nellis and Parker, 2004). Daly (2005) and 
Jackson (2009) imply that such growth has reached a “futility limit” where additional 
growth does not necessarily increase utility.  In this circumstance, the challenge is to 
decouple development from the unsustainable use of natural capital (UNEP, 2011a), as 
most of the current BAU material flows are wasteful and unsustainable (Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation, 2012). Victor and Jackson (2012) argue that growth must be 
curtailed if environmental degradation and social inequality are to be collectively 
reduced; contradicting UNEP (2011b), which states that a green economy should 
pursue growth. If society continues to rely on virgin materials for economic growth, then 
environmental degradation, ecological scarcities and social inequality are thought 
difficult to reduce at the same time (Jackson, 2009). In contradiction to this however, 
UNEP (2011b) implies that the green economy can only exist with ever-increasing 
consumption and market expansion. 
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The development of a green economy therefore needs to address these contradictions 
(Reardon, 2007). Figure 1 below shows a generalised map of the spill-over impacts 
that occur with material flows and economic activity. 
 
 
Figure 1: Causality schematic showing the trade-offs and co-benefits of economic 
activity (developed by author). 
 
The spill-over impacts in Figure 1 represent the trade-offs associated with growth and 
negative externalities, which affect utility and well-being (Brand, 2012; Pochet, 2010; 
Reardon, 2007).  This point is also demonstrated by the link between GDP per person 
and the level of waste produced per person within a range of countries (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: At a national level does a) mean GDP per person determine the level of 
municipal waste per person, or b) does the level of municipal waste partly determine 
GDP? (GDP from World Bank, 2013; municipal solid waste from World Bank, 2012).  Data from 
selected countries.   
 
Figure 2 highlights New Zealand, Ireland and USA as having high levels of GDP and 
municipal waste production per person. Japanese, Belgian and Icelandic citizens, 
although having a comparable GDP, produce around half the amount of municipal 
waste and therefore could serve as a benchmark for material efficiency. Figure 2 
explains why it is unsurprising that growth strategies adopted by emerging and 
developing economies result in high levels of material consumption and subsequent 
waste production (UNEP, 2011a). Published research on Japanese municipal solid 
waste provides evidence of the existence of an environmental “Kuznets Curve” at the 
micro level with the assistance of government intervention (Hossain and Miyata, 2012).  
As indicated by Figure 2 the issues associated with growth pose significant challenges. 
Poorer countries may see greater resource use as worthwhile for economic and social 
progress thus closing the gap between the rich and poor (Bowen and Fankhauser, 
2011). Advanced economies are prepared to accept greater relative financial and 
economic costs to protect the environment and increase social welfare (Victor, 2010). 
This outlook represents a Kuznets Curve scenario where poorer countries adopt policy 
New Zealand 
Ireland 
USA 
Austria 
Denmark 
Austrlia & Italy 
Japan 
Iceland 
Belgium Brazil 
China 
0
400
800
1200
1600
0 20000 40000 60000
A
n
n
u
al
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
 w
as
te
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
(k
g)
 
GDP per capita (US$; 2011) 
202 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
targets and instruments that oppose sustainability discourse in an attempt to mimic the 
progress achieved by advanced economies (Kosoy et al., 2012).  
To address the issues associated with wasteful production and consumption markets 
are the suggested as a means for altering these behaviours (European Commission, 
2011). These market mechanisms are designed to modify price signals that internalise 
externalities (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011) but these price movements are potentially 
problematic in the supply of essential commodities and common goods (Dasgupta, 
2010). Therefore, as Ackerman and Gallagher (2000) suggest, if the market is a 
blueprint for the green economy then the prices must be right or the green objectives 
will fail as recent evidence suggests in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Pielke, 
2013). Brand (2012) argues that the market alone is insufficient and Kosoy (2012) 
states also that the governance for common goods should be controlled by non-market 
mechanisms thus protecting them from the insatiable logic of the market. This view is 
also supported by OECD (2011). 
 
Social equity and inequality 
One of the most pressing challenges within green economic discourse is social 
inequality (Jackson, 2009). Brand (2012) argues that the global pursuit for economic 
growth hinders social equality. For example, Kosoy et al. (2012) states that inequality 
creates a negative spiral that intensifies status competition that motivates excess 
consumption, population growth and conflict, and thereby greater inequality. They, 
therefore, argue that a green economy can only be fully realised if poverty is 
significantly reduced and wealth is more equitably distributed (Jackson, 2009). Despite 
improvements, modern social classes are still determined by wealth that gives greater 
opportunity for access to resources and social mobility. These relationships are 
strongly supported by data from the World Economic Forum (2013) Global Risks 
report.  
Inequality can also bring tensions that make a person more self-serving and 
individualistic, which then inhibits solutions that are seen to benefit the wider 
community (Jackson, 2009). This is because of the perceived disparity between social 
classes where the poorer in society are less willing and as mentioned, able to 
contribute to green initiatives for fear that someone else will receive all the benefits 
(Kennet and Heinemann, 2006). A successful transition to a green economy could be 
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undermined by issues of this nature. Adams and Jeanrenaud (2008), therefore, argue 
that priority should be given to eradicating absolute poverty where people are unable to 
meet their own life supporting needs through the provision of food, shelter, healthcare 
and the means to progress their lives.  
Bringing the world’s poorest into more equal status would also provide global 
opportunity for trade and broader economic development, benefiting the populations 
that live close to the poverty line (Dittrich et al., 2012).   However social mobility and 
population also poses significant challenges as equitable distribution of resources 
could accelerate the decline of the natural capital base (Daly, 2005). A report to “The 
Club of Rome” (Kapitza, 2006) highlights that increasing populations and social 
development have a negative impact on resource depletion and environmental quality. 
For instance, increased populations with increasing disposable income generate more 
greenhouse gas emissions from the current market for production and consumption 
that extend beyond the sequestration rates of the planet (UNEP, 2011a). This also 
supports OCED (2011) suggestions that while technology and innovation serve as an 
essential tool in the successful adoption of a green economy, the targeting of business 
and consumer behaviour must be at the forefront of this emerging system.  
 
Economic solutions 
The green economy & the circular economy 
Industrial ecology and the circular economy provide a way to address the tension 
between growth and resource use.  Building on industrial ecology theory, the “circular 
economy” is being promoted as a way to address the wastefulness of current linear 
models (Li and Wang, 2010). This organised system of material throughput in its most 
basic form is underpinned by the self-explanatory “three R’s” principle of reduce, reuse, 
and recycle (Yong, 2007) 
China has integrated the concept of the “circular economy” into its current five year 
plan with a focus on a progressive closer-loop, cleaner and more efficient value chain 
with high levels of waste recovery thus minimising environmental degradation and 
maximising the longevity of resource use (Li and Wang, 2010). The process requires 
collaboration across sectors. For example, Chinese company, “Guigan Sugarcane” has 
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found a market for its waste products. Their filter sludge is used as an alternative fuel in 
the cement industry and molasses in the production of alcohol based goods (Ellen 
Macarthur Foundation, 2013). Agents are, therefore, motivated to work together to 
utilise waste as raw material inputs for different production processes across the 
economy (Andersen, 2007). Those resources that are unfit for reuse must be recycled 
and those that are unfit for recycling must re-enter the natural system safely (Su et al., 
2013). 
The consumer is also integral to the success of a circular economy by complying with 
the 3 R’s, reducing un-necessary consumption, reusing and then recycling products 
depending on usefulness or value of material content (Yong, 2007). The circular flow of 
resources is supported by government instruments and the cultural foundations of a 
nation (Mathews, 2011). Manufacturers also have responsibility for increasing the 
working life of consumables so more can be achieved with less, freeing productive 
capacity for other economic uses (Victor, 2010). However, longer-lived products are 
also likely to carry a higher price tag thus making them less affordable (Barbiroli, 2011). 
Figure 3 represents a basic example of the general flows within a circular economy. 
The detailed processes and exchanges within recycling (r) and the flows associated 
with consumption (C) (reduce and reuse) are what drives the circular economy in the 
form of industrial ecology and behavioural synergies (Li and Wang, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3: A schematic representation of a macro circular economic system. 
205 
 
Cranfield University  Myles Donnelly 2015 
It is clear that a circular economy saves materials and energy while increasing 
utilisation rates relative to the BAU economic model (Andersen, 2007). The circular 
economy is also believed to foster the development principles of quality service 
provision, rather than a virgin material based production system, and it provides greater 
opportunity for environmental protection and for social development such as through 
new areas of employment (Li and Wang, 2010). For example, a circular economy or 
industrial ecology approach promotes localised production and distribution services 
that can bring positive spill-overs such as raised employment and reduced emissions 
through decreased logistical needs (Reardon, 2007). The consensus within the 
literature is that a circular, green and sustainable economy operates near to or 
continually moving towards zero waste. The consumers’ appetite to raise living 
standards through consumption of material resources is met by the principle of the 
circular economy (World Bank, 2012).  
 A move to a circular economy could have negative impacts on international trade 
because of “green barriers” (Su et al., 2013). A circular economy also cannot endlessly 
recycle as there will remain thresholds (which will vary with product) beyond which 
recycling provides little to no net benefit (Andersen, 2007). The adoption of such 
systems will also only occur if the private economic gains are financially viable (Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation, 2012; Andersen, 2007). Jackson (2009) also argues that re-
circulation of resources is just a short term answer to the resource conundrum as 
continued growth in the global population and consumption rates will still inevitably 
exhaust resources. 
Despite these challenges, the consensus is that the transition from a producing to a re-
producing economy (with an emphasis on the waste sector) is at least initially integral 
to the success of a green economy (UNEP, 2011b). It is of particular importance to 
developing economies, such as China, that require higher levels of material throughput 
(Yong, 2007).  The increase in service based systems could also improve resource use 
with positive impacts on job creation and income equality (Dittrich et al., 2012). 
 
Innovation and technology 
Much of the current discourse assumes that technology will solve the economic, 
ecological and social difficulties of the current system through increased efficiency and 
new markets (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011). It is hoped that such 
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changes will uncouple the links between growth and natural capital (UNEP, 2011b; 
Dittrich et al., 2012). Langhelle (2000) states “the accumulation of knowledge and the 
development of technology can enhance the carrying capacity of the resource base”.  
However dependence on technology and innovation to correct future market failures is 
a high risk speculative strategy (Jackson, 2009; Bosselmann et al., 2012). Gains 
achieved through efficiency can result in lower prices that contribute to increased 
supply and demand (Victor, 2010). Furthermore, in some sectors, efficiency gains have 
been achieved by an increase in resource input to decrease labour factor costs (Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation, 2012). Brand (2012) argues that the application of new 
technologies will result in the demise of resource intensive industries that fail to adapt. 
Although changes in technology can also result in unemployment and the need for 
retraining (Fulai et al., 2011), technology is an essential part of the solutions to our 
economic, environmental and social difficulties (Gurtowski, 2011).   
Barbiroli (2011) provides a qualitative account of many of the costs and advantages in 
transitioning to a green economy. Higher prices for environmentally harmful goods 
encourage the development of substitutes, production alternatives and technologies 
that bring efficiency gains. An example of a shift in production and consumption caused 
by innovation is the development of virtual networks and digital services such as 
electronic e-readers and mobile technologies that contribute to the de-materialisation of 
traditional paper derived industries (Brand, 2012; Dittrich et al., 2012; Barbiroli, 2011). 
Technology can also provide significant social benefits. For example, renewable 
energy technologies can lift people out of poverty and promote health and well-being 
(Reardon, 2007; Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011). This is a 
fundamental target of the green economy, to generate energy with diminishing impact 
on the environment. 
 
Governance – policy targets and instruments 
Brand (2012) and Ban Ki-moon (2010) argue that the success of the green economy 
depends on governments having integrated political strategies that foster sound policy 
and investment across the three pillars of sustainability. The implication is that the 
green economy depends on government interventions. For instance, the EU emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) or the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system that tackles 
open access to marine resources of New Zealand are examples of long run, 
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instruments that work in conjunction with markets to achieve policy targets (Daly, 2005; 
Yang et al., 2013).  
The EU ETS has recently (2013) run into trouble regarding the downward and 
ineffective price of carbon (Scott, 2013). This coupled with diminishing support from the 
European Parliament who indicate a preference towards economic growth and energy 
price stabilisation (Pielke, 2013). The ITQ fish quota system that is represented across 
the globe has however shown evidence in New Zealand and Alaska of successfully 
conserving and regenerating targeted marine species whilst also improving profitability 
(Yang et al., 2013; Earth Island Journal, 2013). This system also has inherent 
economic risks as evidence has shown that small-scale fishermen in New England, 
USA are struggling due to unfair quota allocation (Earth Island Journal, 2013).  
The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon (2010) therefore emphasises the importance 
of governance for propagating the adoption of a green economy in a similar way that 
the current BAU economic system makes use of tax and subsidy regimes.  India for 
example, set a target to increase its global share of renewable energy by 2012 to 10%. 
Reforms that included tax exemptions and fines motivated the Indian economy to 
achieve its policy targets; raising India’s renewables sector to the world’s fourth most 
attractive in terms of investment (Porfir'ev, 2012). UK Council recycling programmes 
are a good example of localised integrated policies that have wide reaching benefits 
across a range of environmental, social and economic issues (HM Government, 
2011c).  
Policies are in part based on the precautionary principle concept that is designed to 
place the responsibility of providing proof of impacts on the proponent rather than 
society (Reardon, 2007). With the precautionary principle as its underpinning, green 
policies and mechanisms work to prevent foreseeable impacts, protecting future 
generations and the environment they will inherit (Kennet and Heinemann, 2006). 
However, the same precautionary thinking processes are also applied to protect high 
yielding economic activities that are harmful to the environment thus preventing 
change, “the economic precautionary principle” (Reardon, 2007). An example of such 
economic precautionary behaviour is the recent decision by the European Parliament 
to not postpone the issuing of CO2 emissions permits because of a faltering economy 
and high energy prices (Pielke, 2013). The following table provides a basic overview of 
the risks associated with choosing certain policies according to the state of the world. 
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Table 1: A risk/reward matrix for the outcomes of policy orientation according to the 
state of the world. 
 
State of the World 
 
Optimists Right Pessimists Right 
Optimistic Policy High Disaster 
Pessimistic Policy Moderate Tolerable 
 
If an optimistic policy option is selected and the optimists (brown economy) are right 
then rewards are high but if they are wrong then irreversible disaster. If a precautionary 
or pessimistic policy is chosen then optimistic (brown economic) gains are moderate 
and if wrong then the issues are tolerable and can be mitigated. This captures the 
essence of green economic policy in tackling issues such as climate change and bio 
diversity loss. 
Evidence therefore suggests that green policies can have negative spill overs.  For 
example stringent green policies in some advanced countries can result in industry 
moving to pollution havens in the developing world (UNEP, 2011b). Actors that know 
the future is difficult will make the most of the present, undermining efforts to reduce 
impacts and mitigate harmful changes to the biosphere (Bowen and Fankhauser, 
2011). The difficulties associated with rare earth mineral supply and Chinese control 
are an example of such manipulation and protective policies (Humphries, 2010).  
Strategies that are perceived as good or bad (depending on point of view) will reflect 
the economic objectives of most governments that are typically high economic growth, 
full employment of labour, natural and manmade resources, low inflation, and a positive 
balance of payments with a stable currency (Nellis and Parker, 2004). The UNEP 
(2011b), OECD (2011) and the EC (2010) argue that a green economy can deliver 
these objectives. Despite the technologies and mechanisms that will enable a green 
economy, governments currently lack the political will to drive it forward and choose 
instead to favour economic stimulus (Kennet and Heinemann, 2006; Happaerts, 2012; 
Schindler et al., 2011). A government will utilise a range of controlling or incentivising 
methods within an economy that promote desirable or suppress harmful activities that 
hinder the achievement of the mentioned objectives (Jackson, 2009).  
However, governments will typically intervene in market-based economies to ensure 
the rule of law and to address issues of equity (e.g. welfare support; education, health 
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care, inflation), and the failure of the market (e.g. natural monopolies) (Nellis and 
Parker, 2004). Victor and Jackson (2012) argue that an economy can only be labelled 
as green if both social and environmental issues are tackled collectively (Victor and 
Jackson, 2012). Kosoy et al (2012) and Csaba (2010) identify five steps to securing a 
green economy.  These are:  
1. Acknowledge that the economy exists for the purpose of human well-being 
steeped in the values set out by the Earth Charter (2000). 
2. Technology must be coupled with a reduction in demand and not as a driver to 
stimulate further consumption. 
3. Acknowledge that ecology, economy and society all operate within one inter-
dependent system. 
4. Measurement to assess levels of well-being must be consistent with the goals 
and values of the new economic system. 
5. Acknowledge and alter the perception that the economic status quo is the best 
means to proceed given the historical failures that have prevailed. 
Beyond the design and implementation of economic strategies, to effectively measure 
the success of the green economy and provide a basis for sound decision making at 
the macro-level, ecological economics provides a useful perspective (Kennet and 
Heinemann, 2006). This most constructive contribution in defining the green economy 
is the relationship between GDP (scale of economic growth) and impact per unit of 
GDP (also known as intensity). An economy where Impacts decreases 
disproportionately faster than GDP increases is considered to be “green” whereas 
impacts that decline slower than GDP increases are typical of the BAU economy 
(Victor, 2010).  
 
The green economy – How do we get there? 
Mathews (2011) suggests that the BAU, fossil-fuelled economy is already “greening” 
and that a green economy will be the default state by mid-century. Stern (2007) likens 
the transformation, or evolution to that of the industrial revolution or the free market 
liberalism and financial deregulation during the Regan and Thatcher years. This is an 
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expression of evolution, based on the idea that the economy is an innovation algorithm 
that is bound by differentiation, selection and amplification (Beinhocker, 2007). In some 
cases this is in stark contrast to the green economy literature, which views the green 
economy as a distinct alternative, rather than something that the BAU economy will 
evolve into (HM Government, 2011a). 
Based on the ideas of evolutionary economics, which is gaining traction in the 
economics literature, an economy is dynamic, active and always in a state of flux as 
determined by the environment, the actors, and their interactions (Beinhocker, 2007). 
Therefore, the economic and social environment is constantly changing either by 
design or through natural “mutation” (Dale, 2012). Acclaimed economist Thomas 
Malthus (1798) made reference of a more specific nature regarding population control 
where preventative checks should be implemented (design) or positive checks such as 
famine, war or plague will prevail. The preventative checks could be viewed as the 
implementation of the green economy and the positive checks are the result of 
continued BAU economic activity. Either way, the agents and factors within must 
respond to such changes or face the risk of failure at some related point (Jänicke, 
2008). Employment opportunities lost from polluting and resource intensive industries 
make way for more efficient and “greener” sectors (Mathews, 2011). This is the 
evolutionary theory in practice. Agents within the economy help set the conditions for 
which evolution occurs. 
Current definitions of the green economy fail to communicate the complex, 
interconnected and inter-dependant nature of all systems within the earth’s boundaries 
as the OECD (2011) conclude in their “towards green growth” report that the economy, 
environment and society can no longer, each be considered in isolation (Girouard, 
2010). This is because economic systems are non-linear with many interdependencies, 
spill over and feedback effects that must be organised and prioritised in any future 
system and decision making framework (Beinhocker, 2007).  
 
Ecological modernisation 
A key issue in the evolution of the BAU economy to a green economy is the 
designation of the limits of sustainable resource use and the establishment of robust 
objectives (Lannoo, 2010). For example, European governments have agreed specific 
targets for greenhouse gas emissions in 2050, which in turn has led to the 
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establishment of the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) (European Commission, 
2011). Hence European companies must adapt to these regulations (Mathews, 2011). 
Some research suggests this form of steering can result in positive impacts to core 
business operations and actually increase productivity (Porter and van der Linde, 
1995). However, it is also possible that the targets become politically unacceptable, 
and the whole process can be quickly undermined, as demonstrated by the recent 
refusal of the European Parliament to address the current over-supply of carbon 
emission permits (Pielke, 2013; Scott, 2013) 
This type of adaptive policy is known as “ecological modernisation” (EM) and is based 
on the Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995), where stringent 
environmental policy is thought to drive innovation and even provide economic benefits 
through gains in efficiency, increased productivity and access to new markets (Jänicke, 
2008). Ecological modernisation is viewed as a necessary function within a green 
economy but is widely regarded as being part of a range of policies required to achieve 
a green economy (Langhelle, 2000; Jänicke, 2008). EM is designed for commercial 
and localised issues, but is not designed to contend directly with social injustices and 
wider environmental issues.  Thus, EM fails to tackle issues such as global biodiversity 
loss or global warming that provide negligible commercial advantage (Langhelle, 2000).  
There is overwhelming consensual evidence of the global economies reliance on 
natural capital. Jackson (2009) highlights that the BAU economic model consists of 
circular flows of man-made and natural capital with the drive to increase productivity 
central to its core. This is in itself is a contradiction where the need to increase 
productivity harms the resource base (and ultimately GDP) upon which it depends. The 
financial sector among others is a key mediator within these flows (UNEP, 2011b). 
Therefore, implementing systems as a primary means of reallocating public and private 
finance away from environmentally damaging practices is essential. Mathews (2011) 
suggests a revised criterion for investments that includes both ‘credit’ and ‘eco’ 
worthiness, where positive and negative externalities are identified to determine the 
merit of an investment; highlighted by Green Bonds and Climate Bonds that give 
investors an ethical choice.  
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Discussion - a framework for a green economy 
From the systematic review it is clear that there exists an imbalance of knowledge that 
is conveyed from varying sources. The majority of green economy focused texts are 
non-economic and significant numbers are non-academic. The economy is certainly an 
issue of multiple disciplines but central to its core is Economics and research should 
reflect this. The work by UNEP and other non-academic sources is undoubtedly 
profound in theoretical terms but is ambiguous as to what constitutes a green economy 
relative to the BAU system. Therefore, at best this work offers a starting point for 
designing a green economy. 
There is also a lack of studies that have empirically investigated mechanisms for 
transitioning to a green economy. There are however a range of concepts that this 
study has proposed could be useful in this respect. For instance, circular economy and 
ecological modernisation are currently being adopted in a global patchwork of 
piecemeal ventures. For these models to work, they must fit the cultural, economic and 
natural characteristics of the adopting economy or region. For instance, China’s 
adoption of the circular economic strategy in its current five year plan fits well within 
their industrialisation strategy, cultural and social belief structure. Private ventures that 
are driven by ecological modernisation are also being undertaken. For example Apple 
is addressing their environmental impact across their business through solar farms that 
power data centres and supply chain adaptations that increase efficiency and utilisation 
of logistics (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2012). This increased efficiency has 
reduced their exposure to energy markets and raised productivity by reducing waste 
and therefore costs (smaller packaging).  As the main goal of economic activity is to 
raise living standards and enhance welfare then this patchwork of green activity needs 
to be expanded. 
Therefore, to sustain growth and living standards by maintaining enough material 
through-put, the green economy will re-circulate resources (re-use and recycle) within 
the supply chain.  In the longer run however the greatest challenge is to significantly 
reduce all throughputs by altering consumer and industry behaviour. This may be 
achieved by a move from products to services. For instance, Amazon and Google sell 
music, print and other forms of entertainment media digitally as a service, rather than a 
product. However, where products are made, the goal should be for them to be 
durable, premium products that can be reused and deconstructed easily and effectively 
for recycling.  
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To set the scene, the literature is largely suggestive that transitioning to a green 
economy requires significant government intervention, both in terms of setting stringent 
environmental policy, but also regulating financial markets so capital is allocated to 
those projects that deliver the most in terms of social, economic and environmental 
gain. This may require new institutions to be designed to achieve effective intervention. 
For example, the literature fails to convey the mechanics of a more equitable welfare 
system that reduces inequality and improves cohesion within society. Reform of the 
welfare economy would serve to establish and support this much needed cohesion. A 
mixture of benefiting society through an equitable health, education and welfare 
system, while demonstrating that tax payers receive a good return on their taxes is 
essential to the success of the green economy. 
If governments are to set in place the preventative checks that bring about evolutionary 
change towards a green economy then the conflict between these measures and 
existing market “forces” must be addressed. Contrary to what the UK government 
(2011a) have stated, it therefore seems unlikely that the green economy could be 
adapted as an entirely new system distinct from the BAU economy. History suggests 
that an economy evolves and the green economy is likely to be a possible future 
evolutionary step. This step will be based on the principles of mixed private and public 
ownership guided by government regulation, fiscal policy,  judicial public sector 
procurement that favours socially beneficial development and a strong emphasis on 
green finance.  
The evolution to a green economy may require a minimum level of GDP/capita, in the 
style of Kuznets curves. As Figure 2 represents the existence of the environmental 
“Kuznets Curve” at the macro level; some economies therefore currently have 
insufficient GDP/capita to decouple growth from natural capital and they should be 
afforded time to develop their economies. The eventual decoupling of consumption and 
natural resource depletion may be achieved through a knowledge based, or service 
economy supported by renewable sources of energy, closed loop supply chains, 
sustainable production of resources and more virtualised consumables and services. 
Traditional industries that are resource intensive, environmentally and socially harmful 
will either adapt to changes initiated by the market and governments or disappear.  
To propagate this new system, the flow of financial capital is essential in the 
development and progress of the concepts outlined within this review as it generates 
growth and incomes on the supply and demand side of an investment. Despite this 
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evidence, it remains to be seen whether these changes can be achieved through 
market forces alone. The growth in ethical investments and “green” indices such as the 
FTSE4Good are indicative of the desire to shape tomorrow’s world whilst providing the 
opportunity for economic gain. The literature on ethical and green index investment 
performance largely focuses on a period of unprecedented growth (1997-2008) with 
little to no evidence of performance during the recent recessionary period (2008-2013) 
and other periods of shock. Research has however shown that family run firms and 
firms that adopt the similar operative principles (Nestle) often outperform non-family 
run, performance focused firms due to an emphasis on resilience. Do green firms 
follow the same trend due to their inherent structure and outlook? Given that fund 
managers and investors alike are concerned with the resilient performance of their 
portfolios then the question remains how resilient are investments environmentally and 
socially screened like the FTSE4Good? 
The management and economics literature use resilience as a generic term and 
therefore fail to precisely convey the difference between the range of interactions and 
reactions to a shock or event, namely stability, resilience and resilience as individual 
concepts. The literature on “engineering” and “ecological” resilience does however 
provide this much needed distinction that can be applied to economics literature to 
determine the metrics of a firm’s resilience effectiveness. Therefore a firm’s ability is 
reflected in its value as this is primary reason for building resilience based strategies. 
The organisational examples provided (Apple, Amazon, Kenco) represent adaptability 
which is a key component of business resilience and is thought to be inherent to the 
green economy and green firms. Economic resilience encompasses all the theoretical 
concepts that derive from physics, ecology and engineering, depending on the context 
of the affected system. Firms sought to maintain a stable business that is resistant to 
shocks (engineering resilience) but also must be adaptable and able to take advantage 
of new operative domains (ecological resilience). Therefore “green” firms are thought to 
be resistant and resilient to economic shocks if they are able to operate within the limits 
of the environment whilst also maintaining effective output and growth. This drives the 
need for efficiency where outputs are achieved with diminishing material inputs 
decreasing exposure to natural resources and all events that effect their determination. 
The speed at which a firm reverts back to normal value and beyond could represent a 
significant measure of resilience.  It is also evident that industries that are perceived 
not to be “entirely green” can receive significant economic benefits by adopting green 
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strategies such as those outlined in the Kenco (2013) and Rainforest Alliance example 
(2013). 
Despite this the majority of research indicates that inclusion in green indices does not 
affect firm behaviour and that investors do no better or worse with or without these 
types of indices. That said if the resilient characteristics of family run firms determine 
performance during periods of economic difficulty this could point to significant risk, 
reward trait that might exist within green firms or firms that show high levels of ESG 
performance. 
All of the evidence that implies this benefit is theoretical with no empirical study to 
support this claim. Given that there are existing investment frameworks that support 
green investment then they are of limited benefit if the firms within are unable to 
operate effectively throughout economic shocks whilst delivering on green objectives. 
There is a lack of academic literature on the resilience of “green” firms despite the 
repeated indication that the green economy and complimenting firms are more resilient 
to shocks. All of the literature that focuses on UK sustainability indices for instance is 
based on accounting and the associations between profit and loss with little to no 
reference to external causality.  
Evidence also suggests that despite the theoretical attractiveness of the green sector 
there is still a significant gap in funding. This is due to the belief that more traditional 
stocks will generate better and less risky returns despite repeated discourse stating 
that socially responsible investments (SRI) offer the safest and most reliable place to 
invest but this has not been unequivocally proven.  
In light of this literature review and in concordance with the neo-classical definition, this 
study offers a new definition of a green economy and suggests metrics for measuring 
progress.  A green economy could be defined as: “the allocation of resources that 
enables effective production, distribution and consumption to best satisfy society but 
within limits that do not compromise the environment”.  For pragmatic purposes this 
definition is an elastic expression where the adopting economy can utilise a useful 
metric in determining the success of a green economy that fits within the context of 
their economic, social and environmental characteristics. For example, given that GDP 
plays such an important role in the measurement and subsequent motivation of an 
economy then, as the literature highlights the use of the scale and intensity approach 
appears to be the most appropriate measure of how successful a specific economy’s 
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green systems are operating at the macro level. Therefore, an economy whose issues 
centre on developing cleaner technologies in the supply of energy (low-carbon) would 
utilise a CO2 per unit of GDP as a measure of green success. The “effective” element 
of the definition hints at resistant and resilient abilities within the economy along with 
overall performance that is linked to social satisfaction. This must all be achieved within 
ecological limits, where the rate of use is equal to or below the rate of regeneration and 
assimilation. 
 
Conclusion 
The green economy marks the next possible evolutionary stage of the global economy, 
where the mechanisms outlined in this review could be adopted to raise living 
standards and enhance social well-being without compromising natural and social 
capital. The BAU economy is thought by some to be unsustainable in terms of its use 
of natural capital. Therefore focusing a designed evolution to a more sustainable 
system rather than reacting to external shocks could provide greater long run economic 
and social benefits. Given that finance is such a powerful tool in influencing behaviour 
that generates significant desirable returns then evidence of benefits from sustainable 
investments are essential if the green economy is to succeed. 
This literature review found that the habits of society and business in conforming to 
green initiatives without external pressure are the most challenging. Therefore, the 
green economy will evolve through the conditions created by central government and 
market pressures. As Thomas Malthus said, we can adopt the preventative checks now 
and continue to thrive or wait for the positive checks and risk everything.  
This study proposes that the green economy could be underpinned by frameworks 
embodied in the circular economy and ecological modernisation ideas that provide 
resilience for businesses and the wider economy but government strategies that foster 
socially desirable growth are significant. Markets are essential in defining the choices 
made by consumers that foster a green economy and therefore proof of benefits in the 
pursuit of green pathways is needed to support this path. The flow of capital is 
therefore a key requisite in the development of a green economy where investment 
choices are made recognising social, economic and environmental impacts and 
benefits rather than just financial gain. 
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10 Electronic appendices ( Accompanying DISC) 
IMPORTANT NOTE: See accompanying disc for the following restricted data (property 
of FTSE4good with access rights for Myles Donnelly only) 
Appendix C : Method testing (Folder) 
C.1 Accounting – Enterprise value, ROE, ROA  
C.2 CAPM – Sharpe, Traynor and Jenson ratios 
C.3 Event study – Market model and constant mean return 
C.4 Event study – Constant mean return model  
 
Appendix D : Excluded event examples (Folder) 
D.1 Japan earth quake index event study 
D.2 Horse meat scandal index event study  
D.3 Mumbai attacks index event study 
 
Appendix E : Index price data (daily stock prices) 
 
Appendix F : Firm price data (daily stock prices) 
 
Appendix G : Event study ranking & descriptive stats. 
 
Appendix H : Index event study results 
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Appendix I : FTSE4good ratings history 
 
Appendix J : ESG firm rating classification 
 
Appendix K : ESG firm code identification 
 
Appendix L : ESG event study results 
 
Appendix M : Sector event study results 
 
 
 
